Grannum v. Evangelidis
| Decision Date | 27 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:18-cv-40137-TSH |
| Parties | KEVIN ERIC GRANNUM, Plaintiff, v. LEWIS G. EVANGELIDIS, DAVID TUTTLE, CAPTAIN M. JACKSON, LIEUTENANT M. STONE, and LIEUTENANT M. FOLEY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Hennessy, M.J.
On August 13, 2018, Plaintiff Kevin Eric Grannum ("Plaintiff"), a pre-trial inmate presently housed at the Worcester County Jail and House of Correction ("WHC"), commenced the instant action, pro se, against Worcester County Sheriff Lewis G. Evangelidis ("Sheriff Evangelidis"), Superintendent David Tuttle ("Superintendent Tuttle"), Captain M. Jackson ("Captain Jackson"), Lieutenant M. Stone ("Lieutenant Stone"), and Lieutenant M. Foley ("Lieutenant Foley," and together with Sheriff Evangelidis, Superintendent Tuttle, Captain Jackson, and Lieutenant Stone, "Defendants"). The complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff's First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion. See generally dkt. no. 1 ("Complaint"). Specifically, the complaint alleges that Defendants, in their individual and official capacities, violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights by refusing to provide him a diet that comports with his religious beliefs. Id.; see also dkt. no. 28-1.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dkt. no. 28. Plaintiff has opposed the motion. See dkt. nos. 31, 32. In addition, Plaintiff has filed several motions to amend his complaint. See dkt. nos. 36, 37, 41. This Order issues pursuant to a referral from District Judge Timothy S. Hillman respecting the above motions (see dkt. no. 42), which are ripe for adjudication.
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) be granted in part and denied in part; that Plaintiff's January 2, 2019 motion to amend certain of the complaint's existing allegations, and to include additional allegations and legal theories (dkt. no. 36) be denied as moot; that Plaintiff's January 2, 2019 motion to add as a defendant Sergeant Richard Cavalieri (dkt. no. 37) be denied as withdrawn; and that Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to add as defendants Corrections Officer Hatch and Sergeant Warren and to include supplemental claims against them (dkt. no. 41) be granted.
Plaintiff has been incarcerated at WHC since July 2018. Complaint ¶ 3. On or about July 25, 2018, Plaintiff informed Lieutenant Stone that he is Muslim and required a Kosher diet.2 Id. ¶ 10. On July 30, 2018, Plaintiff executed and submitted a (i) Special Diet Request Form and (ii) Religious Sincerity Questionnaire. Dkt. no. 28-1, at pp. 1-2. On the former, he listed his religion as "Islamic," and expressed his dietary restriction as "Halal." Id. at 1. On the questionnaire, he listed his religion as "Muslim" and "Islamic," and provided brief answers to theremaining form questions. Id. at 2. The last question of the questionnaire inquired of Plaintiff's dietary restrictions. Id. Plaintiff responded "no pork products." Id.
Plaintiff's special diet request was denied by Lieutenant Stone3 on August 2, 2018. Id. at 1; Complaint ¶ 11. According to Plaintiff, the reason given was that WHC does not serve pork, so Plaintiff's claimed dietary restriction of "no pork products" does not conflict with the diet served the general population. Complaint ¶ 10; dkt. no. 28-1, at p. 2. Plaintiff sent a follow-up letter to Lieutenant Stone to contest the decision but received no response. Complaint ¶ 10. He then brought the matter to the attention of Lieutenant Foley, who suggested Plaintiff file a grievance. Id. Plaintiff also informed Lieutenant Captain Jackson of the matter, who responded, "All of a sudden you['re] a Muslim?" Id. Plaintiff thereafter submitted a grievance and wrote a letter to Superintendent Tuttle to contest the denial. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff did not receive a response from Superintendent Tuttle, and his grievance was denied.
Plaintiff commenced the instant action by filing a complaint in this Court on August 13, 2018. That same day, he filed a motion for a preliminary injunction ordering the Defendants to provide him a religious diet. Dkt. no. 4. On August 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed a proposed order to show cause for a temporary restraining order, which sought the same relief as requested in his motion for a preliminary injunction. Dkt. no. 8. On August 28, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff's proposed order to show cause. Dkt. no. 14. On September 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed a document styled "Amended Complaint," which included an additional claim against Defendants and additional prayers for relief. Dkt. no. 17. On or about November 6, 2018, Plaintiff began receiving meals comporting with his religion after Lieutenant Stone approved Plaintiff for aHalal diet. Dkt. no. 32-1, at p. 5. On December 11, 2018, Judge Hillman denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits and that he could not establish irreparable harm since his request for a religious diet had since been approved. Dkt. no. 34.
On November 8, 2018, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Dkt. no. 28. Plaintiff opposed the motion on November 26, 2018. Dkt. no. 32; see also dkt. no. 31 (supplemental opposition). On January 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed two motions to amend the complaint. The first motion duplicates a document Plaintiff filed on September 19, 2018, which sought to amend the complaint as a matter of course. Compare dkt. no. 17 (September 19, 2018 filing), with dkt. no. 36 (). The second motion filed on January 2, 2019 seeks to add as a defendant Sergeant Richard Cavaliere and to assert claims against him. Dkt. no. 37. On February 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed a third motion to amend his complaint, this time seeking to add as defendants Sergeant Warren and Officer Hatch and to assert claims against them. Dkt. no. 41. The February 13, 2019 motion also seeks to voluntarily dismiss any claims against Sergeant Cavaliere. See id.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). That is, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant hasacted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Indeed, plausible "means something more than merely possible, and gauging a pleaded situation's plausibility is a 'context-specific' job that compels [the Court] 'to draw on [its] judicial experience and common sense.'" Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Despite this generous standard, Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). The complaint must therefore "allege a factual predicate concrete enough to warrant further proceedings." DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Dismissal is appropriate if a plaintiff's well-pleaded facts do not "possess enough heft to show that [the] plaintiff is entitled to relief." Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 2008) (quotations and original alterations omitted).
The court "must assume the truth of all well-plead[ed] facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom." Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)). "Under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court may properly consider only facts and documents that are part of or incorporated into the complaint; if matters outside the pleadings are considered, the motion must be decided under the more stringent standards applicable to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment." Rivera v. Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008)). There liesan exception to this rule "for documents the authenticity of which [is] not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to [a plaintiff's] claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint." Rivera, 575 F.3d at 15 .
Notwithstanding the above, the Court must apply a liberal standard where, as here, the Plaintiffs' complaint was filed pro se. Sergentakis v. Channell, 272 F. Supp. 3d 221, 224 (D. Mass. 2017) (citing Gibbs v. SLM Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D. Mass. 2004)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint will "only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotation omitted).
While Defendants' motion to dismiss is based solely on a First Amendment theory, Plaintiff has also alleged4 (see dkt. no. 17) a violation of the Religious Land Use and...
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