Granoff Realty II Ltd. Partnership v. Rossi

• Decision Date: 29 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2002-344-Appeal.,2002-344-Appeal.
• Citation: 833 A.2d 354
• Parties: GRANOFF REALTY II LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. Thomas ROSSI, in his capacity as Tax Assessor for the City of Providence.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

833 A.2d 354

GRANOFF REALTY II LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. Thomas ROSSI, in his capacity as Tax Assessor for the City of Providence.

No. 2002-344-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

October 29, 2003.

Richard A. Licht, Thomas M. Robinson, Michael P. John, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Caroline Cole Cornwell, Providence, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., FLANDERS, GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and SUTTELL, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This is a commercial property owner's challenge to a municipal tax assessment. The plaintiff, Granoff Realty II Limited Partnership (Granoff), appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Thomas Rossi, in his capacity as tax assessor for the City of Providence (city). Because Granoff failed to file a signed and notarized account valuing the commercial real estate it owned in the city for the tax assessment in question (as of December 31, 1998), we hold that, under the circumstances of this case, it was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to remedy the city's alleged overassessment of its property.

At all times pertinent to this appeal, Granoff owned an office building known as the Turks Head Building, together with related real estate in the city's financial district. The property consisted of lots 121, 126, and 87 within plat 20. On June 5, 1997, Granoff purchased the property for $4.2 million from the Niles Company, Inc. For the tax assessment in question, the city tax assessor's office assessed plaintiffs property at $11,684,200. On June 30, 2000, Granoff filed a complaint in Superior Court pursuant to G.L.1956 § 44-5-26, seeking judicial review of the city's tax assessments of its city property for the tax year in question.¹ Eventually, the city moved for summary judgment, alleging that Granoffs account in this matter was inadequate because it had failed to sign or notarize the account, as required by § 44-5-16. Granoff opposed the motion, arguing that although it had not signed or notarized the account for the challenged tax assessment, it substantially complied with the requirements of § 44-5-16. Granoff also argued that the tax assessor's acceptance of the account constituted a waiver and that the tax assessor, therefore, was estopped from pleading that the account was incomplete because Granoff prejudicially relied upon the city's acceptance of the account. On appeal, it also suggests that, under the circumstances of this case, the law did not require it to file such an account because the city assessed its property at a value that exceeded the value at which the city assessed this same property in its last preceding assessment.

Relying on Van Alen v. Stein, 119 R.I. 347, 376 A.2d 1383 (1977), the motion justice concluded that the account that Granoff filed was not in compliance with § 44-5-16. She entered an order granting the city's motion on May 3, 2002, and entered a judgment in favor of the city on that same day. Granoff thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal. After a prebriefing conference, a single justice of this Court ordered the parties to show cause why we should not resolve this appeal summarily. Because they have not done so, we proceed to decide the appeal at this time.

In its appeal, Granoff argues, as it did below, that it substantially complied, in good faith, with the requirements of § 44-5-16. It suggests that the account it filed fulfilled the purpose and intent of § 44-5-16 because it placed the city on notice that Granoff objected to the assessment. Granoff also contends that it timely filed the account, which was identical to the signed and notarized account that it filed the previous year. Additionally, Granoff maintains, its failure to sign the account did not prejudice the city. In support of this contention, Granoff cites Bishop v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 47 R.I. 351, 133 A. 342 (1926), for the proposition that when innocent omissions are made in an account that the taxpayer filed in good faith, the court should allow the taxpayer to proceed with an action for relief from the assessment.

The facts of this case, however, are markedly different from those in Bishop. In Bishop, 47 R.I. at 352, 133 A. at 343, the taxpayer was ill and physically unable to appear before the assessors to swear that the account was a true and full valuation of her property. The Court held that the Legislature did not intend to require "that which is impossible to do." Id. at 356, 133 A. at 344. Here, Granoff does not suggest that it was impossible or even difficult for it to file the statutorily required account.² Thus, Bishop affords no solace to Granoff because the various obstacles to the taxpayer's filing of a proper account in that case are absent from this one.

Granoff also argues that Van Alen is not controlling, because it is factually distinguishable from this situation. Additionally, Granoff maintains that in Rock Ridge Ltd. v. Assessor of Taxes of Woonsocket, 667 A.2d 778, 779 (R.I.1995) (per curiam), this Court limited the holding in Van Alen when it stated, "[w]e shall take this opportunity to state that to hold that a court is deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction because a litigant fails to satisfy one of the conditions precedent to bringing an action is an incorrect statement of law. Cases so stating are no longer controlling." Granoff suggests that neither defendant nor the trial court were aware of this limitation on the Van Alen holding.

The city counters that the trial justice properly granted summary judgment. It contends that a taxpayer must comply with the dictates of § 44-5-16 as a prerequisite to challenging a tax assessment. Pursuant to this Court's holding in Van Alen, the city argues, the failure to submit an account under oath deprives a taxpayer of its remedy for an alleged overassessment because the taxpayer has improperly invoked the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court to provide such a remedy without first satisfying the statutory condition precedent of filing a signed and sworn account.

Section 44-5-16, which is entitled "Oath to account brought in — Remedies after failure to bring in account — Effect on proration — " sets forth certain requirements for filing an account and provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Every person bringing in any account shall make oath before some notary public or other person authorized to administer oaths in the place where the oath is administered that the account by that person exhibited contains, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, a true and full account and valuation of all the ratable estate owned or possessed by him or her; and whoever neglects or refuses to bring in the account, if overtaxed, shall have no remedy there — for, except as provided in §§ 44-4-14, 44-4-15, 44-5-26, 44-5-31, and 44-9-19, 44-9-24. In case a taxpayer is, because of illness or absence from the state, unable to make the required oath to his or her account within the time prescribed by law, the taxpayer may, in writing, appoint an agent to make oath to his or her account within the time prescribed by the assessors and the agent shall at the time of making the oath append his or her written appointment to the account, and for all purposes in connection with the account the taxpayer is deemed to have personally made the oath."

In this case, although Granoff filed an account, that account was neither signed nor notarized in accordance with § 44-5-16.

In Van Alen, 119 R.I. at 362,376 A.2d at 1391, which is factually similar to this case, the Court held that the taxpayers' failure to have the account notarized resulted in an inadequate account and, therefore, the taxpayers were "not entitled to judicial review of their claim of overassessment." In that case, the plaintiffs' attorney had filed, on their behalf, an account of their property in response to a 1972 tax assessment. Id. at 352, 376 A.2d at 1386. The plaintiffs, however, had not signed the account under oath nor did they include a written appointment authorizing an agent to make such an account, as § 44-5-16 requires. Van Alen, 119 R.I. at 361,376 A.2d at 1390. With respect to that particular assessment, "the trial justice ruled that since the account did not meet the statutory requirements for a sworn, true and accurate account of all ratable estate possessed by the taxpayer, petitioners were not entitled to relief." Id. at 353, 376 A.2d at 1386. On appeal, this Court noted that the account, in addition to not being notarized, also did not contain "a significant portion of their taxable property." Id. at 361, 376 A.2d at 1390. The plaintiffs argued that the omission of property was "insubstantial" and, therefore, the court should have deemed the account to be adequate. Id. at 361-62, 376 A.2d at 1390. This Court, however, held that — even accepting that the taxpayers' omission of certain property was inconsequential — the requirements contained in § 44-5-16 (that the taxpayer either notarize the account or file a written appointment authorizing an agent to make the account and oath) could not be ignored so easily. Id. at 361-62, 376 A.2d at 1390-91. The Court stated: "[N]othing in that section confers authority upon the judiciary to ignore the statutory requirement that the list be accompanied by either a personal oath or a written appointment." Id. at 362, 376 A.2d at 1391.

Moreover, contrary to plaintiff's assertion, this Court in Rock Ridge did not limit its previous holding in Van Alen. Rather, in Rock Ridge, 667 A.2d at 779, we noted that the trial court misstated the law in holding that it "had `no jurisdiction' to hear the matter on the basis of petitioner's failure to file an amended account." Rather, pursuant to the statute, the Superior Court would always retain subject-matter jurisdiction to hear tax-abatement claims. Id. But, "[t]here is a critical distinction between the complete absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the refusal to exercise that jurisdiction...