Grant County Service Bureau, Inc. v. Treweek

• Decision Date: 02 April 1963
• Citation: 19 Wis.2d 548,120 N.W.2d 634
• Parties: GRANT COUNTY SERVICE BUREAU, INC., Appellant, v. W. L. TREWEEK, Garnishee-Defendant, Respondent, Arthur J. Kendall, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 634

120 N.W.2d 634

19 Wis.2d 548

GRANT COUNTY SERVICE BUREAU, INC., Appellant, v. W. L. TREWEEK, Garnishee-Defendant, Respondent Arthur J. Kendall, Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

April 2, 1963.

Dissenting Opinion Filed April 2, 1963.

Knudson, Morrow & Pope, Dodgeville, for appellant.

James P. Fiedler, Mineral Point, for respondent garnishee defendant.

HALLOWS, Justice.

This case raises the interesting question of whether a person may prepay his funeral and have such arrangement immune from attack by his creditors. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings. The argument is grounded on the theory the prepaid funeral arrangement for the benefit of Kendall created a trust revocable by Kendall as alleged in the answer and therefore constituted a void transfer under sec. 241.01, Stats., 28 W.S.A. p. 79. We pass over the question which is not raised whether, if this arrangement is void under that section, it may be so adjudicated and the property reached by the garnishment process. See First Nat. Bank of Stevens Point v. Knowles (1886), 67 Wis. 373, 28 N.W. 225, and Dahlman v. Greenwood (1898), 99 Wis. 163, 74 N.W. 215, reaching such result under an earlier garnishment statute expressly creating a garnishee's liability under a void conveyance. As far as material in this case, sec. 241.01 provides all transfers or assignments of things in action made in trust for the use of the person making the transfer are void against existing or subsequent creditors of such person. It might be argued the use of a trust res contemplated by this section means use by the grantor during his lifetime and whatever benefit one might receive from being buried in the manner in which he desired and prepaid is not such a use. It is plain sec. 241.01 expresses a public policy that a debtor must pay his creditors and cannot use the trust device to enjoy his worldly possessions at their expense.

The trial court made no mention of sec. 156.125, Stats., 21 W.S.A. p. 175, which was first enacted by c. 291, Laws of 1953. This section as amended in 1955 (Laws of 1955, c. 80, secs. 1 and 2) provides any payments made under a prearranged funeral plan shall be and remain trust funds including the interest thereon until the death of the person whose funeral is so provided for or the funds are sooner released upon the demand of the person making the payments after written notice to the funeral director. Provision is also made for the deposit of funds in the bank or trust company or invested in a savings and loan association to be held in a separate account in the name of the person making the payments under the contract. Regardless of the somewhat misleading and confusing language of the statute, it is apparent the intent of the legislature was to secure the performance of the funeral services and burial contracted for by creating a trust of the payments made. Funeral directors before performing the contract might go out of business, die, or be unable to perform the contract for other reasons. The enactment of the legislature recognizes the validity of prearranged and prepaid funerals and the public interest in securing the performance of such arrangements.

Assuming a prepaid funeral arrangement by an insolvent debtor for his own burial is the type of transaction contemplated by sec. 241.01, Stats., it would seem sec. 156.125, Stats., validates such arrangements on the grounds of public policy. Sec. 241.01 is a general statute voiding all gifts, transfers and assignments in trust for the use of the person making them as against his creditors, while sec. 156.125 is a more recent and specific statute dealing with part of the same general subject matter. The two statutes must be construed together and harmonized. Under the well-recognized standards of statutory construction, the more recent specific statute controls and exists as an exception to the general statute. Some cases state the general statute cannot be construed to embrace the subject matter of the special statute. Pruitt v. State (1962), 16 Wis.2d 169, 114 N.W.2d 148; Green County v. City of Monroe (1958) 3 Wis.2d 196, 202, 87 N.W.2d 827; Maier v. Racine County (1957), 1 Wis.2d 384, 84 N.W.2d 76; In re Estate of Kirsh (1955), 269 Wis. 32, 68 N.W.2d 455, 69 N.W.2d 495; Boyle v. Larzelere (1944), 245 Wis. 152, 13 N.W.2d 528. While we differ with the trial court on the reasons assigned, we find no error in denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The plaintiff argues the trial court committed error as a matter of law in granting judgment dismissing the complaint. Both parties agree the prepaid funeral arrangement constituted a trust under sec. 156.125, Stats. True, the certificates of deposit were not invested as directed by sec. 156.125(2), Stats., and were held in the name of the defendant rather than invested in an account in the name of Kendall. Regardless of how the payments under the contract are invested, the section makes such payments trust funds and we impress the trust upon the certificates of deposit held by the defendant and apply the statute to the defendant as trustee. The statute contemplates no passive trust as claimed by the plaintiff but an active one.

The trial court erroneously found 'the property covered by this contract is a coffin and other articles for burial' and was exempt under sec. 272.18(20), Stats., 33 W.S.A. p. 532. This section applies to cemetery lots, tombstones, monuments, coffins and other articles of burial. We point out that sec. 156.125, Stats., applies to cemeteries as well as to funeral directors. One might make a prepaid agreement with the cemetery for the delivery of specific personal property such as a tombstone, vault, perhaps a coffin, and to furnish services for a burial. Such personal property independently of sec. 156.125 would be exempt under sec. 272.18(20). The testimony in this case showed no particular personal property such as a coffin or a monument or tombstone was agreed upon between Kendall and the defendant. The true nature of this agreement was the purchase of a complete funeral as a unit including the performance of the services of a funeral director and the furnishing of such personal property as was necessary for the burial of Kendall in Graceland Cemetery. We hold sec. 272.18(20) has no application to this contract. However, this section does evince a public policy to allow a person to prepare to some extent for his burial free from the claims of his creditors.

The plaintiff's recovery must depend upon the scope and the effective function of the garnishment process. To reach the certificates of deposit, Kendall's right to recover them from the funeral director must be absolute and not contingent at the time the garnishment process is served. Secs. 267.17 and 267.18(4), Stats. Vollmer v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. (1893), 86 Wis. 305, 56 N.W. 919; Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co. (1894), 89 Wis. 96, 61 N.W. 76; Edwards v. Roepke (1889), 74 Wis. 571, 43 N.W. 554; Lehmann v. Farwell (1897), 95 Wis. 185, 70 N.W. 170, 37 L.R.A. 333. The liability of the defendant as garnishee under sec. 267.17 is for property in his possession or control belonging to Kendall or in which he is interested to the extent of his right or interest therein and for all the defendant's debts due or to become due to Kendall with exceptions not material here. Under sec. 267.18 the garnishee is not liable by reason of anything owing by him upon a contingency. See Anno., 134 A.L.R. 853 and 1950 Wisconsin Law Review 553.

A garnishee is generally liable to the creditor to the same extent as he is liable to suit by the principal debtor in respect to property in his possession with several exceptions, one of which is a garnishee may be chargeable where no demand is made although the principal debtor could not maintain an action without proof of a prior demand. 4 Am.Jur., Attachment & Garnishment, p. 637, sec. 134. This exception to the rule is followed in Steer v. Dow (1908), 75 N.H. 95, 71 A. 217, 20 L.R.A.,N.S., 263 and Godfrey Coal Co. v. Gray (1936), 296 Mass. 323, 5 N.E.2d 556. A contrary result was reached in Morphet v. Morphet (1958), 19 Ill.App.2d 304, 152 N.E.2d 492. In the Morphet Case the principal debtor had an option of making a written election to receive the present cash value of an annuity or to receive periodic payments. The option was not exercised at the time the insurance company was garnisheed. In Vollmer v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., supra, the garnishee's obligation was held contingent because conditioned upon the exercise of an option by employees to be paid directly by the garnishee. In Lehmann v. Farwell, supra, the obligation to pay the amount due on a verdict was contingent because the judgment thereon had not been entered.

Under sec. 156.125, Stats., Kendall had a right to demand the release of the funds from the trustee after written notice to the funeral director. This in effect would be either terminating the trust or revoking it by the grantor. Since Kendall is in fact the grantor and also the beneficiary of the trust, he has in effect an option to receive either the funeral upon his death or the return of the money in his lifetime. The precise question is whether the nonexercise of such option to receive the return of the money is a...