Grant-Davis v. Wilson

Decision Date15 July 2021
Docket NumberCivil Action 2:19-cv-0392-DCN-TER
PartiesKING GRANT-DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL ALAN WILSON, MARK KEEL, Chief of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, WILLIAM BARR, United States Attorney General, BENJAMIN CARSON, United States Secretary of Department of Housing and Urban Development, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff who is proceeding pro se, brings this action to challenge the constitutionality facially and as applied to him of South Carolina's Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA), S.C.Code Ann. § 23-3-400, et seq., the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C § 20901, et seq., and numerous other federal statutes. Presently before the court are Defendants Mark Keel and Alan Wilson's (the State Defendants) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 140), Defendants William Barr and Benjamin Carson's (the Federal Defendants) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 136), and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 152). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendants' motions could result in dismissal of his case. Plaintiff timely filed a Response (ECF No. 149) to the Federal Defendants' motion. He did not file a response to the State Defendants' motion. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(g), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed this action on February 11, 2019. Following Defendants' first Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint and submitted a proposed amended complaint. Plaintiff's motion was granted and the Amended Complaint was filed. Defendants then filed Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff also filed numerous documents entitled “Notice of Joinder” in which he presented additional factual allegations and claims. In his responses to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff discussed his “joindered claims” and argued that Defendants had not responded to those claims and, thus, waived any defenses to such claims.

In a Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 100) on the Motions to Dismiss, the undersigned noted that the factual allegations and claims set forth in the numerous Notices of Joinder were not properly before the court because they were not included in his Amended Complaint. The undersigned further noted in a footnote that even if Plaintiff were to amend his Amended Complaint to add those allegations and claims, the amendment would be futile. Upon review of the Report and Recommendation and Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, the District Judge in his discretion allowed Plaintiff to amend his Amended Complaint and denied the Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint as moot. The Court directed Plaintiff “to include all claims he wishes the court to consider in his second amended complaint, including any claims alleged in his ‘Notice of Joinder' or other filings. The court will not consider any of [Plaintiff's] claims outside of the Second Amended Complaint.” Order p. 6 (ECF No. 126).

Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint and Defendants filed the present Motions to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.

III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

In January of 1971, Plaintiff was arrested in Manhattan, New York on a charge of rape of a teenage girl. Sec. Am. Compl. p. 7 (ECF No. 134). Plaintiff entered a guilty plea. Sec. Am. Compl. p. 8. In January of 1978, Plaintiff was released on parole. Sec. Am. Compl. p. 8. In February of 1978, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with “sodomy of a teenage youth.” Sec. Am. Compl. p. 8. A jury reached a verdict of guilty following a four day trial in July of 1978. Sec. Am. Compl. p. 8. Plaintiff was sentenced to 12 to 25 years in state prison, and was eligible for parole in 1985. Sec. Am. Compl. p. 8. Plaintiff appeared before the parole board in 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993. Each time, the parole board denied parole upon finding that Plaintiff was a risk to re-offend if released. Sec. Am. Compl. p. 8. Plaintiff's sentence was set to expire in June of 2003. Sec. Am. Compl. p. 8.

In April of 2000, the state board of examiners of sex offenders made a recommendation to the sentencing court that Plaintiff be assigned a “Risk Level 3 and designated a predicate sex offender.” Sec. Am. Compl. p. 9. Following a hearing, the sentencing court accepted the recommendation. Sec. Am. Compl. p. 9. An appeal was made, and the decision was reversed and remanded to the trial court in either 2000 or 2002. Sec. Am. Compl. p. 9. Following two hearings, the court reached the same determination as the original. Sec. Am. Compl. pp. 9-10.

In July of 2000, Plaintiff was released to parole supervision “after he earned condition release by the accumulation of ‘good time.' Sec. Am. Compl. pp. 8-9. When Plaintiff moved from New York to South Carolina in May of 2005, he was required to comply with the sex offender registration requirements of this state. Sec. Am. Compl. p. 11. In January of 2017, Plaintiff applied for tenantbased or project-based housing assistance, but City of Charleston Housing Authority officials denied his applications pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 13663, which directs “an owner of federally assisted housing to prohibit admission to such housing for any household that includes any individual who is subject to a lifetime registration requirement under a State sex offender registration program.” Sec. Am. Compl. p. 13; 42 U.S.C. § 13663(a).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion examines whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Expounding on its decision in Twombly, the United States Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:

[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations, ” but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s] devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 570) (citations omitted); see also Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003). The court may consider documents attached to a complaint or motion to dismiss “so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir.2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n. 1 (4th Cir.2006)).

V. DISCUSSION
A. Statutes Challenged by Plaintiff

Plaintiff mentions numerous statutes in his Second Amended Complaint: the Jacob Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071, et seq.; South Carolina's Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA), S.C.Code Ann. § 23-3-400, et seq.; the Adam Walsh Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4248; the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq.; the International Megan's Law, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(b); and 42 U.S.C. § 13663. A brief introduction to the statutes at issue is helpful to the analysis of Plaintiff's claims.

In 1994, Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 et seq., which encouraged States to create facilities for the registration of sex offenders and for notification to law enforcement officers of registration data. As a result of the Jacob Wetterling Act, all States and the District of Columbia established sex-offender registration programs, although different in nature and scope. In addition, through subsequent amendments to the Jacob Wetterling Act, Congress also established a national database at the FBI. See 42 U.S.C. § 14072.

United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 473 (4th Cir. 2009).

In 1994, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted the SORA. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-400 to -555 (2007 & Supp. 2017). Subsection 23-3-430(A) (2007) provides, “Any person, regardless of age, residing in the State of South Carolina ... who has been convicted adjudicated delinquent, pled guilty or nolo contendere, or found not guilty by reason of insanity in any comparable court in the United States ... to an offense described below, ... shall be required to register” as a sex offender. Subsection 23-3-430 includes criminal sexual conduct in all degrees as an offense requiring registration. “A person required to register pursuant to this article is required to register biannually for life.” § 23-3-460(A) (Supp. 2017). “A person classified as a Tier III offender . . .is required to register every ninety...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT