Grant v. Bank of Am., N.A.
| Decision Date | 02 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:19-CV-2737 PLC |
| Parties | C. EARL GRANT, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Bank of America, N.A.'s motion to dismiss Plaintiff C. Earl Grant's second amended petition pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 11] Plaintiff opposes the motion. [ECF No. 14] For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is granted.
The facts, as alleged in Plaintiff's second amended petition, are as follows: Plaintiff owned residential property at 2653 Bruno Avenue ("the property") in St. Louis, Missouri. [ECF No. 7 at ¶ 1] Defendant was "the servicer, bailiff and receiver of Plaintiff's mortgage funds on" the property, and Plaintiff "relied upon [Defendant] to accurately account, assess, calculate and service his mortgage for the payment of real estate taxes." [Id. at ¶ 3]
Since August 2004, Plaintiff made his monthly mortgage payments, which included payment towards real estate property taxes, to Defendant. [Id. at ¶ 4] Defendant, in turn, escrowed and paid Plaintiff's annual real estate taxes for the property to the St. Louis County Collector of Revenue. [Id.] Plaintiff alleged that, from 2003 through 2016, Defendant "has negligently failed or refused to properly pay the correct amount of real estate property taxes owed by Plaintiff to the St. Louis Collector of Revenue with the result that Plaintiff has been overcharged in an amount in excess of $10,000." [Id. at ¶ 6] Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant published inaccurate credit reports reflecting "late and insufficient mortgage payments," as a result of which, he "has been unable to obtain credit, and Plaintiff has suffered damage to his reputation in the community." [Id. at ¶¶14-15]
In December 2018, Plaintiff filed a petition in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County against Defendant and St. Louis County ("the County") seeking an accounting and damages. [ECF No. 1-1 at 5-8] Defendant and the County each moved to dismiss. [Id. at 19, 34-44] After a hearing, the court granted the County's motion and granted Plaintiff leave to amend the petition. [Id. at 45]
Plaintiff filed a first amended petition against Defendant in April 2019 alleging actions for an accounting, conversion, and punitive damages. [Id. at 46-49] Defendant moved to dismiss the first amended petition for failure to state a cause of action, and the court granted the motion in part without explanation, dismissing Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages and declining to dismiss his claims for an accounting and conversion. [Id. at 50-57, 74]
In October 2019, Plaintiff filed his second amended petition for an accounting (Count I) and defamation of credit (Count II).1 [Id. at 91-94] Defendant removed the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on the ground that the second amended petition "involves a federal question 28 U.S.C. § 1331, in that the defamation of credit claim should be brought pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.," the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). [ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10] Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's second amended petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 11] More specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for: (1) an accounting in Count I because "he cannot allege a fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff" and Defendant; and (2) defamation of credit in Count II because he did not allege either violations of the FCRA or that "the reporting was ever disputed to [Defendant] or the credit reporting agencies." [Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6] In response, Plaintiff contends that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Defendant's motion to dismiss the accounting claim. [ECF No. 14] As to Defendant's defamation claim, Plaintiff states: "In the event the Court deems Plaintiff's claim for defamation of credit to be deficient, Plaintiff requests leave to amend." [Id.]
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint, but it need not accept legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim satisfies the plausibility standard "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Defendant moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for an accounting because Plaintiff "cannot allege all four elements required for this cause of action." [ECF No. 12 at 2] Inparticular, Defendant challenges Plaintiff's allegations that there existed a fiduciary relationship between the parties. Plaintiff does not address Defendant's arguments. Instead, Plaintiff contends that, because Defendant previously moved the state court to dismiss the accounting claim presented in Plaintiff's first amended petition, "Defendant is barred by collateral estoppel from re-opening this decision to re-litigate the facts by an ersatz appeal of the state court ruling."2 [ECF No. 14 at ¶ 2]
As a preliminary matter, the Court considers whether collateral estoppel precludes the Court from considering Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) argument. Plaintiff maintains collateral estoppel bars Defendant from moving to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for an accounting in the second amended petition because Defendant raised, and the state court rejected, the same argument in relation to Plaintiff's first amended petition.
"Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of an issue already decided in a different cause of action."3 Ideker v. PPG Indus., Inc., 788 F.3d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Derleth v. Derleth, 432 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo. App. 2014)). In determining whether collateral estoppel applies, a court considers the following four factors:
(1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit.
Id. (quotation omitted). See also James v. Paul, 49 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Mo. banc 2001). Importantly, for collateral estoppel to apply "a final judgment on the merits must have been rendered involving the same claim or issue sought to be precluded in the cause in question." Jeffrey v. Cathers, 104 S.W.3d 424, 430 (Mo. App. 2003).
"A final judgment is one that resolves 'all issues in a case, leaving nothing for future determination.'" Universal Credit Acceptance, Inc. v. Ware, 556 S.W.3d 69, 74 (Mo. App. 2018) (). "[T]he denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order and not a judgment on the merits." McMahon v. Geldersman, 217 S.W.3d 700, 795 (Mo. App. 2010) (citing Stevenson v. City of St. Louis Sch. Dist., 820 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Mo. App. 1991)). See also Murr Plumbing, Inc. v. Scherer Bros. Fin. Servs. Co., 48 F.3d 1066, 1070 (8th Cir. 1995); Sentinel Ins. Cov. v. Haines, 2008 WL 4247788, at *2 (W.D. Mo. 2008) (). The Court therefore finds that collateral estoppel does not preclude consideration of Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's action for an accounting.4
Defendant urges the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Count I pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for an accounting. To establish a right to an accounting under Missouri law, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the need for discovery; (2) thecomplicated nature of the accounts; (3) the existence of a fiduciary or trust relationship; and (4) the inadequacy of legal remedies. Tobias v. Korman, 141 S.W.3d 468, 575 (Mo. App. 2004). See also Camden Cty. ex rel. Camden Cty. Comm'n v. Lake of the Ozarks Council of Local Gov'ts, 282 S.W.3d 850, 861 (Mo. App. 2009). "Of these [four elements], the existence of a fiduciary relationship is the most critical element to support the exercise of equitable jurisdiction." Id. See also Am. Button Co. v. Weishaar, 170 S.W.2d 147, 152 (Mo. App. 1943).
In regard to the first element, the need for discovery, Plaintiff alleged in the second amended petition that he could not "adequately determine the exact amounts not properly credited for payment of real estate property taxes without the Defendant Bank providing a complete accounting of all sums received from Plaintiff for real estate taxes measured against the real estate tax records for Plaintiff's property...." [ECF No. 7 at ¶ 8] Plaintiff did not plead that the account was complicated. As to the third element, the existence of a fiduciary relationship, Plaintiff stated that Defendant "by virtue of its function and obligation was in a fiduciary relationship to Plaintiff[.]" [Id. at ¶ 7] Plaintiff further alleged that a fiduciary relationship existed because "Plaintiff has entrusted to Defendant the authority to act as a custodian, bailiff and receiver on behalf of Plaintiff for the task of properly" servicing his mortgage, escrowing funds for real estate taxes, and paying those real estate taxes. [Id.] Finally, Plaintiff averred without explanation: "Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law." [Id. at ¶ 10]
Defendant argues that Plaintif...
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