Grant v. CPC Logistics, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-00200-L |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
| Parties | LEROY DONNIE GRANT, Plaintiff, v. CPC LOGISTICS, INC., and CPC BUILDING & MANUFACTURING PRODUCTS, Defendants. |
Before the court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 41), filed June 17, 2013; Plaintiff's Motion to Answer Defendants' Summary Judgment (Doc. 43), filed June 28, 2013; and Defendants' Reply to Grant's Response to Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 49), filed July 15, 2013. After careful consideration of the motions, responses, replies, record, and applicable law, the court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and overrules and denies as moot Defendants' Objection to and Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence.
Leroy Donnie Grant ("Grant" or "Plaintiff") filed his complaint against Defendants CPC Logistics, Inc. and CPC Building & Manufacturing Products (collectively, "Defendants") on January 19, 2012. Plaintiff then filed his First Amended Complaint against Defendants on August 10, 2012, seeking to recover damages for race and color discrimination under Title VII, the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on August 31, 2011. Pl.'s Am.Compl. ("Compl.") ¶ 5. The EEOC issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter on December 1, 2011. Id. ¶ 17.
Plaintiff argues that his termination was wrongful. Id. ¶ 5. He states that he is one of the few black truck drivers employed by Defendants. Id. ¶ 6. He contends that on August 26, 2011, he was terminated for an alleged logbook violation that occurred on August 13, 2011. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff argues that Defendants' reasons for terminating him were a pretext to terminate him because he is black. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff contends that there are other similarly-situated white drivers employed by Defendants who have received numerous tickets for log violations and other violations within the last year but have not been terminated. Id. ¶ 14. During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that John Fitzgerald ("Fitzgerald"), his supervisor, referred to him as "boy" two or three times, in addition to "nigger," during his employment.1 App. to Br. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s App.") at 44. Finally, in his response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff contends that Defendants "wanted to get rid of him / or fire him after he reported wrongdoing of CPC Logistics Inc. Driver Eddie Ice employee was also assigned to the Crosby Group Inc., for going to the sex club while on duty." Pl.'s Mot. to Answer Defs. Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Resp.") 6.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff was not qualified for his position due to logbook and speeding violations. Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Their Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Br.") 10-11. Defendants argue that his disqualification led to his termination. Id. Additionally, Defendants maintain that no similarly-situated employee was treated more favorably than Plaintiff. Id. at 12.Finally, Defendants deny the allegation that Fitzgerald made any discriminatory or racial comments towards Plaintiff. Id. at 12-13.
Summary judgment shall be granted when the record shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, a court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the other hand, "if the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, either because he is the plaintiff or as a defendant he is asserting an affirmative defense, he must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor." Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). "[When] the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of factto find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine [dispute] for trial.'" Id. (citation omitted). Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994).
The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim. Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues that are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Plaintiff's employment by Defendants began on April 11, 2006. CPC Logistics, Inc. ("CPC"), the employer, is a transportation logistics company that provides drivers and driver services to private transportation carriers. William Mike Williams and Eddie Ice were also employees of CPC. Plaintiff was assigned to drive for the Crosby Group, one of CPC's clients. Fitzgerald, aregional manager for CPC, was the manager and supervisor of the Crosby Group account starting in August 2010. Plaintiff was terminated by Defendants on August 26, 2011.
The United States Department of Transportation ("USDOT") and CPC policies require drivers to complete accurate daily logs charting their duty status. CPC's Uniform Rules and Regulations require drivers to log their time accurately and comply with state speed limits. Compliance with CPC policy is a condition of a driver's employment, and drivers can be subject to discharge on the first offense for violations of the CPC logging policy or for speeding.
When reviewing the logbooks and calculating a driver's speed, Fitzgerald, Plaintiff's supervisor, first determined a route's distance in miles by using GPS. He then divided the route's distance by the time it took to drive as entered into the logbook. Then, Fitzgerald added the total miles driven to get the average speed on all routes throughout the day.
Plaintiff admits that he used "poor judgment" when he logged his time and also states that his logs could have reasonably given Fitzgerald the impression that he was either speeding or violating CPC's policies. App. at 63-64; 66-67. Plaintiff also states that the time record in the logbook uses a rounding system, which rounds to fifteen-minute intervals, and that he "erroneously rounded his time down." Pl.'s Resp. 10.
Plaintiff bases his claims on Title VII, the TCHRA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. When all three of these causes of actions have been asserted, the analysis for each is the same and may be done pursuant to Title VII. "Because one of the purposes of the TCHRA is to 'provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' we have consistently held that those analogous federal statutes and the cases interpreting them guide our reading of the TCHRA." Reedv. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 439 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 633-34 (Tex. 2012) (footnotes and internal citations omitted)). Additionally, when analyzing a claim for discrimination under both Title VII and § 1981, the analysis under both statutes is identical. Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp. L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Raggs v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 468 (5th Cir. 2002)). The only substantive differences between the two statutes are their respective statutes of limitations and the requirement under Title VII that the employee exhaust administrative remedies. Id. (citing Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 351 (5th Cir. 2001)). Neither of those differences is relevant here. Therefore, since these three statutory bases are functionally identical for the purposes of Plaintiff's claims, it would be redundant to analyze separately the merits of the claim under each statute....
To continue reading
Request your trial