Grant v. Delco Oil, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | 6:98-CV-1317-Orl-28C.,No. 6:98-CV-1316-Orl-28C,6:98-CV-1316-Orl-28C |
| Parties | Charles E. GRANT, Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Robert E. Wolfe, Jr. and Nettie K. Wolfe, Plaintiff, v. DELCO OIL, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
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Frank Alexander Ford, Jr., Landis, Graham, French, Husfeld, Sherman & Ford, P.A., Deland, FL, Kevin E. Hooks, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Arthur Randell Brown, Jr., Alfred Truesdell, Brown, Ward, Salzman & Weiss, P.A., Orlando, FL, Garen E. Dodge, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Washington, D.C., for defendant.
James R. Tanner, Tanner Law Firm, P.A., New Smyrna Beach, FL, Catherine Anne Kyres, Catherine A. Kyres, P.A., Tampa, FL, for plaintiffs.
This cause is before the Court on the Motion To Add Bankruptcy Trustee as Party Plaintiff (Doc. 45 in Case No. 98-cv-1316, filed June 30, 2000) and Defendant Delco Oil's Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 31 in Case No. 98-cv-1316, filed May 31, 2000).
The United States Magistrate Judge has submitted a Report and Recommendation (Doc. 64, filed August 22, 2000) recommending that both Motions be granted in part and denied in part. No objections to the Report and Recommendation have been filed.
After an independent review of the record in this matter and noting that no objections were timely filed, the Court agrees with the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Report and Recommendation. Therefore, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 64, filed August 22, 2000) is ADOPTED and CONFIRMED and made part of this Order.
2. The Motion To Add Bankruptcy Trustee as Party Plaintiff (Doc. 45 in Case No. 98-cv-1316, filed June 30, 2000) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Charles E. Grant, Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Robert E. Wolfe, Jr. and Nettie K. Wolfe, is hereby substituted as the sole Plaintiff in Case Number 98-cv-1316. The caption of this action is hereby AMENDED in part to read, "Charles E. Grant, Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Robert E. Wolfe, Jr. and Nettie K. Wolfe, Plaintiff" instead of "Nettie Wolfe, Plaintiff." All future filings in this matter shall be styled with Grant as the Plaintiff.
3. Defendant Delco Oil's Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. 31 in Case No. 98-cv-1316, filed May 31, 2000) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion (Doc. 31) is DENIED with respect to the claims of sexual harassment and retaliation and is GRANTED as to the claim under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act.
CHARLES E. GRANT, Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Robert E. Wolfe, Jr. and Nettie K. Wolfe, Plaintiff,
v.
DELCO OIL, INC., Defendant.
This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motions:
MOTION: MOTION TO ADD BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE AS
PARTY PLAINTIFF Docket No. 45
FILED: June 30, 2000
RECOMMENDATION: GRANTED in part and DENIED in part
MOTION: DEFENDANT DELCO OIL, INC.'s MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT Docket No. 31
FILED: May 31, 2000
RECOMMENDATION: DENIED with respect to Trustee's Title VII claims of
sexual harassment and retaliation, and
GRANTED in favor of defendant as to the plaintiff's
claim under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act
29 U.S.C.§ 2001
I. BACKGROUND
On April 1, 1997, Nettie K. Wolfe resigned from her employment with defendant Delco Oil, Inc. ("Delco"). One week later, on April 8, 1997, Robert E. Wolfe, Jr. and Nettie Wolfe filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. On December 23, 1997, while her bankruptcy proceeding was still pending, Nettie Wolfe filed her Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Office Commissioner ("EEOC").
Approximately, one year later, on November 25, 1998, Nettie Wolfe filed this present action against Delco for relief from alleged sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and for Delco's alleged deprivation of Wolfe's rights under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, (EPPA), 29 U.S.C. § 2005(c). The Wolfes' bankruptcy estate was closed by order dated February 25, 1999, which was filed on March 1, 1999. (See Doc. No. 33, Exhibit O). Upon becoming aware of the instant action, on June 21, 2000, the bankruptcy court reopened the Wolfes' bankruptcy estate. (See Doc. No. 45). On June 26, 2000, the bankruptcy court appointed Catherine A. Kyres — Nettie Wolfe's attorney in this civil action — to serve as counsel on behalf of the estate. (See Doc. No. 45). Charles E. Grant is the duly appointed Chapter 7 Trustee in the bankruptcy of the Robert and Nettie Wolfe. (Doc. No. 45).
On May 31, 2000, Delco filed a motion for summary judgment Doc. No. 31, which was opposed by plaintiff Doc. No. 36. On June 30, 2000, plaintiff filed a motion to add bankruptcy trustee Charles W. Grant as party plaintiff in this case.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Trustee, the record reflects the following. Wolfe worked for Delco as an assistant store manager from November 1996 through April 1997. Elizabeth Rowe was the store manager and Wolfe's immediate supervisor. One of Delcos' supervisors, Donnie Meyer, repeatedly subjected Wolfe and Rowe to extreme sexual harassment. (Doc. No. 43 at 28-38; Doc. No. 41 at 23, 20-21, 35-36, 46-47, 74, 120-123). Wolfe complained about this conduct on numerous occasions to her store manager, Rowe. (Doc. No. 31). After the harassing conduct occurred, Rowe complained about it to Delco managers. (Doc. No. 41 at 24-28, 41, 52-58; Doc. No. 44 at 110-11). After making repeated complaints, Rowe met with various members of Delco's management (Doc. No. 41 at 38; Doc. 43 at 108). Rowe accompanied Wolfe, but was not allowed in the meeting. (Doc. No. 44 at 62). Rowe's supervisors did not tell Wolfe what actions, if any, would be taken against the harassing supervisor. (Doc. No. 52-53). Rowe explained to Wolfe that Meyer was not going to be fired, but that he had been placed on probation, and would be taken out of the store. Wolfe resigned shortly after the meeting with Delco's management, because she believed that the management was not serious about stopping the sexual harassment. (Doc. No. 43 at 55-56, 66-67).
Within a week of Rowe's and Wolfe's resignation, Wolfe was accused of stealing money from Delco. (Doc. No. 43 at 84). Wolfe was questioned by police, and consented to a polygraph examination conducted by the Edgewater Police Department. (Doc. No. 43 at 71, 85).
II. THE LAW
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir.1995); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir.1991). A moving party discharges its burden on a motion for summary judgment by showing the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Rule 56 permits the moving party to discharge its burden with or without supporting affidavits and to move for summary judgment on the case as a whole or on any claim. Id. When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then "go beyond the pleadings," and by its own affidavits or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
In determining whether the moving party has met its burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court must draw inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party's favor. Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir.1989); Samples on Behalf of Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir.1988). The Eleventh Circuit has explained the reasonableness standard:
in deciding whether an inference is reasonable, the Court must "cull the universe of possible inferences from the facts established by weighing each against the abstract standard of reasonableness." citation omitted. The opposing party\'s inferences need not be more probable than those inferences in favor of the movant to create a factual dispute, so long as they reasonably may be drawn from the facts. When more than one inference reasonably can be drawn, it is for the trier of fact to determine the proper one.
Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d 590, 594 (11th Cir.1995), quoting WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir.1988).
Thus, if a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant the summary judgment motion. Augusta Iron and Steel Works v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir. 1988). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."...
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