Grant v. Grant

Decision Date28 January 1935
Docket NumberNo. 6211.,6211.
Citation75 F.2d 665,64 App. DC 146
PartiesGRANT v. GRANT.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Jean M. Boardman and Raymond Neudecker, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Joseph D. Malloy, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, HITZ, and GRONER, Associate Justices.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

An appeal from a decree of the lower court dismissing appellant's bill of complaint for want of merit.

It is alleged in the bill that plaintiff and defendant are residents of the District of Columbia and are husband and wife; that they have one child now living, born on February 3, 1930; that on September 12, 1932, plaintiff obtained in the circuit court for Montgomery county, Md., a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro from defendant upon the ground of cruelty; that she was awarded the custody of their child, and defendant was directed to pay permanent alimony to her in the sum of $20 per month beginning with September 12, 1932, and continuing monthly thereafter; that defendant personally appeared in the case, but took no appeal from the decree, and it remains in full force and effect; that under the laws of the state of Maryland in force when the decree was entered, and still in force, the circuit court for Montgomery county, Md., has jurisdiction and authority to enforce its decree for the payment of alimony by the attachment and imprisonment of defendant in case of his willful failure and refusal to obey the same.

Plaintiff alleged that defendant has never paid any part of the alimony awarded by the decree, and there is now due and payable to her the sum of $340 thereon; that since the date of the decree defendant has been continually in receipt of an income sufficient to enable him fully to comply with the decree and his failure and refusal so to do has been willful, deliberate, and contumacious. That at the time the decree was entered defendant was an actual resident of Montgomery county, Md., but in the month of February, 1932, he became a resident of the District of Columbia, and ever since has continuously lived in the District. Plaintiff has been unable by reason of the absence of defendant from the state of Maryland since the entry of the decree to obtain personal service of the process of that court upon him.

That defendant is a noncommissioned officer in the United States Army and has no income save his salary from the government. He owns no property of a substantial value either in the state of Maryland or in the District of Columbia out of which a judgment obtained by plaintiff could be satisfied. She claims that owing to these facts she has no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law for the recovery of her alimony; that she is employed as a waitress at a restaurant, receiving about $14 per week, and owns no property of substantial value, and is in receipt of no income other than that just stated. The child resides with plaintiff and is dependent upon her for support.

That defendant is now stationed for duty at Walter Reed Hospital in the District of Columbia and is paid the sum of $56.70 per month besides being supplied with living quarters, meals, uniforms, and medical attention. That on October 14, 1933, defendant unlawfully abducted from plaintiff the aforesaid child of the parties in violation of the terms of the decree of the circuit court for Montgomery county, Md., and that plaintiff was compelled to recover the custody of the child by a writ of habeas corpus, by which plaintiff sustained an expense of $61; and that defendant has willfully and maliciously molested plaintiff by means of unlawful attempts to prevent her from securing employment.

The plaintiff therefore prayed that defendant be summoned and "be directed by the decree of the court specifically to perform the aforesaid decree of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Md., and to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $340 in satisfaction of the alimony now due and payable to the plaintiff under the provisions of the said decree," and that defendant hereafter be required to pay to plaintiff during the pendency of this cause and permanently maintenance in an...

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4 cases
  • Scholla v. Scholla, 11267
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 8 Enero 1953
    ...Worsley v. Worsley, 64 App.D.C. 202, 76 F.2d 815, certiorari denied, 1935, 294 U.S. 725, 55 S.Ct. 640, 79 L.Ed. 1256; Grant v. Grant, 1935, 64 App.D.C. 146, 75 F.2d 665; Davis v. Davis, 1907, 29 App.D.C. 258, 9 L.R.A., N.S., By his cross-appeal the defendant below attacks the order allowing......
  • Clubb v. Clubb
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 15 Marzo 1949
    ...of divorce entered even in another State of the Union. Such holding in effect was made in the District of Columbia in Grant v. Grant, 64 App.D.C. 146, 75 F.2d 665, where the court held that a divorced wife could not maintain a suit in equity for enforcement of alimony provisions of a foreig......
  • Thomason v. Thomason, 14965.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 5 Noviembre 1959
    ...64 App.D.C. 202, 76 F.2d 815 (D.C.Cir.), certiorari denied 294 U.S. 725, 55 S.Ct. 640, 79 L.Ed. 1256 (1935), and Grant v. Grant, 64 App.D.C. 146, 75 F.2d 665 (D.C.Cir.1935), decided prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., suggest nothing to the contrary, ......
  • Hitchcock v. Thomason, 2250.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 9 Febrero 1959
    ...asked to enter judgment on a foreign decree. In our view this case is more nearly governed by the principles laid down in Grant v. Grant, 64 App.D.C. 146, 75 F.2d 665, and Worsley v. Worsley, 64 App.D.C. 202, 76 F.2d 815, certiorari denied 294 U. S. 725, 55 S.Ct. 640, 79 L.Ed. 1256. There i......

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