Grant v. Iowa Dept. of Human Services

Decision Date14 July 2006
Docket NumberNo. 04-1114.,04-1114.
Citation722 N.W.2d 169
PartiesRobert James GRANT, Appellant, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Natalie Hope Cronk of Johnston & Nathanson, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

CADY, Justice.

This appeal is from a district court's ruling on a petition for judicial review of an administrative agency decision. The Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) dismissed an application to correct a child abuse report on grounds of issue preclusion. The district court affirmed. Upon our review, we reverse the district court judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Robert Grant and Linda Jensen had a tumultuous, rollercoaster relationship. They were married in 1991, followed by periodic episodes of discontent and reconciliation. In November 2000, Robert filed for divorce for the second time, and a custody battle ensued over their two sons, Robert Jr. and Samuel. Robert Jr., known as Bo, was born in 1995. Samuel, known as Sam, was born in 1997. He has Down syndrome. The dissolution trial was eventually scheduled for July 2002.

In August 2001, during the pendency of the dissolution, Linda filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse in district court. Linda and Robert entered into a consent agreement resulting in a protective order entered by the district court that granted Linda temporary custody of Bo and Sam, with visitation on alternating weekends to Robert. The visitation exchange was set up to take place at a police station, and Robert exercised his visitation at a local motel.

Following a weekend visit in October 2001, Bo reported that Robert became angry after Bo and Sam started to argue. Robert responded by grabbing Bo by the shoulder and throwing a toy truck that struck Sam on the head. Bo also reported that Robert kicked him in the groin after he objected to his father's behavior. The incident was subsequently reported to the state Department of Human Services (DHS). The department promptly conducted a comprehensive investigation and assessment.

The department filed a founded assessment report on November 8, 2001. The child protection worker who conducted the investigation prepared the report that determined the incident met the definition of child abuse based on Robert's failure to provide proper supervision of children under his care.1 The report indicated Robert denied the incident occurred, and further stated that Robert believed Bo fabricated the event due to improper influences from Linda and a male friend. The child protection worker found Bo to be credible based on a variety of factors, and concluded Robert failed to properly supervise the two boys by "a preponderance of evidence." The report also concluded the incident was not minor, and that Robert was the alleged perpetrator in a prior founded child abuse report in November 2000. The prior report involved an assault incident between Robert and a stepchild. Consequently, the current report was placed in the state child abuse central registry.

Based on the event that occasioned the child abuse report, Linda filed an application in the domestic abuse proceeding to modify the terms of the visitation so as to limit Robert to supervised visits with Bo and Sam. The application for modification was set for hearing before the district court, and both Linda and Robert were represented by counsel.

The district court modified the visitation provided under the protective order by written order on December 7, 2001. It found the incident reported by Bo "took place" and that Robert "demonstrated inappropriate anger" that endangered the children. The court found Bo's report was consistent, detailed, and credible. To the contrary, the court found Robert's denial was "implausibl[e]" and "hollow."

On March 5, 2002, Robert filed a written statement with the DHS claiming the report and assessment were erroneous. He requested that it be corrected. Robert claimed the report should be changed from "founded" to "not confirmed" and be removed from the central registry for four reasons: (1) Bo fabricated the incident due to manipulative influences by Linda; (2) there was insufficient evidence of a physical injury to Bo or Sam; (3) Robert does not fit the profile of a child abuser; and (4) employees at the motel where the visitation took place reported Robert was an attentive father to the boys. Additionally, Robert asserted that he submitted to a polygraph examination that revealed he truthfully answered questions about the alleged incident.

The DHS denied the correction request, and Robert sought review through the state inspection and appeals procedure. The DHS asserted Robert was precluded from seeking to change the conclusion in the report from "founded" to "not confirmed" because the district court decision previously determined the incident occurred as reported by Bo. The DHS sought to dismiss the request.

An administrative law judge issued a proposed ruling dismissing the request. The director of the Department of Human Services subsequently adopted the ruling as a final decision.

Robert then sought judicial review of the DHS decision from the district court. The district court affirmed the agency action based on issue preclusion.

Robert appealed, and raised three grounds of error. First, he claimed the doctrine of issue preclusion did not apply because there was no identity of issues between the modification-of-visitation proceeding in district court and the request to correct the abuse report before the administrative agency. Second, he claimed issue preclusion did not apply because a statute gave him the right to an evidentiary hearing on his request to correct the abuse report. Finally, he claimed issue preclusion did not apply under an exception to the rule, based on the legislature's specific allocation of jurisdiction to the DHS to correct child abuse assessments.

II. Standard of Review

Chapter 17A governs our review. We may only interfere with the agency's "decision if it is erroneous under one of the grounds enumerated in the statute, and a party's substantial rights have been prejudiced." Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006) (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)). We are bound by the agency's findings of fact "if supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." Id. (citing Excel Corp. v. Smithart, 654 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 2002); Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)). "[T]he question on appeal is not whether the evidence supports a different finding than the finding made by the commissioner, but whether the evidence `supports the findings actually made.'" Id. (quoting St. Luke's Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 2000)). In contrast, we are not bound by the agency's interpretation of the law and "may substitute our interpretation for the agency's." Id. (citing Clark v. Vicorp Rests., Inc., 696 N.W.2d 596, 604 (Iowa 2005)). Finally, while "[w]e allocate some degree of discretion" to the agency in its application of the law to the facts, we may reverse if the agency's application of the law to the facts was affected by "irrational reasoning; failure to consider relevant facts; or irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of law to the facts." Id. (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c), (i), (j), (m)).

Whether the elements of issue preclusion are satisfied is a question of law. See Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 709 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Iowa 2006) (reviewing decision as to applicability of doctrine of issue preclusion for correction of errors at law); Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 281 Wis.2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 54, 61 (2005) ("Whether issue preclusion is a potential limit on litigation in an individual case is a question of law . . . ."); accord Bartlett v. Dep't of Revenue ex rel. Bartlett, 125 P.3d 328, 330 (Alaska 2005); Smith v. U.S.R.V. Props., LC, 141 Idaho 795, 118 P.3d 127, 130 (2005); Simpson v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 693 N.W.2d 612, 616 (N.D.2005). Therefore, we are not bound by the agency's decision on this issue, and may substitute our own interpretation of the law for the agency's. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c) (stating a reviewing court may reverse agency action if it is "[b]ased upon an erroneous interpretation of a provision of law whose interpretation has not clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency").

III. Issue Preclusion

Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, "prevents parties from relitigating issues previously resolved in prior litigation if certain prerequisites are established." Comes, 709 N.W.2d at 117 (citing Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1981)). We have identified four elements that must be satisfied in order for the prior determination to have preclusive effect in a subsequent proceeding. They are:

"(1) the issue concluded must be identical; (2) the issue must have been raised and litigated in the prior action; (3) the issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action; and (4) the determination made of the issue in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment."

Comes, 709 N.W.2d at 118 (quoting Hunter, 300 N.W.2d at 123); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, at 250 (1982) ("When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim."); id. § 29, at 291 ("A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party, in accordance with §§ 27 and 28, is also precluded from doing so with another person unless the fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or other...

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