Grant v. Lockett
| Decision Date | 26 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | 5:15-CV-0445 (DNH/TWD) |
| Parties | ALONZO and STEPHANIE GRANT; Plaintiffs, v. DAMON LOCKETT, Police Officer; PAUL MONTALTO, Police Officer; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
LAW OFFICES OF BONNER & BONNER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CHARLES A. BONNER, ESQ.
A. CABRAL BONNER, ESQ.
JESSE P. RYDER, ESQ.
CHRISTINA F. DEJOSEPH, ESQ.
TODD M. LONG, ESQ.
Plaintiffs Alonzo Grant ("Mr. Grant") and Stephanie Grant ("Mrs. Grant") brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York state law against defendants the City of Syracuse ("the City"), Syracuse Police Officer Damon Lockett ("Officer Lockett") and Police Officer Paul Montalto ("Officer Montalto"), among others. On October 23, 2018, following a jury trial that lasted nine days and featured twenty eight witnesses, the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs against Officers Lockett and Montalto and awarded compensatory damages to Mr. Grant in the amount of $1,130,000.00 and damages for loss of consortium to Mrs. Grant in the amount of $450,000.00.
Presently under consideration are: (a) plaintiffs' letter motion for additional attorneys' fees and expenses and (b) defendants' motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 62(b) to stay proceedings to enforce the judgment pending appeal. Both motions have been fully briefed.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
Familiarity with the procedural and factual background of this case is presumed, and portions of the background are only recited where necessary to decide the pending motions.
In the February 8, 2019 Memorandum, Decision & Order, defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial were denied and the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees was granted in part, in the amount of $639,266.50. Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal on February 22, 2019.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir.1996) (citations omitted). The purpose of allowing attorneys' fees in a civilrights action "is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). "[A]ccordingly, a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(b) provides that "[a]t any time after judgment is entered, a party may obtain a stay by providing a bond or other security." FED. R. CIV. P. 62(b). "The stay takes effect when the court approves the bond or other security and remains in effect for the time specified in the bond or other security." Id. However, district courts in the Second Circuit, in their discretion, "may use equitable principles to grant such a stay without a full bond if the filing of a supersedeas bond would irreparably harm the judgment debtor and, at the same time, such a stay would not unduly endanger the judgment creditor's interest in ultimate recovery." Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki, 188 F. Supp. 2d 223, 254 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (S.J. McCurn) (internal quotations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION.
On February 13, 2019, plaintiffs submitted a letter motion seeking an additional attorneys' fees in the amount of $22,465.00 and costs in the amount of $1,180.00. Plaintiffs assert that these amounts were incurred to oppose defendants' post-trial motion and include 13.4 hours of work from Charles A. Bonner, 16.7 hours from Jesse Ryder and 54.4 hours from A. Cabral Bonner. Defendants object to the request for multiple reasons.
In this circuit, fee awards are governed by the Second Circuit's instructive decision in Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2008). Under the protocol announced in Arbor Hill, a court must first consider whether the rates at which compensation is sought are those that a "reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay" before multiplying that figure by the number of hours expended. Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190-91; see also Lewis v. City of Albany Police Dep't, 2008 WL 2103565, at *1 (). The Second Circuit cautioned that a court should also "bear in mind that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively." Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190. Parties may be compensated for attorneys' fees incurred in post-trial motion practice. See Marchisotto v. City of New York, 2009 WL 2229695, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009).
In the February 8, 2019 Memorandum, Decision and Order, it was determined the appropriate hourly rate for Charles A. Bonner was $350.00 per hour and the appropriate hourly rate for Jesse Ryder and A. Cabral Bonner was $250.00 per hour. These hourly rates will also be applied to the plaintiffs' current request.
The next step requires a determination of the number of hours reasonably expended by plaintiffs' attorneys. Plaintiffs' attorneys have submitted documentation evidencing that they expended approximately eighty four and one half (84.5) hours in opposition to defendants' posttrial motion. See Declaration of Charles A. Bonner, Amended Declaration of Jesse P. Ryder, Declaration of A. Cabral Bonner. Defendants contend that such amount of time is excessive and redundant and that the contemporaneous billing records provided by plaintiffs are vague.
In considering the number of reasonably expended hours, the court should exclude "excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary" hours, and "has discretion simply to deduct a reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application." Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)); see also; Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 876 (2d Cir.1998). The court should also consider "whether, at the time the work was performed, a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures." Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1177 (6th Cir. 1990)). Courts can use significant discretion in making the determination of reasonableness of time spent based on the scope and complexity of a case. See N.Y. Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146-47 (2d Cir. 1983).
Reviewing the records submitted by plaintiffs' attorneys, it appears that attorney A. Cabral Bonner primarily worked on the opposition to defendants' post trial motion, with input from Charles A. Bonner and Jesse Ryder.
The Second Circuit requires that any attorney who applies for court-ordered compensation in this Circuit should "specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done." New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147 (2d Cir.1983). In examining the entirety of plaintiffs' materials, plaintiffs' attorneys have adequately documented both the number of hours spent on the caseand the nature of the work performed during each of those hours. Therefore, the entries are not vague.
Further, the number of hours spent opposing defendants' post-trial motion was neither excessive nor duplicative. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the level of skill required to competently address the numerous and diverse issues raised by defendants in their post-trial motion justify the number of hours billed by plaintiffs' attorneys. See Zhiwen Chen v. County of Suffolk, 927 F. Supp. 2d 58, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (). A reasonable, paying client would have expected their attorneys to expend such hours to fiercely defend the significant jury verdict in their favor. See Dancy v. McGinley, 141 F. Supp. 3d 231, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (). Accordingly, plaintiffs will be awarded additional attorneys' fees.
The reasonable attorneys' fees are calculated as follows:
Attorney Requested Hours Rate Total Charles A. Bonner
13.4 $350.00 $ 4,690.00 A. Cabral Bonner
54.4 $250.00 $ 13,600.00 Jesse Ryder
16.7 $250.00 $ 4,175.00 Total 84.5 Total $ 22,465.00
Therefore, plaintiffs will be awarded an additional $22,465.00 in attorneys' fees.
In addition to attorneys' fees, plaintiffs also request an award of costs in the amount of $1,180.00. Plaintiffs assert that such costs represents the service of trial subpoenas and that the invoice for the expenses was not received until December 16, 2018.
"Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs...
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