Grant v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of New York

• Decision Date: 02 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 81 Civ. 4406 (JES).,81 Civ. 4406 (JES).
• Citation: 638 F. Supp. 1528
• Parties: Sonia V. GRANT, Plaintiff, v. MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

638 F. Supp. 1528

Sonia V. GRANT, Plaintiff, v. MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.

No. 81 Civ. 4406 (JES).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

July 2, 1986.

Sonia V. Grant, Brooklyn, N.Y., pro se.

Davis Polk & Wardwell, New York City, Attorneys for defendant; Howard A. Ellins, of counsel.

OPINION AND ORDER

SPRIZZO, District Judge:

The following Opinion and Order constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Sonia V. Grant, a black female, filed this action, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,¹ and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,² against her former employer, the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York ("Morgan"). Ms. Grant has alleged that Morgan discriminated against her on the basis of race and sex in compensation, promotion, assignment, transfer and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment, and that these conditions forced her to resign. See Complaint at ¶ 1. This resignation is claimed to be a "constructive discharge." See id. at ¶ 16(b). Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and costs, including attorney's fees. See id. at ¶ 17.

On April 20, 1979, plaintiff filed timely complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")³ and the New York City Commission of Human Rights ("NYCCHR"). On June 25, 1980, plaintiff withdrew her then-pending complaint before the NYCCHR prior to any determination, see Def.Ex. MM, and on April 24, 1981, the EEOC determined that there was "no reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff's allegation is true." See Def.Ex. NN.⁴ The EEOC issued a "Notice of Right to Sue," and, on July 15, 1981, the plaintiff filed her complaint and properly invoked the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4).

Plaintiff's motion for class certification, brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c), was denied. See Grant v. Morgan Guaranty Trust, 548 F.Supp. 1189, 1193 (S.D.N. Y.1982). This Court also dismissed all of plaintiff's Title VII claims except those raised before the EEOC, namely, the promotion and "constructive discharge" claims arising from her 1979 resignation. Id. at 1192. While the § 1981 claims were not limited to these two claims, it was held that plaintiff could only raise a claim of race discrimination because sex discrimination is not cognizable under § 1981. See id. at 1192 & n. 5; see also Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F.Supp. 894, 896 (S.D.N.Y.1985).

At the subsequent non-jury trial of this action, plaintiff was required to proceed pro se because of her attorney's refusal to proceed with the trial on her behalf. The Court then elicited whatever testimony plaintiff desired to offer in support of her claims. See Tr. at 5-12.⁵ However, it became apparent that plaintiff's attorney had not properly consulted with plaintiff prior to trial, even though he previously had been granted an extensive adjournment for that purpose, and had been afforded ample notice of the trial date. Therefore, the Court afforded plaintiff an opportunity to submit a post-trial memorandum to synthesize any evidence of discrimination shown at trial, and directed that the record be left open so that plaintiff could offer evidence in addition to that elicited at trial. See id. at 112-13. Plaintiff retained no new counsel, nor did she thereafter file an application to have counsel appointed. However, plaintiff did successfully seek several adjournments so that she could file an adequate post-trial memorandum. That memorandum was filed, and, as is evident from that memorandum and the ensuing discussion set forth herein, plaintiff has ably argued the merits of her claims.

I.

TITLE VII and § 1981 CLAIMS

FACTS

Plaintiff's Employment History

On June 3, 1969, Sonia Grant was hired as a Transfer Checker in Morgan's Stock Transfer Department. See Pre-Trial Order ("PTO") at ¶¶ 5(2), 5(3).⁶ Her job classification was eventually changed to "Control Clerk I" because of a departmental reorganization — not because of a promotion. See id. at ¶¶ 5(3), 5(4). Ms. Grant remained in this position without a promotion until her resignation in 1979. See id. at ¶ 5(4).

On March 2, 1979, plaintiff submitted a letter of resignation to Morgan's Chairman of the Board, Walter Page. See Def.Ex. JJ. This letter makes no mention of discrimination. See id. Morgan re-evaluated its decision not to promote Ms. Grant, see Tr. at 42-43 (McGlynn), but found that its original decision was appropriate. See Def.Ex. KK (Letter of William Eiseman, Senior Vice President of Morgan, dated March 16, 1979).

During plaintiff's employment, Morgan had a policy of evaluating all employees once a year to determine whether each employee was eligible for a salary increase. These reviews were recorded on "salary review forms." See PTO at ¶ 5(5); see also Tr. at 40, 55; Def.Ex. B-Y. Various levels of supervisors contributed to the evaluation process. See Tr. at 55. Employees were rated on job knowledge, accuracy, productivity, initiative, assimilation, sense of responsibility towards work and towards others, appearance and courtesy. See Def.Ex. B-Y. Daily records of employees' instances of lateness and absence were also made and maintained. See Def.Ex. UU.

The employees received grades of: (1) "less than satisfactory;" (2) "satisfactory;" (3) "above average;" and (4) "outstanding." See id. Plaintiff never received a grade higher than "satisfactory." See PTO at ¶ 5(7); see also Def.Ex. B-Y. There is undisputed evidence that plaintiff's overall job performance was rated "unsatisfactory" in three reviews. See PTO at ¶ 5(8); Def.Ex. C, E, L.

Plaintiff claims that a supervisor had explained to her that the grades of "above average" and "outstanding" were reserved for the evaluations of the supervisors' performance, and that therefore the rating of "satisfactory" was excellent for non-supervisory personnel. See Tr. at 26.⁷ However, Philip Alfieri, a supervisory assistant for Morgan with responsibility for maintaining and reviewing employee performance evaluations, see Tr. at 53, testified that an evaluation of "satisfactory" was the minimum level at which an employee could retain her position. See Tr. at 60. The Court accepts Alfieri's testimony as credible and concludes that the grade of "satisfactory" was the lowest level of acceptable performance and rejects plaintiff's testimony that ratings of "above average" and "outstanding" were given only to supervisory personnel.

Instances of employees' lateness and absence ("L/A") were recorded daily on time sheets. See Def.Ex. UU. These records reveal that plaintiff had a history of excessive lateness and absence. In her ten-year employment with Morgan, without considering that plaintiff took three maternity leaves and worked four days per week at certain times, Sonia Grant was late approximately fifty times and absent another seventy-five times. See Def.Ex. UU. Also, plaintiff's overall L/A record was rated "unsatisfactory" five times. See PTO at ¶ 5(8).

Plaintiff stated that these L/A records are inaccurate, see Tr. at 30, 102-06, and that she was "there every day and on time." See Tr. at 30. The Court does not find these claims to be credible. First, plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence to substantiate her contention that Morgan's records were inaccurate. Secondly, it has been stipulated that plaintiff's annual salary increase was deferred for six consecutive years because of her poor L/A and marginal performance records. See PTO at ¶ 5(9).

In her Post-Trial Memorandum, ("Pl. Post-Trial Memo") plaintiff stated that "all of her illnesses and medical excuses were documented ... and substantiated at all times by her doctor...." See Pl. Post-Trial Memo at 48. This statement is not supported by plaintiff's evidence. Plaintiff submitted only one doctor's note, dated December 9, 1978, which merely refers to an extension of her third maternity leave. See Exhibit F to Pl. Post-Trial Memo ("Pl.Ex. F").

Plaintiff's further contention that Morgan never informed her of its L/A policy, see Tr. at 105-106, is rebutted by overwhelming credible evidence that she was informed of this policy. There was credible testimony that all Morgan employees were issued a manual describing the company's attendance policies. See Tr. at 57 (Alfieri).⁸ Several office memoranda stipulated into evidence, see PTO at ¶ 14, indicate that Ms. Grant was informed seven times by five different supervisors that her job performance and her L/A record were unsatisfactory, and that, if not improved, Ms. Grant would be recommended for dismissal. See Def.Ex. AA-HH. Two of these cautionary incidents were described at trial in the testimony of Philip Alfieri and Florence Yee, an employment interviewer at Morgan whose responsibilities included interviewing employees returning from leave. See Tr. at 58, 77.

Mrs. Yee testified that plaintiff requested a transfer in 1976, upon return from her second maternity leave, because of her attendance at college. See PTO at ¶ 5(10); Tr. at 80. Mrs. Yee denied the request because of plaintiff's unsatisfactory performance and L/A records and placed plaintiff on "final warning" because of her L/A record. See Tr. at 84; PTO at ¶ 5(10). Similarly, Mr. Alfieri testified that in 1978 he had spoken to the plaintiff regarding her L/A record. See id. Tr. at 58.

Finally, it has been stipulated that plaintiff's annual salary increase was deferred for six consecutive years, 1971-1976, because of her marginal employment record. See PTO at ¶ 5(9). At trial, plaintiff admitted that her salary was deferred, but she claimed that it was deferred because of Morgan's policy of discrimination against blacks and women. See Tr. at 31. There is no evidence in the record to substantiate this conclusory allegation. Therefore, the Court concludes that plaintiff's employment record was,...