Grant v. People

• Decision Date: 03 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00SC799.,00SC799.
• Citation: 48 P.3d 543
• Parties: Jeron GRANT, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

48 P.3d 543

Jeron GRANT, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

No. 00SC799.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

June 3, 2002.

Rehearing Denied July 1, 2002.¹

David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Cynthia Camp, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.

Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Katherine A. Hansen, Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Division, Criminal Justice Section, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.

Justice KOURLIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo.App.2000), to interpret the waiver provision of section 19-2-511, 6 C.R.S. (2001) ("juvenile statements statute").² Seventeen-year-old Jeron Grant spoke with police about a double homicide while his parents waited in a nearby room. Under the statute, such interview is permissible only when the juvenile and his parents expressly waive in writing the statutory requirement of parental presence. Grant's parent signed a waiver, but Grant did not. The statutory phrase "[t]his express waiver shall be in writing" in subsection 19-2-511(5) does not direct whether the juvenile must sign such waiver, and we therefore find it ambiguous. After resorting to the tools of statutory construction, we conclude that the legislature never intended written unsigned waivers to be conclusively ineffective. In this case, where the waiver was in writing, bore the signature of a parent, was obtained after full advisement, and was supported by ample evidence that the juvenile consented, we determine that the statutory mandate was satisfied. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

I. Facts

Police arrested Jeron Grant in connection with the murder of two teenage boys. Because Grant was a juvenile, the officers awaited the arrival of his parents at the police station before interviewing him. When Grant's mother and stepfather arrived, the officers explained the reasons for Grant's arrest and requested permission to question him about the murders. They advised Grant and his parents of the juvenile's Miranda rights. On a printed "Fact Sheet," the officers filled in relevant information, pointed out the Miranda rights that were printed at the bottom, and had both Grant and his parents sign the form after they indicated their understanding.

The officers then began interviewing Grant who denied committing the murders and instead blamed the crime on an individual named "Quick." One Officer, Detective Crouch, told Grant he did not believe the story and asked Grant why he was lying. Shortly thereafter, Grant asked to speak with the officer alone. Crouch asked Grant's parents for their consent, which they gave verbally, but not in writing. The parents left the interview room and waited across the hall.

Crouch resumed the interview with Grant; however, the juvenile continued to deny his involvement. He accepted Crouch's offer to take a polygraph test. Crouch and Grant then moved into the polygraph room while Grant's parents moved into an adjoining room where they could watch. Before the polygraph started, Crouch told Grant, "You don't really want to waste my time with this [the polygraph], do you? You know I know the truth. Why don't you come clean?" At this point Grant broke down in tears and told Crouch that he was afraid of going to jail.

Crouch asked Grant if he was ready to relate what really happened, and Grant responded in the affirmative. Crouch told Grant that if he was responsible for the boys' deaths, it would be "extremely tough on [Grant] to live with." At that point, Grant admitted his previous version of events was "a lie." At Crouch's request, Grant wrote out a statement and signed it. The statement implicated Grant in the murders. During these events, Grant's parents remained in the adjoining room where they could see, but not hear. Crouch took Grant's written statement to the parents who signed it without reading its contents. The officers then led Grant back to the initial interview room where his parents joined him; the officers later transferred Grant to Zebulon Pike Juvenile Detention Center.

At trial, the judge suppressed this statement as rendered in violation of the juvenile statements statute, see § 19-2-511, because it was taken outside the presence of Grant's parents and absent a written waiver. That decision is not at issue in this proceeding.

After the officers took Grant to the detention center, Crouch learned of changes to the juvenile statements statute that required a written waiver for interviews conducted outside the presence of a juvenile's parents. He decided to reinterview Grant, this time in compliance with the statute. Crouch had his office prepare a written waiver form, and he made arrangements for Grant and his parents to return to the station. He did not tell them the reasons for this second interview.

When Crouch arrived at the center to pick up Grant for the second interview, Grant showed the detective the business card of a public defender and told him, "I'm not supposed to talk to anyone until tomorrow." Crouch asked whether the public defender represented him; Grant responded that he did not know, but that he had "signed something."³ Crouch told Grant to "go ahead and come with us down to the [police station]," and that, "his folks would be there." Grant complied and allegedly told the officers during the drive that he would consent to the second interview, but only if his parents were not present.

When the parties arrived at the police station, Grant and his parents met alone in the interview room for several minutes to discuss "a family matter." Crouch then entered and requested permission to conduct the second interview.

When Crouch received the parents' verbal consent, he provided them with a second "Fact Sheet" containing the written Miranda warnings. He again explained those rights and had all three of them initial the appropriate space on the form to signify their understanding. Crouch then presented a form entitled "Juvenile Interview Waiver." He asked Grant's mother to read it, and if she agreed, to sign it. She read and signed the waiver. Grant's stepfather initialed the form. Grant looked at the form, but was not asked to, nor did he, sign it. There was, in fact, no space on the form for his signature. At that time, however, he verbally agreed to an interview conducted outside his parents' presence.

Crouch's second interview with Grant lasted a few hours. At the end, Grant wrote out a statement that was substantially similar to his earlier statement but contained slightly more detail. The admissibility of this statement is at issue here.

In a written order, the trial judge denied Grant's motion to suppress the second statement finding that it did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment.⁴ In a motion to reconsider, defense counsel argued that the second statement should be suppressed based solely on the fact that Grant did not sign the waiver form and that without his signature, the document was invalid under the statute. The trial court rejected this argument finding that the waiver complied with the intent of the statute and that such waiver need not be signed by both the juvenile and the parents. A jury acquitted Grant of first-degree murder, but convicted him of accessory to murder and accessory to manslaughter.

The court of appeals affirmed. The court noted that the statute requires all waivers to be "in writing," but that it does not specify that both the parents and the juvenile must affix their signatures to such writing. The court went on to reason that a "requirement for a writing is separate and distinct from a signature requirement" in Colorado's statutory law. Grant, 30 P.3d at 673 (citing § 2-4-401(17), 1 C.R.S. (1999) ("`Written' or `in writing' includes any representation of words, letters, symbols, or figures; but this provision does not affect any law relating to signatures.")). After listing several statutes that specifically require signatures as part of a writing, the court concluded that the juvenile statements statute contained no such requirement. Ultimately, so long as the written waiver was "attributable to the person against whom it is to be enforced," the court ruled that such waiver was valid and, therefore, Grant's second statement was properly admitted. Grant, 30 P.3d at 673. We review a lower court's statutory interpretation de novo. Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 273 (Colo.1995).

II. Statutory Interpretation

This court follows a well-worn path in interpreting our state's statutes. "Our primary task in construing a statute is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.... To discern that intent, a court should look first to the plain language of the statute." Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo.1991). When we determine that statutory language is ambiguous, we may look to rules of statutory construction and to the legislative history as indications of the legislature's intent. Rodriguez v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921, 925 (Colo.1996). We give effect both to the spirit and to the intent of the legislators in enacting the statute. Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 229 (Colo. 1998). "Although we must give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning, the General Assembly's intent and purpose must prevail over a literalist interpretation that leads to an absurd result." Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Colo.2000). Thus, we try to ascertain the intent of the general assembly in promulgating the juvenile statements statute and the waiver provision. When we deem the statute itself to be ambiguous, we look to statutory interpretation tools to aid us in the analysis.

Here, the statute requires that a juvenile be accompanied by a parent when making statements to the police, unless the juvenile and parent expressly waive that right. Specifically, the statute reads in relevant part:

(1) No statements or

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