Grant v. State
| Decision Date | 22 January 1948 |
| Docket Number | 1 Div. 295. |
| Parties | GRANT v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
W C. Beebe, of Bay Minette, and Forest Christian, of Foley, for appellant.
A. A. Carmichael, Atty. Gen., and Jas. T. Hardin Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The oral charge is in pertinent part as follows:
'I charge you that insanity, to be a defense to crime, must be the result of a disease of the mind and of such a nature as to dethrone his reason; to destroy his reason to such an extent that he can not distinguish right from wrong, or if he can distinguish right from wrong, that the disease has such a compelling power over him that he is forced to commit a crime; that he can not resist the impulse to commit this particular crime, because of the diseased condition of his mind, but it must be either one or the other; that the disease has so destroyed his mental capacity that he can not distinguish right from wrong and does not know that he is doing wrong, or that the disease of the mind must have so destroyed his reasoning--so underminded his mental capacity--that he could not resist the impulse to do the wrongful act. The law of Alabama does not recognize temporary or emotional insanity or insane jealousy. Jealousy is no defense to crime in Alabama--it must be such insanity that would destroy his reason or his mind so weakened that he can not resist the doing of the particular act with which he is charged. And as I said, it must be of a fixed or prolonged nature rather
than momentary or fleeting; not temporary or effervescent in nature--sane one minute and insane another--more permanent than transient; more or less prolonged as distinguished from effervescent; it must be a disease of the mind in all cases and be of such nature as to destroy his reason; that he does not know right from wrong; or some mental hallucination, the result of the disease, this hallucination must be of such a strong and compelling power that he can not resist the impulse to commit the particular crime with which he is now charged.
'That is the question that is submitted to you for your determination. Was this defendant, at the time of the commission of the act with which he is charged, insane as I have defined insanity to you? Was he suffering from a disease of the mind that had so dethroned his reason that he could not distinguish right from wrong, or had some mental hallucination so overpowered him--had such overwhelming power over him--that he could not resist the impulse to commit this particular crime? If so, that is a defense to crime--if either one of those conditions existed, and you are reasonably satisfied of that, he would be entitled to a verdict at your hands of not guilty by reason of insanity.
The appellant, Noel J. Grant, was indicted, tried and convicted of murder in the first degree. His punishment was fixed at death by electrocution. The appeal comes to this court under the automatic appeal act. General Acts 1943, p. 217 et seq. Code 1940, Tit. 15, § 382(1) et seq.
On March 9, 1947, state witness Ora Barton Ewing while driving back from Fort Morgan in Baldwin County discovered a human hand sticking out of the sand a short distance from the side of the road. He reported the matter to the authorities with the result that the body of a woman was dug up from a shallow grave in the sand. She had been shot three times. One wound was in the abdomen. One wound was in the leg. And one wound was in the breast at the clavicle.
Doctor Nelson E. Grubb, State Toxicologist, testified that the three wounds had been inflicted in the foregoing order in point of time and that the last wound had proved to be the fatal wound, the first two wounds being superficial.
The body was identified as Gertha Grant, the wife of Noel J. Grant, the appellant. They resided at Pensacola, Florida. He was arrested in Pensacola, Florida, and subsequently turned over to the sheriff of Baldwin County, Alabama.
Noel J. Grant made a confession to the authorities at the jail in Bay Minette, which was reduced to writing and signed by him. The confession was introduced in evidence. He testified as a witness in his own behalf and in substance on the witness stand corroborated the statements contained in the written confession. The evidence showed that Noel J. Grant killed Gertha Grant in substantially the following manner.
On the morning of March 8, 1947, appellant and his wife, together with Richard, her seven year old son by a former marriage, left Pensacola in his car for a ride. They crossed into Alabama and passed through several Alabama towns, eating lunch in Fairhope, Alabama, and then having a sandwich in Brewton, Alabama. From Brewton they proceeded back to Florida. Shortly after 7 o'clock in the evening he stopped the car on the side of the road and when he got back in the car got his wife to turn her head to see if the door on her side of the car was closed. He then hit her twice upon the head with his pistol which he drew from his belt. His wife screamed and jumped from the car. He caught her, threw her to the ground and fired one shot into her body. He then placed her in the trunk of the car, reentered the car and drove away. After driving a short distance, he stopped the car, raised the trunk lid, found that she was conscious. She asked him to let her out. Instead he fired another shot into her body and closed the trunk lid. He drove back into Alabama and disposed of the boy by luring him out of the automobile at a bridge over a stream. He then struck the boy in the head and pushed him off the bridge into the stream. Driving on he reached a filling station and stopped for gas, but hearing his wife moving in the trunk drove on. He again stopped, raised the trunk lid and after his wife spoke to him, he addressed certain remarks to her and fired a third shot into her body. She then fell over and made no more noise. The third shot was fired in Baldwin County, Alabama. He then obtained gasoline at the next filling station and from there drove to the point where he buried the body, scooping out the shallow grave with his hands. First, however, he removed her rings and watch. Then he drove back to Pensacola, stopping on the way to wash out the trunk of the car. The pistol with which the deceased was slain, together with her rings and watch, were found in the defendant's possession at the time of his arrest.
Appellant testifying, as stated, in his own behalf, admitted he killed his wife and buried her body where it was found. According to him, he did so because she had been guilty of 'running around' with other men. The pleas of the defendant were not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
We shall now proceed to discuss the various matters on which appellant bases his right to reversal, but none of which we deem sufficient to produce that result.
1. The voluntary confession made by appellant included a statement that he knew he was going to have to get rid of Richard and since the boy asked him when he reached the bridge to let his mother out of the trunk because she was getting cold, he stopped the car and told Richard to get out of the car so that he could show him his mother was not cold, that he then got out his gun, hit Richard on the head and shoved him off the bridge into the water. It is insisted that on a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime independent of that for which he is on trial, is irrelevant and inadmissible. Clearly, however, the acts of appellant with reference to the boy were a part of the res gestae. It was part of the series of events leading up to the final fatal shot. The fact that under the circumstances the acts of appellant may tend to show another crime is immaterial. The evidence was competent. Kennedy v. State, 182 Ala. 10, 62 So. 49; Oakley v. State, 135 Ala. 15, 33 So. 23; Allison v. State, 1 Ala.App. 206, 55 So. 453; Sexton v. State, 239 Ala. 287, 196 So. 744; Barnes v. State, 31 Ala.App. 187, 14 So.2d 242, certiorari denied 244 Ala. 597, 14 So.2d 246. The state sought to show that when the defendant was arrested in Pensacola after the commission of the crime he was asked by the deputy sheriff, Owens, when referring to a little book satchel on the wall, 'Do you reckon this kid will ever need this any more,' to which the defendant replied, 'No, he will never need it any more, because he had killed them both.' The court expressly instructed the jury not to regard anything that the defendant said about killing the boy, and not to consider any injury to the child. Without considering whether this evidence was competent, we mention it to show that the court was careful to keep from the jury any testimony regarding the assault on the boy, except as it was a part of the series of events making up the res gestae.
2. There was no error in allowing the boy Richard, aged 7, to testify for the state. He was first examined by the court and adjudged competent as a witness. His testimony was used solely to show that the dead woman was his mother, that she was the wife of the defendant and that he went on the ride in question with the defendant. The record is silent as to how he survived after being pushed off the bridge.
3. The state introduced photographs showing the three wounds on the body of the deceased. It is claimed that this evidence showing a body in its condition after death was prejudicial and unnecessary. We have examined the photographs and think them competent. McKee v. State, Ala.App., 31 So.2d 656. The photographs show the three bullet wounds and tend to corroborate the testimony of the toxicologist that three shots were fired into the body of Gertha Grant. DeSilvey v. State, 245 Ala. 163...
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