Grant v. The Slater Mill and Power Co.
| Decision Date | 01 March 1884 |
| Citation | 14 R.I. 380 |
| Parties | GEORGE E. GRANT v. THE SLATER MILL AND POWER COMPANY. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
A local act of the legislature affecting the city of Providence provided that " every building already built or hereafter to be erected, in which twenty five or more operatives are employed in any of the stories above the second story, shall be provided with proper and sufficient strong and durable, metallic fire escapes, or stairways constructed as required by this act, unless exempted therefrom by the inspector of buildings, which shall be kept in good repair by the owner of such building, and no person shall at any time place any incumbrance upon any such fire escapes."
Other sections of the act provided remedies as follows:
The chief engineer of the fire department was charged with executing the provisions of the act.
Held, that the scheme of the act was to secure safe structures as a police measure and for the general safety.
Held, further, that it was not the scheme of the act to create any duty which could be made the subject of an action by individuals, and that no remedy in favor of individuals beyond what is expressly given in the act should be implied for mere neglect to perform the duties created by the act.
Hence, when one employed as an operative in a building subject to the act was compelled by a fire to jump from an upper window and thereby suffered injuries, there being no fire escape on the building, and brought trespass on the case against the owner of the building to recover damages for his injuries, alleging the owner's violation of the duties imposed by the act:
Held, on demurrer to the declaration, that the action could not be maintained.
Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R.I. 199, distinguished.
Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & B. 402, discussed.
TRESPASS ON THE CASE. On demurrer to the declaration.
The plaintiff's declaration stated that the defendant corporation owned and rented a building in which he was employed as an operative; that the defendant neglected to comply with the provisions of Pub. Laws R.I. cap. 688, of April 12, 1878, although subject to these provisions, in consequence of which the plaintiff was compelled by a conflagration in the building to leap from a window in an upper story in order to save his life; that his leg was fractured in the leap, and amputation became necessary. The defendant demurred generally to the declaration.
So much of cap. 688 as is involved in the case is recited in the opinion of the court.
Charles Hart, Benjamin T. Eames & Stephen A. Cooke, Jun., in support of the demurrer.
Henry J. Spooner, Augustus S. Miller & Arthur L. Brown, contra.
1. Where a statute imposes a duty for the benefit of particular persons or classes, an action on the case lies against the violator for special injuries caused by the violation: and the imposition of a penalty for the public offence does not affect the right of private redress. Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R.I. 456; Willy v. Mulledy, 78 N.Y. 310; Parker v. Barnard, 135 Mass. 116; Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R.I. 199; Cooley on Torts, 653-658, and cases cited: Caswell v. Worth, 5 El. & Bl. 849, 855; Britton v. Great Western Cotton Co. L. R. 7 Exch. 130; Brown's Legal Maxims, *194, *195.
2. Where precautionary rules are prescribed by statute for the protection of individuals, a failure to observe such rules is negligence per se. Every person while violating an express statute is a wrong doer, and as such is ex necessitate negligent in the eye of the law. Jetter v. N.Y. & Harlem R. R. Co. 2 Abb. Ct. App. Decis. 458, 464; 2 Thompson on Negligence, 1232, § 5.
A local building act required fire escapes on buildings where more than a certain number of operatives were employed, and imposed a penalty for a violation of the law, and also provided for an injunction. Held, that an operative employed in such a building having no fire escape could not maintain an action against the owner for an injury sustained by being compelled to jump from the building.
This is Case to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff caused by a destructive fire, which occurred November 21, 1882, in a building belonging to the defendant corporation, in which the plaintiff was employed as an operative. The action is founded on Public Laws R.I. cap. 688, § 23, of April 12, 1878, entitled, " An Act in relation to buildings in the city of Providence, and for other purposes." Section 23 is as follows, to wit:
" .
The declaration avers that the building which was burnt was four stories high, and that more than twenty five operatives were employed in each of the two upper stories. The declaration also alleges that said third and fourth stories were rented for workshops for manufacturing purposes by the corporation; that the operatives were employed by the tenants; that the corporation rented the said stories knowing there were more than twenty five operatives employed in each of them; that it derived great gains from the renting thereof, and that it thereby became subject to the duties imposed by the act. The corporation demurs to the declaration and contends that it is not liable to the action.
The question raised is one of great difficulty, as the question of civil liability is apt to be under such a statute. Cooley on Torts, 650, 651. The act expressly gives two remedies. Section 37[1] provides that any person violating any provision of the act, wherein no other penalty is prescribed shall be fined twenty dollars for every violation, and not exceeding twenty dollars for every day's continuance of the violation after service of warrant in the first complaint. The same section also provides that the Supreme Court may restrain by injunction any violation of the act, and may, according to the course of equity, secure the fulfilment and execution of the provisions thereof. The fines, when recovered, are directed to be paid into the city treasury. If the remedy by fine were the only remedy given, the inference would be, as decided in Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R.I. 199, that it was intended only as punishment for the public offence, and the remedy by action on the case in favor of persons specially injured, if such remedy were proper, would not be excluded. But in this respect the case at bar differs from Aldrich v. Howard, for in the case at bar there is the remedy by suit in equity, which is not purely a public remedy. The question, therefore, is whether two remedies being given, one of which is not necessarily solely for the public, it is not to be presumed that they were intended to be the only remedies. The familiar rule is, where a new right is created or a new duty imposed by statute, there, if a remedy be given by the same statute for its violation or nonfulfilment, the remedy given is exclusive. Is this rule inapplicable to the case at bar? Or, to put the question in another form, is the case at bar an exception to the rule? If it be, it is because the remedy in equity, being purely preventive, is no remedy for an injury already incurred. The answer to that is, if the preventive remedy had been resorted to in season, no injury would have been incurred. We are not prepared to say that the answer is entirely satisfactory, nor are we prepared to say that a statute might not be enacted, especially if it were enacted simply for the benefit of particular persons, under which the remedy in equity would be so clearly inadequate that it could not be presumed to have been intended to exclude the common law remedy by action on the case. It is evident, however, that the act here was designed primarily as a police regulation, and only incidentally, if at all, for the benefit of particular persons or classes of persons. It is when there is or may be a combination of both purposes that the difficulty arises. In such a case, says Judge Cooley, the question of civil liability for neglect of duty can only be determined by a careful consideration of the statute. Cooley on Torts, 681. This, too, is the doctrine enunciated in Atkinson v. Newcastle...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Munro v. City of Albuquerque (two Cases).
...by statute, and an adequate provision for its enforcement is therein made, the statutory remedy is exclusive.” In Grant v. Slater Mill & Power Co., 14 R.I. 380, it was held that under a statute as to fire escapes a public remedy is given and also a remedy by injunction, available by individ......
-
Munro v. City of Albuquerque
...and an adequate provision for its enforcement is therein made, the statutory remedy is exclusive." In Grant v. Slater Mill & Power Co., 14 R.I. 380, it was held that under a statute as to fire escapes a public remedy is given and also a remedy by injunction, available by individuals an acti......
-
Clements v. Tashjoin
......314] benefit of a particular class of persons, Grant v. Slater Mill & Power Co., 14 R.I. 380. And some years later in Oates v. ......
-
Johnson v. Snow
...... committed error in refusing to grant defendant's. instruction that plaintiff could not recover. From the ... comply with its requirements. Maker v. Slater Mill & Powder Co., 1 N.E. 176. (8) Section 4 of the act itself. indicates ... that it was intended to reach the person in possession with. power to control, whether he be owner, superintendent or. manager. However hard ......