Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 12286

• Decision Date: 02 June 1971
• Docket Number: No. 12286,12286
• Citation: 26 Utah 2d 100,485 P.2d 1035
• Parties: d 100 Maurice GRANT, Plaintiff, v. UTAH STATE LAND BOARD, Defendant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 1035

485 P.2d 1035

26 Utah 2d 100

Maurice GRANT, Plaintiff, v. UTAH STATE LAND BOARD, Defendant.

No. 12286.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 2, 1971.

Clyde, Mecham & Pratt, Frank J. Allen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Sheridan L. McGarry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant.

CROCKETT, Justice:

In this proceeding the plaintiff Maurice Grant seeks to reverse the action of Utah State Land Board in denying his application for reinstatement of certain contracts of purchase of State land.

The essential facts are not in dispute: The plaintiff had acquired personally, and by approved assignments, certain contracts of purchase of State lands, which were payable in installments. The payments were delinquent in January, 1966, and after proper notice remained delinquent in excess of 90 days, and were forfeited in accordance with the provision of Sec. 65-- 1--47, U.C.A.1953. ¹ Nearly three years later, on April 16, 1969, plaintiff presented his application for reinstatement of the contracts, together with one year's interest, as required by the section referred to. There had been no sale or lease of the lands meanwhile.

The issue in this case is brought into sharp focus by the plaintiff's statement that the following portion of said Sec. 65--1--47 vests in him 'the absolute right to reinstate a forfeited certificate at any time before lands described in the certificate are made subject of another sales or lease agreement':

* * * Any person whose contract of sale has been forfeited may upon application have his contract reinstated at any time before the land has again been sold or leased by paying one year's interest, and if said land has been leased, the board may reinstate said contract at the termination of said lease, or within thirty days thereafter, upon the payment of one year's interest as aforesaid.

The Land Board contends to the contrary: that the statute is permissive; and that the plaintiff's contract having been forfeited, he may have it reinstated only at the discretion of the Board.

It is to be conceded that the problem involves some perplexity. This is particularly so because upon a first-blush impression from reading the above-quoted portion of the statute by itself, the meaning might seem to depend upon where the emphasis is laid. Plaintiff argues that the language of the first emphasized clause, which deals with land which has not been leased, in stating that a purchaser '* * * may upon application have his contract reinstated' clearly mandates that the contracts must be reinstated. He contrasts this with the subsequent emphasized clause, which deals with land which has been leased, with respect to which it states that '* * * the board may reinstate said contract at the termination of the lease * * *.' He urges that there is sufficient contrast between the two provisions to indicate that the former is mandatory and the latter is discretionary.

We are constrained to agree that this argument projected by plaintiff is not entirely without plausibility. Assuming then, for the purpose of our analysis of this statute, that there are different interpretations that reasonably may be given its language, there are certain principles relating to statutory construction which may be resorted to for assistance in arriving at a proper solution to this problem.

Foundational rules require that we assume that each term of a statute was used advisedly; ² and that each should be given an interpretation and application in accord with their usually accepted meaning, ³ unless the context otherwise requires. In this connection it must be realized that, although there are exceptions where the context does fairly require otherwise, the word 'may' in its most usual meaning does not import certainty, but uncertainty. ⁴ That is, that whatever is referred to, either may or may not be, or occur. This line of reasoning proceeds: that if the legislature had intended an applicant to have an absolute right of reinstatement instead of saying that an applicant 'may have his contract reinstated,' it could easily have used the word 'shall' or 'must,' and thus have rendered a mandatory meaning clear.

The reasonable deduction here is that the use of the term 'may' in this statute in its ordinary meaning indicates that one 'may' or 'may not' have his contract reinstated upon a condition to be fulfilled, or a choice to be made. The plaintiff having made his choice by filing the application, the only remaining choice would be that of the Land Board. This reasoning then concludes: that the interpretation which gives the Land Board discretion as to whether the applicant 'may * * * have his contract reinstated' harmonizes with the rule of statutory construction stated above in assuming that the term was used advisedly and in consonance with its most commonly accepted meaning.

The other important term concerning which the plaintiff's urged interpretation raises a question is 'forfeit.' The statute provides that after notice is given to a defaulting purchaser, his contract may be forfeited, which it is conceded was done here. The term 'forfeited' in its usually accepted meaning as applied to rights to property is that they are taken away, or lost. ⁵ Thus it would seem that the idea advocated by plaintiff that he retains an absolute right to reinstate his contract is quite inconsistent with the true meaning and effect which should be given the words 'forfeit' and 'forfeiture' as used in the statute. Again, if the legislature had intended something so unlike a forfeiture as he contends, it should not have used that term. But it should have stated that the contract should be under suspension, remain in abeyance, or some other like term, until it was reactivated or...