Grantland v. Lea Regional Hosp., Inc., 19230

• Decision Date: 23 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. 19230,19230
• Citation: 796 P.2d 599,110 N.M. 378,1990 NMSC 76
• Parties: James R. GRANTLAND and Betty Grantland, husband and wife, Petitioners, v. LEA REGIONAL HOSPITAL, INC., Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 599

796 P.2d 599

110 N.M. 378

James R. GRANTLAND and Betty Grantland, husband and wife, Petitioners, v. LEA REGIONAL HOSPITAL, INC., Respondent.

No. 19230.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Aug. 23, 1990.

Gary C. Mitchell, Ruidoso, for petitioners.

Atwood, Malone, Mann & Turner, Rod M. Schumacher, Roswell, for respondent.

OPINION

WILSON, Justice.

Defendant-respondent Lea Regional Hospital, Inc. (Regional) filed a motion in district court to dismiss the medical malpractice complaint of plaintiffs-petitioners James R. and Betty Grantland (Grantlands) on the basis that the statute of limitations barred their recovery. When the district court denied Regional's motion, Regional filed an interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the district court. We granted certiorari and now reverse the court of appeals.

Pursuant to the Medical Malpractice Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 41-5-1 to -28 (Repl.Pamp.1989) (the Act), on May 14, 1986, Grantlands filed an application with the New Mexico medical review commission (the commission) requesting consideration of their claim of medical malpractice against Regional. Grantlands alleged that Regional committed medical malpractice in the care and treatment of James R. Grantland from mid-June through July 1983. In September 1986, Grantlands made further inquiry of the commission as to Regional's status as a qualified health care provider. On October 8, 1986, the commission advised Grantlands that Regional had not contributed to the patient's compensation fund and therefore was not a qualified health care provider under the Medical Malpractice Act.

In the meantime, on September 12, 1986, Grantlands filed a medical malpractice complaint against Regional in district court. The district court found that Grantlands did not know or have reason to know that Regional was not a qualified health care provider for the purposes of the Act, and even though the Grantlands' complaint was filed in district court more than three years after the date of the alleged malpractice, it was not barred by the statute of limitations as a matter of law.

The single issue in this case is whether the filing of a medical malpractice application with the New Mexico medical review commission tolls the statute of limitations as to nonqualified health care providers.

In 1976, the New Mexico legislature created a medical review commission to review all medical malpractice claims against "health care providers covered by the Medical Malpractice Act." Sec. 41-5-14(A). See generally Kovnat, Medical Malpractice Legislation in New Mexico, 7 N.M.L.Rev. 5 (1976-77). The intent of the Act is to prevent the filing of nonmeritorious malpractice lawsuits. Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482 (1985). To facilitate this purpose, the Act provides that prior to filing a complaint in any court against a "qualifying health care provider," the claimant must submit an application to the medical review commission. Sec. 41-5-15(A). Upon receipt of an application a panel is selected, Sec. 41-5-17, and after consideration of all relevant material, the panel decides only two questions, namely, "(1) whether there is substantial evidence that the acts complained of occurred and that they constitute malpractice; and (2) whether there is a reasonable medical probability that the patient was injured thereby." Sec. 41-5-20. Submission of a case for the consideration of the panel tolls the statute of limitations period until thirty days after the panel's final decision is entered in the permanent files of the commission and a copy is served upon the claimant and his attorney by certified mail. Sec. 41-5-22.

In its opinion the court of appeals relies upon Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482 (1985). A comprehensive reading of this case convinces us that claimants who make a good-faith attempt to comply with the Medical Malpractice Act should not be deprived of their day in court by placing form above substance. As stated in Zouhar:

We see no justice in strictly applying the Act now to void the complaint filed and thus circumvent the tolling provision of the Act that would have applied to save [claimant's] cause of action if the trial court's ruling and the time consumed in appellate proceedings had not intervened. Such "Catch-22's" are procedural anomalies that do not deserve perpetuation.

102 N.M. at 485, 697 P.2d at 485.

Similarly, in Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425, 659 P.2d 311 (1983) we allowed the claimants to circumvent Section 41-5-15(A) and file their medical malpractice complaint in district court before applying for the commission's review in order to protect their constitutional right of access to the courts. In that case we said: "The institution of the Medical Review Commission as a forum for screening medical malpractice claims appears to work well in most instances. Nevertheless, when a statute or rule operates to deprive an individual of a protected right, it may be held constitutionally invalid as applied to that individual." 99 N.M. at 426, 659 P.2d at 312.

Like the claimants in Zouhar and Jiron, Grantlands are in a "Catch-22" position. Had Grantlands filed a complaint in district court and then discovered after the statute of limitations had run that Regional was a qualified health care provider, strict adherence to the Act would eliminate Grantlands' chance of recovery. In this case the opposite situation occurred: Grantlands filed an application with the commission and before they were notified that Regional was not a qualified health care provider, the statute of limitations barred their filing in district court. We cannot accept this result. If we require claimants to file in district court at the peril of losing their case before the classification of the health care provider is known, then every claim will be filed in district court as a safety precaution, and the purpose behind the Act (to prevent court filing of nonmeritorious malpractice claims) will be defeated. The medical profession likely will suffer the ill effects of their members being accused publicly, and perhaps unjustly, of malpractice, the cost of health care may escalate as medical malpractice insurance premiums reflect the number of medical malpractice cases being filed in the courts, and the courts will be burdened with premature and frivolous medical malpractice claims.

We hold that Section 41-5-22, which tolls the statute of limitations period upon submission of a case to the commission, should be enforced according to its terms whether the commission's determination is that the health care provider is not qualified and the claim is consequently rejected, or whether the commission determines that the health care provider is qualified and the claim is resolved on its merits. To the extent that Otero v. Zouhar holds Section 41-5-22 inapplicable to nonqualified health care providers, it is overruled.

The court of appeals is reversed, and the district court is affirmed with directions to proceed in a manner consistent with this opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

RANSOM, BACA and MONTGOMERY, JJ., concur.

SOSA, C.J., dissents.

SOSA, Chief Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. I agree with the court of appeals that the hospital's motion to dismiss should be granted on the basis that the filing of the complaint after the statute of limitations period expired barred recovery.

Section 41-5-13 of the Medical Malpractice Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 41-5-1 through -28 (Repl.Pamp.1989 & Cum.Supp.1990), is controlling as to whether any medical malpractice action has been timely filed. Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (Ct.App.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016, 103 S.Ct. 377, 74 L.Ed.2d 510 (1982). The three-year limitations period under Section 41-5-13 begins to run from the date of the alleged act of malpractice, but, upon submission of the case to the medical review panel, the limitations period is tolled...