Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith

• Decision Date: 11 April 1955
• Docket Number: No. 261,261
• Citation: 3 V.I. 701
• Parties: ELIZABETH R. GRANVILLE-SMITH, Petitioner v. EDWARD GRANVILLE-SMITH, Respondent
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

3 V.I. 701

ELIZABETH R. GRANVILLE-SMITH, Petitioner v. EDWARD GRANVILLE-SMITH, Respondent

No. 261

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued February 3 and 4, 1955

Decided April 11, 1955

See, also, 349 U.S. 1,75 S. Ct. 553, 99 L. Ed. 773

Writ of certiorari in wife's divorce action where District Court of Virgin Islands denied divorce on jurisdictional grounds and Court of Appeals affirmed (3 V.I. 519). The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held that a Virgin Islands statute making six weeks presence prior to filing divorce complaint prima facie evidence of domicile, was designed for people outside the Virgin Islands and thus beyond the power delegated to the Virgin Islands Legislative Assembly by Congress to legislate on subject of local application, and proof of domicile pursuant to the statute was insufficient to confer jurisdiction in uncontested divorce action.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Clark, with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Reed joined, dissented.

[COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED]

ABE FORTAS, WASHINGTON, D. C., for petitioner

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, Cambridge, Mass., amicus curiae, by invitation of the Court

No brief filed for respondent.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns § 9(a) (16 V.I.C. § 106 note) of the divorce law of the Virgin Islands:

"Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 8 and 9 [16 V.I.C. §§ 105, 106] hereof,¹ if the plaintiff is within the district at the time of the filing of the complaint and has been continuously for six weeks immediately prior thereto, this shall be prima facie evidence of domicile, and where the defendant has been personally served within the district or enters a general appearance in theaction, then the Court shall have jurisdiction of the action and of the parties thereto without further reference to domicile or to the place where the marriage was solemnized or the cause of action arose."

The circumstances of the case and the course of the litigation are briefly stated. Petitioner filed suit for divorce because of "irreconcilable incompatibility"² in the District Court of the Virgin Islands on March 16, 1953. The complaint alleged that she had been a "resident and inhabitant" of the Islands for more than six weeks prior to the commencement of the action, that respondent was not a resident of the Islands, and that the couple had no children under 21. Through Virgin Islands counsel — authorized by a power of attorney executed in New York — respondent entered an appearance, waived personal service, denied petitioner's allegations, and filed a "Waiver and Consent" to "hearing of this cause as if by default" and to "such findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree as to the Court may seem just and reasonable."

Solely on the basis of petitioner's testimony that she had resided in the Virgin Islands continuously for 43 days before bringing suit, the Commissioner who heard the case found that she was a resident and inhabitant of the Islands and had been so for more than six weeks prior to the action. Having also found that the claimed ground for divorce was substantiated, he recommended that she be granted a divorce. On petitioner's motion to confirm the Commissioner's recommendation, the District Court inquired of petitioner's counsel whether he had "any more evidence to offer on the question of domicile." Since no further evidence was proffered, the court, relying on its earlier opinion in Alton v. Alton (2 VI. 282), 121 F. Supp. 878, dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction over petitioner.

[1] The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed (3 V.L 519), 214 F.2d 820, on the basis of its decision in the Alton case (2 V.L 600), 207 F.2d 667. In that case, the Court of Appeals, likewise sitting en banc and three judges dissenting, held § 9(a) in violation of "due process" guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and the Virgin Islands Organic Act (1936, prec. 1 V.I.C), 48 U.S.C. § 1405 et seq. This Court had granted certiorari in the Alton case, 347 U.S. 911, 74 S. Ct. 478, 98 L. Ed. 1068, but intervening mootness aborted disposition on the merits. 347 U.S. 610 (3 V.I. 699), 74 S. Ct. 736, 98 L. Ed. 987. The obvious importance of the issue which brought the Alton case here led us to grant certiorari in this case. 348 U.S. 810, 75 S. Ct. 60. In view of the lack of genuine adversary proceedings at any stage in this litigation, the outcome of which could have far-reaching consequences on domestic relations throughout the United States, the Court invited specially qualified counsel "to appear and present oral argument as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below." 348 U.S. 885, 75 S. Ct. 205.

[2] We need not consider any of the substantive questions passed on below and we intimate nothing about them. For we find that Congress did not give the Virgin Islands Legislative Assembly power to enact a law with the radiations of § 9(a).

Article IV, § 3 of the Constitution gives the Congress authority to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . ." Accordingly, Congress has from time to time established governments in the various territories that have come under federal control. Territorial government in the continental United States was customarily viewed as a transition step to statehood, and statehood in fact resulted. The Spanish-American War openeda new chapter. Beginning with the Treaty of Paris, the United States acquired by conquest, treaty or purchase outlying territories for which statehood was not contemplated. The position of these territories in our national scheme gave rise to lively political controversy. Answers to some of the constitutional issues that arose were unfolded in a series of decisions best formulated, perhaps, in opinions by Mr. Chief Justice White³ and Mr. Chief Justice Taft.⁴

A vital distinction was made between "incorporated" and "unincorporated" territories.⁵ The first category had the potentialities of statehood like unto continental territories. The United States Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, fully applied to an "incorporated" territory. See, e.g., Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 25 S. Ct. 514, 49 L. Ed. 862. The second category described possessions of the United States not thought of as future States. To these only some essentials, withal undefined, of the Constitution extended. See, e.g., Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S. Ct. 343, 66 L. Ed. 627. The incidence of the differentiation fell in two areas: (a) the right of the individual to trial by jury and similar protections, e.g., Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, supra; (b) the right of the Federal Government to tax territorial products on a nonuniform basis, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S. Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. 1088.

The legislative power of territories has customarily been expressed as extending to "all rightful subjects of legislation" not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of theUnited States.⁶ This conventional phrasing was altered to subjects of "local application," or "not locally inapplicable," in the case of unincorporated territories such as pre-Commonwealth Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam.⁷

The questions that have arisen under grants of legislative powers to territories have fallen into three main classes: (1) those in which the sovereign immunity of the territory was in issue, e.g., People of Porto Rico v. Rosaly y Castillo, 227 U.S. 270, 33 S. Ct. 352, 57 L. Ed. 507; (2) those in which conflict was claimed with the United States Constitution or laws, e.g., People of Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 58 S. Ct. 167, 82 L. Ed. 235; Territory of Montana v. Lee, 2 Mont. 124; (3) those in which the "rightful" nature of particular territorial legislation was assailed, e.g., Chuoco Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 33 S. Ct. 585, 57 L. Ed. 960; People v. Daniels, 6 Utah 288, 22 Pac. 159, 5 L.R.A. 444. It is the third group that is our immediate concern. In determining the rightfulness of territorial legislation the courts have considered whether a territorial legislature has transcended the familiar bonds of legislation. See, e.g., Christianson v. King County, 239 U.S. 356, 36 S. Ct. 114, 60 L. Ed. 327. One of the earlier questions regarding the power of territorial legislatures involved the right to pass laws applicable not generally but to specific individuals or portions of a territory. In May-nard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 S. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654, this Court held that a legislative divorce granted without cause by the Oregon Territorial Legislature to a local homesteader was valid though the wife was not in the Territory and had had no notice. The Court relied on the historic practice ofindividual legislative divorces.⁸ It is significant, however, that while the litigation was in progress Congress forbade territories to pass "local" or "special" divorce laws. 24 Stat. 170, now 48 U.S.C, § 1471.

The United States acquired the Virgin Islands by purchase from Denmark in 1917,⁹ but it was not until the Organic Act of 1936, prec. 1 V.I.C, that Congress provided a complete government — including a Legislative Assembly. The Organic Act: (1) labeled the Islands an "insular possession" of the United States, 49 Stat. 1807, 48 U.S.C § 1405a; (2) endowed the Legislative Assembly (consisting of the two pre-existing municipal councils in joint session) with power to enact laws on "all subjects of local application not inconsistent with . . . this title or the laws of the United States made applicable to said islands, but no law shall be enacted which would impair rights existing or arising by virtue of any treaty entered into by the United States, nor shall the lands or other property of nonresidents be taxed higher than the lands or other property of residents", 49 Stat. 1811, 48 U.S.C. § 1405r; (3) enacted a due process clause for the Islands, 49 Stat. 1915, 48 U.S.C. §...