Grass v. Damar Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | 1:13-cv-00310-JMS-DML |
| Parties | JAMES H. GRASS, Plaintiff, v. DAMAR SERVICES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Presently pending before the Court in this action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Indiana Wage Payment Act ("IWPA"), and the Indiana Wage Claims Act ("IWCA") are Defendant Damar Services, Inc.'s ("Damar") Motion for Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 38], and Motion for Leave to Amend Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 48]. The crux of Damar's Motion for Summary Judgment is that Mr. Grass was an exempt employee who is not entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay under the FLSA. Mr. Grass maintains that he was a non-exempt employee.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As the current version of Rule 56 makes clear, whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party can also support a fact by showing that thematerials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Affidavits or declarations must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on matters stated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider disputed facts that are material to the decision. A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Hampton v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009). In other words, while there may be facts that are in dispute, summary judgment is appropriate if those facts are not outcome determinative. Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2005). Fact disputes that are irrelevant to the legal question will not be considered. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
On summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court need only consider the cited materi-als, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has "repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not required to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them," Johnson, 325 F.3d at 898. Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial is resolved against the moving party. Ponsetti v. GE Pension Plan, 614 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 2010). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court construes facts and draws inferences "in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made." Keck Garrett & Associates, Inc. v. Nextel Communications, Inc., 517 F.3d 476, 483 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting In re United Air Lines, Inc., 453 F.3d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 2006)).
II.
BACKGROUND
At the outset, the Court is compelled to address a deficiency in Mr. Grass' brief in response to Damar's Motion for Summary Judgment. Local Rule 56-1(e) provides:
A party must support each fact the party asserts in a brief with a citation to a discovery response, a deposition, an affidavit, or other admissible evidence. The evidence must be in the record or in an appendix to the brief. The citation must refer to a page or paragraph number or otherwise similarly specify where the relevant information can be found in the supporting evidence.
Local Rule 56-1(e) (emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) () (emphasis added). Citing an entire lengthy document without pointing the Court to the page or paragraph number where such evidence can be found fails to comply with the dictates of Local Rule 56-1(e).
For example, for the proposition that Damar required him to "carry[y] a cell phone at all times to be available for phone calls, which [he] did," Mr. Grass cites to "Ex. B, Ex. F, Ex. C,"but does not provide the page numbers of those exhibits which contain the referenced information. [Filing No. 45 at 10.] Exhibit B (filed as "Exhibit 2" on the CM/ECF system) is a forty-six page excerpt from Mr. Grass' deposition, [Filing No. 44-2], Exhibit F (filed as "Exhibit 6") is a forty-four page excerpt from Mr. Vandivier's deposition, [Filing No. 44-6], and Exhibit C (filed as "Exhibit 3") consists of ten pages of copies of Mr. Grass' Annual Performance Appraisals, [Filing No. 44-3]. To support the statement that Mr. Grass "frequently took maintenance calls during evenings, weekends, holidays and while on vacation," [Filing No. 45 at 10], he cites again to "Ex. B" (the forty-six page excerpt from his deposition), and also to "Ex. G" (filed as "Exhibit 7"), which is a forty-one page document that includes Damar's written discovery responses. [Filing No. 44-7.] This is insufficient under Local Rule 56-1(e) in that it does not provide the Court with the "page or paragraph number or otherwise similarly specify where the relevant information can be found in the supporting evidence." Local Rule 56-1(e).
The Local Rules make clear that the Court is under no obligation to review the evidence, such as lengthy deposition excerpts, in a wholesale fashion unless Mr. Grass specifically directs the Court to certain portions of it. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has "repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not required to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them," Johnson, 325 F.3d at 898, yet this is exactly what Mr. Grass expects in generally citing to lengthy documents in the record without pointing the Court to the specific "page or paragraph number," Local Rule 56-1(e).
Mr. Grass' failure to comply with the Federal and Local Rules in his response brief has consequences. In deciding Damar's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will only consider Mr. Grass' factual assertions that are supported by citations to record evidence that - when the exhibit is voluminous - include the page or paragraph number or otherwise sufficiently direct theCourt to the place in the cited document that supports the factual assertion in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and Local Rule 56-1(e). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (). The factual background set forth below reflects this approach.
The Court finds the following to be the undisputed facts, supported by admissible evidence in the record:
Damar is a not-for-profit agency that provides numerous community programs for children and adults with developmental and behavioral challenges. [Filing No. 40-3 at 2.] Between 2010 and 2012, Damar provided programs for between 1,200 and 1,450 clients on a daily basis. [Filing No. 40-4 at 4.] Damar employed an average of 823, 864, and 924 employees in 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively. [Filing No. 40-4 at 4.]
Damar's Maintenance Department maintains all Damar buildings and much of its grounds. [Filing No. 40-3 at 2.] In 2012, this included "almost 200,000 square feet in fifteen buildings on the main campus of approximately forty-six acres, four Medicare-licensed group homes, five DCS-licensed group homes, fifteen Transitional Service Line homes, two ancillary office properties, and a Charter School." [Filing No. 40-3 at 2.] The Operating Budget for the Maintenance Department in fiscal years ending June 30, 2011 and 2012 was $935,768.00 and $922,671.00, respectively. [Filing No. 40-4 at 4.]
Joseph Vandivier was the Maintenance Director, in charge of all operations and safety, in 1998. [Filing No. 40-3 at 3.] In June 1998, Mr. Vandivier hired Mr. Grass as Maintenance Su-pervisor. [Filing No. 40-1 at 10; Filing No. 40-3 at 3.] Mr. Vandivier told Mr. Grass that he expected Mr. Grass would use his technical expertise and experience to train the Maintenance Department staff. [Filing No. 40-3 at 4.] Mr. Grass reported to Mr. Vandivier during the entire time that he was Maintenance Director. [Filing No. 40-1 at 26.]
In August 2011, Mr. Grass requested that his title be changed to Facility Maintenance Manager because "due to the fact that I have a ground manager, a garage manager and am requesting a campus...
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