Grassel v. Dep't of Educ. of N.Y., 12-CV-1016 (PKC)
| Decision Date | 20 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | 12-CV-1016 (PKC) |
| Parties | RONALD GRASSEL, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Pro se Plaintiff Ronald Grassel ("Grassel") brought this action against his employer, the Department of Education of the City of New York ("DOE"), alleging violations of Title 42, United States Code, §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"). In his Complaint, Grassel alleged, inter alia, that the DOE had subjected him to an impermissible medical exam and disability-related inquiry, discriminated against him based on a perceived disability, and retaliated against him for filing a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In a Memorandum and Opinion ("M&O"), dated September 24, 2015, this Court granted summary judgment to the DOE on Plaintiff's ADA and NYSHRL claims of discrimination based on a perceived disability, Plaintiff's ADA and NYSHRL claims of retaliation, and Plaintiff's Section 1981, 1983, and 1985(3) claims. Grassel v. Dept. of Educ. of the City of New York (Grassel I), No. 12-CV-1016, 2015 WL 5657343, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015). However, the Court denied Defendant's summary judgment motion as to Plaintiff's impermissible medical exam and disability-related inquiry claim under the ADA because the DOE's motion papers made no attempt to assert that the medical exam and inquiry at issue were "job-related and consistent with business necessity," as required under the ADA. Id. at *7-8. The Court allowed the DOE to address this remaining claim in a supplemental summary judgment motion.1 (Dkt. 63 ("Def. Supp. Mem.").) The Court directed the DOE to submit as part of its briefing, to the extent it could, an affidavit attesting to the DOE's policy and business necessity for requiring its employees to undergo medical exams and answer questions relating to their physical and mental health. (See 11/17/2016 Order.)
In its supplemental motion, the DOE, for the first time, raised the argument that Plaintiff must allege injury-in-fact in order to recover damages under Section 12112(d) of the ADA ("ADA Section 12112(d)"), the section that prohibits employers from requiring employees and job applicants to undergo medical exams and from posing disability-related inquiries to employees. (Def. Supp. Mem at 2-3.) In light of this belated argument, the Court allowed Plaintiff to supplement his Complaint to the extent he had intended to allege emotional or physical injury as a result of the medical exam and disability-related inquiry at issue. On December 16, 2016, Plaintiff supplemented his Complaint. (Dkt. 66.) On January 5, 2017, the Court heard oral argument on Defendant's supplemental motion.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS summary judgment to the DOE on Plaintiff's sole remaining claim.
On January 18, 2011, under the DOE's directive, Grassel met with Dr. Ann Garner ("Dr. Garner"), a School Medical Inspector employed by the DOE, for a psychological evaluation ("2011 Exam"). (Def. 56.1, ¶ 7.)3 As part of the 2011 Exam, Grassel was given a form to complete that asked about his physical and mental health history ("DOE Form"). (Dkt. 38-1, Deposition of Ronald Grassel dated August 16, 2013 ("Grassel Dep.") at 190:21-22.)4 At the exam, Dr. Garner asked Grassel several questions. (Grassel Dep. at 192:5-8.) While it isunclear exactly what those questions were, according to Dr. Garner's notes, Grassel's vision was discussed. The notes indicate that Grassel had suffered a retinal detachment and tear in his left eye and that his vision was poor at that time. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 14; Compl. at ECF 69-70.)5 Grassel denies having any problems with his eye (Compl. at ECF 6, ¶ 19) or bringing up a vision problem with Dr. Garner (Pl. 56.1 at ECF 2).6 Though Dr. Garner found Grassel psychologically fit, she deemed him "not fit" to return to work pending further medical clearance, citing his self-reported vision problems. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 16; Compl. at ECF 71.) Dr. Garner requested documentation from Grassel's treating ophthalmologist regarding the diagnosis, current signs and symptoms, treatment, and prognosis regarding Grassel's left eye. (Dkt. 38-4, Hearing Officer's Opinion and Award dated May 14, 2012 ("Hearing Op.") at ECF 9.) Grassel submitted the requested documentation, and Dr. Garner scheduled a follow-up medical exam that was to include a vision exam. (Id. at ECF 10.) Grassel, however, did not appear for that exam. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 19; Hearing Op. at ECF 9.) Due to Grassel's failure to appear, the DOE rescheduled the exam twice. (Def. 56.1, ¶¶ 18-19; Hearing Op. at ECF 9-11.) Grassel did not appear for any of the exams and objected to the follow-up exam as being outside the scope of the 2011 Exam. (Hearing Op. at ECF 11.)
Based on Grassel's failure to appear for a follow-up exam, the DOE brought disciplinary charges against Grassel under N.Y. Education Law § 3020-a, alleging that the failure constituted insubordination and just cause for termination. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 20; Hearing Op. at ECF 4.) The matter was presented to an arbitrator over the course of multiple hearings between August 2011 and February 2012. (Id. at ECF 3.) As summarized in Grassel I:
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action on March 1, 2012. Defendant answered on March 28, 2012. Defendant moved for summary judgment on August 18, 2014, and Plaintiff opposed the motion on September 29, 2014. The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment on September 24, 2015. On October 7, 2016, Defendant filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff filed his response on October 21, 2016. On December 16, 2016, Defendant filed an affidavit attesting to the DOE's policy and business necessity for requiring its employees to submit to a medical exam pursuantto N.Y. Education Law Section 2568 ("NYEL Section 2568"). On the same day, Plaintiff supplemented his Complaint with allegations of injury caused by the 2011 Exam. On January 5, 2017, the Court held oral argument on Defendant's supplemental summary judgment motion.
A defendant seeking summary judgment must establish that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact," and that they are thus "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Material" facts are facts that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A "genuine" dispute exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. "The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact." Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep't, 613 F.3d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Once a defendant has met his initial burden, the plaintiff must "designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-24 (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether there are genuine disputes of material fact, the court must "resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court's inquiry upon summary judgment is "determining whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also id. at 251-52 (). "Summary judgment is appropriate only '[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.'" Donnelly v. Greenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 691 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2012) (alterations in original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
Plaintiff claims that that the DOE violated the ADA by directing him to undergo a medical exam on January 18, 2011, and to complete the DOE Form. (Dkt. 1-1, Compl. at ECF 3-6; Dkt. 36 ("Pl. Opp.") at ECF 4; Grassel Dep. at...
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