Gravely v. Thiel

Docket Number1:22-CV-01588
Decision Date15 September 2023
PartiesNAIYANA V. GRAVELY, D.O., Plaintiff, v. ALAINA M. THIEL, M.D., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CHARLES E. FLEMING, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Naiyana Graveley's complaint against Defendants Alaina M. Thiel M.D. (Dr. Thiel), Kathleen M. Fay, M.D. (“Dr. Fay”), Melanie K. Bortell, D.O. (“Dr Bortell”), Cynthia S. Kelley, D.O. (“Dr Kelley”), and Paul D. Chenowith, D.O. (“Dr. Chenowith,” and collectively, the “Individual Defendants). The motion asserts that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which this Court may afford her relief. (ECF No. 15). For the reasons stated herein, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendants alleging that her employment was terminated based on her race and in retaliation for her prior protected activity against the Defendants in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Ohio Civil Rights Act, Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code (the Revised Code). (ECF No. 1, PagelD 2-3).

On October 5, 2022, the Individual Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that neither Title VII nor the Revised Code permit liability against individual employees who allegedly engaged in discriminatory or retaliatory conduct. (ECF No. 15, PageID 70).

On October 17, 2022, Plaintiff opposed Individual Defendants' motion. (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff admitted that the Title VII claims against the Individual Defendants are not permissible, but she countered that the Revised Code does not bar liability for claims of retaliation or aiding and abetting discrimination against individual employees. Id.

On October 31, 2022, the Individual Defendants replied in support of their motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 18). The Individual Defendants asserted that Plaintiff failed to state claims alleging retaliation or aiding and abetting discrimination by them. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. The “complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some viable legal theory.” Commercial Money Center, Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). In assessing plausibility, the Court construes factual allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, accepts the allegations of the complaint as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff's favor. Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides that a pleading setting forth a claim for relief must contain:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction ...;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

FRCP 8(a)(1)-(3). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) is intended “to give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This requirement ensures “that the defending party can prepare an adequate answer.” The State Bank & Trust Co. v. Spaeth (In re Motorwerks, Inc.), 371 B.R. 281, 292 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007). Pursuant to this rule, “the form of the complaint is not significant if it alleges facts upon which relief can be granted, even if it fails to categorize correctly the legal theory giving rise to the claim.” Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 765 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If the pleading is sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the grounds for which plaintiff is seeking relief, the pleading will satisfy the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) “notwithstanding plaintiff's failure to ... cite the relevant statute.” Chiaverini, Inc. v. Frenchie's Fine Jewelry, Coins & Stamps, Inc., 2007 WL 1344183, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 4, 2007).

III. ANALYSIS

The Individual Defendants allege that Plaintiff failed to state a claim pursuant to Title VII and the Revised Code. (ECF No. 15). Defendants argue that neither Title VII nor the Revised Code permit liability against individual employees who allegedly engage in discriminatory or retaliatory conduct. (Id. at PageID 70). The Individual Defendants request that the Title VII and Revised Code claims against them be dismissed with prejudice. Id.

A. Title VII

Plaintiff did not oppose Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss her Title VII claims against them. (ECF No. 17). The Sixth Circuit has long held that individual employees cannot be subject to liability under Title VII. Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2000); Little v. BP Exploration & Oil Co., 265 F.3d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The law in this Circuit is clear that a supervisor who does not otherwise qualify as an employer cannot be held personally or individually liable under Title VII.”); Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997) (We now hold that an individual employee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as an ‘employer,' may not be held personally liable under Title VII.”).

Accordingly, count one and count two are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE against the Individual Defendants.

B. Ohio Civil Rights Act- Retaliation

In count three, Plaintiff asserts claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Ohio Civil Rights Acts, Ohio Revised Code §§ 4112.01, et seq., (2022 Supp.). (ECF No. 1, PageID 16-17). Defendants argue that they are not subject to liability under the Revised Code and any claims against them should be dismissed. (ECF No. 15, PageID 77-78). In response, Plaintiff argues that Individual Defendants are subject to liability under the Revised Code for retaliation under O.R.C. § 4112.02(I). (ECF No. 17). The Individual Defendants reply that the complaint does not include the specific claim for retaliation, so Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 18).

In addressing the issue that Revised Code subsections 4112.02(I) and 4112.02(J) are not cited explicitly in the Plaintiff's original complaint, this Court follows the Sixth Circuit in its application of Twombly stating that a complaint need only allege facts upon which relief can be granted, regardless of its form. Gean, 330 F.3d 758. Here, Plaintiff not only alleged facts upon which relief could be granted, but she did so in an adequate fashion to allow Defendants to prepare an answer. (ECF No. 1). Further, Plaintiff alleges a violation under “Ohio Revised Code §§ 4112.01, et seq., (2022 Supp.),” a citation that includes both O.R.C. § 4112.02(I) and O.R.C. § 4112.02(J). (Id. at PageID 2). Therefore, the Court will consider whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a claim under O.R.C. § 4112.02(I) and O.R.C. § 4112.02(J) against the Individual Defendants.

O.R.C. § 4112.02(I) defines an unlawful discriminatory practice as the following:

For any person to discriminate in any manner against any other person because that person has opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice defined in this section or because that person has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under sections 4112.01 to 4112.07 of the Revised Code.

To establish retaliation under this statute, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) the defending party was aware that the claimant had engaged in that activity, (3) the defending party took an adverse employment action against the employee, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action.” Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 879 N.E.2d 174, 180 (Ohio 2007). To satisfy the second element, the plaintiff must show that the defending party had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's protected activity as opposed to “general corporate knowledge” of the activity. Rembert v. Swagelok Co., 604 F.Supp.3d 670, 694 (N.D. Ohio 2022) (“This element cannot be met merely by showing that the defendant had ‘general corporate knowledge' of the protected activity; rather, the plaintiff must present evidence that the decisionmaker had actual knowledge of the protected activity.”).

The requirements to establish an adverse employment action in the context of retaliation differ from the requirements to establish an adverse employment action in the context of discrimination. Moody v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 183 N.E.3d 21, 33 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 2021) (defining an adverse employment action under a discrimination claim to be “a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment.”). In the context of retaliation, however, an adverse employment action is defined as an action that “might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 37 (citation omitted).

To establish a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, Plaintiff “must produce sufficient evidence from which an inference could be...

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