Graves v. Arpaio

Decision Date20 April 2009
Docket NumberNo. CV-77-0479-PHX-NVW.,CV-77-0479-PHX-NVW.
Citation633 F.Supp.2d 834
PartiesFred GRAVES, Isaac Popoca, on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of all pretrial detainees in the Maricopa County Jails, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph ARPAIO, Sheriff of Maricopa County; Fulton Brock, Don Stapley, Andrew Kunasek, Max W. Wilson, and Mary Rose Wilcox, Maricopa County Supervisors, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Debra Ann Hill, Larry A. Hammond, Sharad H. Desai, Osborn Maledon PA, Daniel Joseph Pochoda, ACLU, Phoenix, AZ, Hanh Nguyen, Margaret Winter, ACLU, National Prison Project, Washington, DC, Theodore C. Jarvi, Law Offices of Theodore Jarvi, Tempe, AZ, for Plaintiffs.

Adam S. Polson, Dennis Ira Wilenchik, Thomas E. Lordan, Wilenchik & Bartness PC, Michele Marie Iafrate, Courtney Rachel Cloman, Iafrate & Associates, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.

ORDER

NEIL V. WAKE, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Non-taxable Costs. (Doc. # 1640.)

I. Background

In 1977 this class action was brought against the Maricopa County Sheriff and the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors alleging that the civil rights of pretrial detainees held in the Maricopa County, Arizona, jail system had been violated. (Doc. # 1.) In 1981 the parties entered into a consent decree that addressed and regulated aspects of County jail operations as they applied to pretrial detainees. (Doc. # 166.)

In 1995 the initial consent decree was superseded by an Amended Judgment entered by stipulation of the parties. (Doc. # 705.) The Amended Judgment provided relief regarding the following: population/housing limitations, dayroom access, natural light and windows, artificial lighting, temperature, noise, access to reading materials, access to religious services, mail, telephone privileges, clothes and towels, sanitation, safety, hygiene, toilet facilities, access to law library, medical care, dental care, psychiatric care, intake areas, mechanical restraints, segregation, outdoor recreation, inmate classification, visitation, food, visual observation by detention officers, training and screening of staff members, facilities for the handicapped, disciplinary policy and procedures, inmate grievance policy and procedures, reports and record keeping, security override, and dispute resolution.

In 1998 Defendants filed a motion to terminate the Amended Judgment pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3626 and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. (Doc. # 755.) Judge Earl H. Carroll denied the motion to terminate, relying on Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.1998), which held the decree termination provisions of the PLRA to be unconstitutional. (Doc. # 774.) Defendants appealed from the denial of their motion for termination. (Doc. # 777.) The Taylor panel opinion subsequently was withdrawn.

On January 25, 2001, 2 Fed.Appx. 867 (9th Cir.2001), the Ninth Circuit issued a memorandum decision reviewing the denial of Defendants' motion to terminate the Amended Judgment. (Doc. # 799.) Acknowledging that Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987 (9th Cir.2000), held the PLRA decree termination provision constitutional and controlled the appeal, it reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with Gilmore. (Doc. # 799.)

On September 25, 2001, Defendants renewed their motion to terminate. (Doc. # 821). On September 12, 2002, Judge Carroll denied Defendants' renewed motion to terminate without prejudice subject to findings to be entered following an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. # 840.) On November 14, 2003, Defendants filed a pre-hearing memorandum in support of a renewed motion to terminate, which operated as a second renewed motion to terminate the Amended Judgment. (Doc. # 906.)

On November 25, 2003, and January 22, 2004, Judge Carroll began hearing evidence on Defendants' motion. (Doc. ## 918, 939.) The parties engaged in further discovery, but the hearing was not completed. On April 3, 2008, Judge Carroll caused the case to be reassigned, and it subsequently was assigned to the undersigned judge. (Doc. ## 1222, 1234.) On April 25, 2008, 2008 WL 2008966, this Court set Defendants' motion to terminate the Amended Judgment for evidentiary hearing commencing August 12, 2008. (Doc. # 1241.) Evidence was received and argument heard on August 12-15, 19-22, 28-29, 2008, and September 3-5, 2008. From May to August 2008, the parties conducted a substantial amount of discovery, including tours of five jail facilities with experts, review of medical records at each facility, and numerous depositions of fact and expert witnesses.

Based upon the pre-hearing and post-hearing briefing, oral argument, and the evidence presented, the Court made findings of fact and conclusions of law on October 22, 2008, 2008 WL 4699770. (Doc. # 1634.) With respect to the Amended Judgment, the Court found some provisions exceeded constitutional minimums, some provisions did not exceed constitutional minimums but are no longer necessary to correct current and ongoing violations of federal rights, and some provisions did not exceed constitutional minimums and continue to be necessary to correct current and ongoing violations of federal rights of pretrial detainees. The Court expressly found:

475. . . . . Plaintiffs have proven, or Defendants failed to disprove, current and ongoing violations of constitutional right and of the Amended Judgment as originally written or as narrowed by the Second Amended Judgment. Defendants are in breach of the Amended Judgment as found in these findings and conclusions and as it is restated and narrowed by the Second Amended Judgment entered this day.

. . . .

478. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) for the award of attorney fees, Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties on Defendants' Renewed Motion to Terminate the Amended Judgment (doc. # 906) and its predecessors.

479. Subject to the limitations of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d), Plaintiffs are entitled to award of attorney fees incurred in defending against the motion. Fees may be claimed under the procedures in Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2) and LRCiv 54.2 upon entry of this order. If enforcement proceedings become necessary, future fees may be claimed and will be determined and awarded at appropriate intervals during the enforcement proceedings.

On October 22, 2008, the Court also entered the Second Amended Judgment, which vacated the Amended Judgment as to future effect and restated the portions of the Amended Judgment that continue in effect, as originally written or as modified. (Doc. # 1635.) The Second Amended Judgment ordered prospective relief regarding the numbers of pretrial detainees housed in cells and placed in holding cells; the maximum temperature in housing of pretrial detainees taking prescribed psychotropic medications; cleaning supplies and sanitization of cells prior to occupancy by pretrial detainees; toilets, sinks, toilet paper, and soap in intake areas and court holding cells; receiving screenings; access to care for serious medical and mental health needs; continuity of prescription medications; continuous monitoring in intake areas; access to toilet and wash basin facilities in intake areas; provision of a blanket and a bed or mattress for pretrial detainees held in an intake area for more than twenty-four hours; outdoor exercise; food; visual observation of pretrial detainees in intake areas, court holding cells, the psychiatric unit, and segregation units; incident reports; and compliance records and quarterly summaries.

On October 28, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Non-taxable Costs. (Doc. # 1640.) Oral argument on the motion was held on March 27, 2009. (Doc. # 1791.)

II. Legal Standard

Any award of attorneys' fees and non-taxable costs in this civil rights action by pretrial detainees must be authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and comply with limits imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). Section § 1997e(d)(1) begins:

In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under section 1988 of this title, such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that. . . .

The Tenth Circuit has described the relationship between § 1988 and § 1997e(d) as follows:

It is worth remembering that the American Rule is that the losing party in litigation is not required to reimburse the prevailing party's attorney fees. An award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is a departure from general practice, presumably designed as an incentive to plaintiffs to engage in litigation to vindicate civil rights. Section 1997e(d) reduces that incentive in civil-rights suits by prisoners. . . .

Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). See also Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir.2003) (a reasonable fee award under § 1997e(d) required consideration of the degree of success analyzed under § 1988 principles); Siripongs v. Davis, 282 F.3d 755, 757 (9th Cir.2002) (where prisoner sought fees under § 1988, his recovery was restricted by the PLRA); Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 593-94 (7th Cir.2003) (en banc) (award of fees under § 1997e(d) required satisfaction of the reasonableness requirement in § 1988).

A. Section 1988

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Prevailing parties in civil rights litigation "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (internal quotations and citation omitted)...

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