Graves v. City of Muncie, 668S88

• Decision Date: 15 December 1970
• Docket Number: No. 668S88,668S88
• Citation: 264 N.E.2d 607,255 Ind. 360
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Parties: Robert GRAVES, Norman Miller and Bing Crosby, each being a resident voter and taxpayer of the City of Muncie in Delaware County, Indiana and a member of the Fire Department of the City of Muncie and the International Fire Fighters Association, Local #1348 of the City of Muncie, Indiana, for and on behalf of themselves individually and as members of the said Fire Department and Union Local #1348, and on behalf of all others similarly situated who have a common and general interest in the subject of this action, but who are so numerous it would be impracticable to bring them all before the Court, Appellants, v. The CITY OF MUNCIE, John V. Hampton, Mayor, Garland Hardy, Roland Meister, Van P. Smith, Veva Peters, Alvin McKillip, as Members of the Merit Plan Commission, for the Police and Fire Departments of the City of Muncie, Indiana, Marion J. Gibson, Jr., Chief of the Police Department of the City of Muncie, Indiana, as an Ex-Officio Member of the Merit Plan Commission; and Wilbur Shimer, Chief of the Fire Department for the City of Muncie, Indiana, as an Ex-Officio Member of the Merit Plan Commission of the City of Muncie, Indiana, Appellees.

Page 607

264 N.E.2d 607

255 Ind. 360

Robert GRAVES, Norman Miller and Bing Crosby, each being a resident voter and taxpayer of the City of Muncie in Delaware County, Indiana and a member of the Fire Department of the City of Muncie and the International Fire Fighters Association, Local #1348 of the City of Muncie, Indiana, for and on behalf of themselves individually and as members of the said Fire Department and Union Local #1348, and on behalf of all others similarly situated who have a common and general interest in the subject of this action, but who are so numerous it would be impracticable to bring them all before the Court, Appellants, v. The CITY OF MUNCIE, John V. Hampton, Mayor, Garland Hardy Roland Meister, Van P. Smith, Veva Peters, Alvin McKillip as Members of the Merit Plan Commission, for the Police and Fire Departments of the City of Muncie, Indiana, Marion J Gibson, Jr., Chief of the Police Department of the City of Muncie, Indiana, as an Ex-Officio Member of the Merit Plan Commission; and Wilbur Shimer, Chief of the Fire Department for the City of Muncie, Indiana, as an Ex-Officio Member of the Merit Plan Commission of the City of Muncie, Indiana, Appellees.

No. 668S88.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Dec. 15, 1970.

Haggerty, Haggerty & Kias, Hamill & Price, Indianapolis, for appellants.

Edward Dixon, Frank E. Gilkison, Jr., White, Haymond, Pierce, Beasley & Gilkieson, Ralph E. Dennis, Jr., Muncie, for appellees.

GIVAN, Judge.

The appellants brought an action against the appellees for permanent injunction and a restraining order to restrain and prohibit the defendant from administering the provisions of Chapter 141 of the Acts of 1963 which may be found in Burns' Ind.Stat., 1963 Repl., §§ 48--6260 to 48--6285 as it applied to the Fire Department of the City of Muncie. The trial court denied the relief sought and the appellants appealed claiming as error that the decision of the trial court was contrary to law and that it was not sustained by sufficient evidence. Since the decision in this case was a negative one against the appellants who had the burden of proof the grounds claiming insufficiency of the evidence present no question here. Schuh v. State (1968), Ind., 15 Ind.Dec. 667, 241 N.E.2d 362; Hinds v. McNair (1955), 235 Ind. 34, 129 N.E.2d 553.

Therefore, the only question before this Court is whether the decision of the trial court was contrary to law.

In the trial court the appellees challenged the right of appellants to maintain this action claiming that appellants had failed to show that any of their rights were impaired or prejudiced by the statute; that any rights affected by the statute are not personal rights. With this we cannot agree.

In the instant case the appellants possessed a sufficient property interest to bring the suit. As taxpayers of the City of Muncie they were directly involved since city expenditures were involved in administering the system. Burns' Ind.Stat., 1963 Repl., § 48--6280.

As employees of the City they were directly involved under the act through tenure, seniority, work conditions, pensions, salaries and job assignments; therefore, the appellants had sufficient standing not only as being directly and individually affected, but also as taxpayers questioning the expenditures of public funds. Ellingham v. Dye (1912), 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1. Appeal dismissed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 34 S.Ct. 92, 58 L.Ed. 206.

Appellants challenged the constitutionality of the statute claiming that it is a special law rather than a general law, thus violating Section 22, Article 4 of the Indiana Constitution, the pertinent part of which reads as follows:

'The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws, in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: * * *.'

and is also violative of Section 23, Article 4, which provides:

'In all the cases enumerated in the preceding Section, and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the State.'

There is a long line of cases in this state holding that the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature unless the classification challenged is manifestly arbitrary and not based upon substantive distinctions. Perry Township of Marion County v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. (1946), 224 Ind. 59, 64 N.E.2d 296. The Court will determine only whether the classification is founded upon the substantial distinctions in the subject matter. Balley v. Guilford Twp. School Corporation (1954), 234 Ind. 273, 126 N.E.2d 13.

The classification need not be scientific, consistent, logical or exact. Evansville-Vanderburgh Levee Authority District v. Kamp (1960), 240 Ind. 659, 168 N.E.2d 208.

The statute involved in the case at bar provides for the establishment by referendum of a merit plan for police and fire departments. A commissioner is provided to administer such a plan including the selection, promotion and discipline of members in those departments. The title of the act reads as follows:

'An act providing for a public referendum and establishing a merit plan for police and firemen in all cities of the second class located in counties having a population of not less than 110,000 inhabitants nor more than 120,000 inhabitants according to the last preceding United States decennial census, and prescribing penalties.'

The categorization at the time of the passage of the act clearly isolated and identified only the City of Muncie, Indiana.

Appellants argue that this statute could have no purpose other than to locally legislate for the City of Muncie. They further argue that it was improper to use a population standard as to the county when the governmental unit regulated was that of a city. They thus argue that the act is local and special legislation which violates the above sections of the Indiana Constitution. We disagree with appellant's contention.

A statute authorizing the...