Graves v. Gamble
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-344 |
| Decision Date | 10 April 2023 |
| Parties | BENNIE D. GRAVES, Plaintiff v. KENNETH J. GAMBLE, Prothonotary, and KELLY MALONE, Deputy Prothonotary, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 21)
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Kenneth J. Gamble and Kelly Malone, ECF No. 21, be granted.
Plaintiff Bennie D. Graves is an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at the State Correctional Institution at Albion. In his complaint before this Court, ECF No. 8, he alleges the following facts, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of the Defendants' pending motion.
On November 7, 2019, Plaintiff mailed multiple copies of a civil complaint (“the DOC Complaint”) to the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, as well as a packet of exhibits and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The defendants named in the DOC Complaint were the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Correct Care Solutions and tweleve employees of those defendants. These documents were time- and date-stamped and signed by Defendant Kenneth J. Gamble (“Gamble”), the Erie County Prothonotary/Clerk of Records and/or Defendant Kelly Malone (“Malone”), the Deputy Prothonotary. The DOC Complaint was filed in the Court of Common Pleas on December 5, 2019.
On December 12, 2019, Plaintiff received from the Erie County Prothonotary's office the copies of the DOC Complaint, the packet of exhibits, and the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which had been granted. These documents were not accompanied by an explanation or instructions. On December 16, 2019, Plaintiff wrote to Malone to ask if he was responsible for serving the defendants with the DOC Complaint himself.
On December 27, 2019, Plaintiff received a response from Gamble, advising him that service had to be accomplished by Plaintiff, that Plaintiff may have to contact the Sheriffs office for its service fee information, and that Gamble's office could not provide Plaintiff with advice about how to proceed.
On February 5, 2020, after two unsuccessful attempts to contact the Sheriffs office, Plaintiff wrote to the Prothonotary's office/Gamble, explaining his attempts and asking Gamble what he should do to effectuate service of the DOC Complaint. Plaintiff did not receive a response to this letter.
In the complaint sub judice, against Gamble and Malone,[1] Plaintiff alleges state law negligence claims as well as a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting violations of Plaintiff s right to due process, right to petition the government for redress of grievances, and right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff has also filed an “Amendment to Original Complaint” in which he asserts an additional state law malpractice claim against Gamble and Malone. ECF No. 19. He seeks relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages as well as an order that Defendants pay for future medical costs stemming from injuries complained of in the DOC Complaint. He has sued each defendant in both his or her individual and official capacities.
Defendants Gamble and Malone filed the instant motion to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6), accompanied by a brief in support. ECF Nos. 21-22. Graves filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 30. The motion is ripe for consideration.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will likely prevail on the merits; the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (). In making this determination, the Court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Further, because Plaintiff is representing himself, the allegations must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's allegations of fact to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) ().
As a preliminary matter, Defendants contend that any claims against them in their official capacities are barred by the immunity afforded to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by the Eleventh Amendment. ECF No. 22 at 3-4. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes actions in the federal courts against states, their agencies, and state officials acting within their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985). The Prothonotary is part of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County. It is well-settled that courts of common pleas are arms of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and are, thus, entitled to the same Eleventh Amendment immunity that the Commonwealth enjoys. See Benn v. First Judicial District, 426 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) ().
Plaintiffs official capacity claims against the Defendants also fail because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania “is not a ‘person' subject to suit” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Whiteford v. Penn Hills Municipality, 323 Fed.Appx. 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2009), and a “claim against a state actor in his or her official capacity is tantamount to lodging the claim against the state itself, since it is the real party in interest.” Francis ex rel. Est. of Francis v. Northumberland Cnty., 636 F.Supp.2d 368, 385-86 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Therefore, a claim against a state actor in his or her official capacity is generally not cognizable under § 1983. See Alston v. Nat'l Conf of Bar Examiners, 314 F.Supp.3d 620, 626 (E.D. Pa. 2018) ( that “[n]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under § 1983”) (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991)).
The foregoing principles preclude a §1983 claim for money damages against the Defendants in their official capacities. Plaintiff argues, however, that these principles do not preclude his claims for prospective relief. ECF No. 30 at 2-3. It is true that “a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.'” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10 (citations omitted). And it is also correct that “claims requesting prospective injunctive relief from official-capacity defendants do not run afoul of sovereign immunity.” See Iles v. de Jongh, 638 F.3d 169 177 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Perry v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 441 Fed.Appx. 833, 836 (3d Cir. 2011)). For a plaintiffs official capacity claim to survive, however, “[t]he relief sought must be prospective, declaratory, or injunctive relief governing an officer's future conduct and cannot be...
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