Graves v. Lioi

Decision Date16 July 2019
Docket Number No. 17-1857,No. 17-1848,17-1848
Citation930 F.3d 307
Parties Eunice GRAVES, Plaintiff – Appellant, and Carlin Robinson, individually, as Guardian and next Friend of I.Y., M.Y. and A.Y., and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Veronica Williams, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. Daniel A. LIOI; Melvin Russell, Major, Defendants – Appellees and Baltimore City Police Department, Defendant, Cleaven L. Williams, Jr., Defendant. Carlin Robinson, individually, as Guardian and next Friend of I.Y., M.Y. and A.Y., and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Veronica Williams, Deceased, Plaintiff – Appellant, and Eunice Graves, Plaintiff, v. Daniel A. Lioi; Melvin Russell, Major, Defendants – Appellees, and Baltimore City Police Department, Defendant, Cleaven L. Williams, Jr., Defendant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

ARGUED: Cary Johnson Hansel, III, HANSEL LAW, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Elisabeth Susanne Walden, BALTIMORE CITY LAW DEPARTMENT, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Daniel L. Cox, THE COX LAW CENTER, LLC, Emmitsburg, Maryland, for Appellants. Suzanne Sangree, Senior Public Safety Counsel, Daniel C. Beck, Chief of Police Legal Affairs, Kara K. Lynch, Assistant Solicitor, BALTIMORE CITY LAW DEPARTMENT, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion in which Judge Niemeyer joined. Chief Judge Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion.

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

Cleaven Williams stabbed his pregnant wife, Veronica ("Mrs. Williams"), outside a Baltimore, Maryland, courthouse where she had just obtained a protective order against him. Mrs. Williams and her unborn child died from their injuries a few days later. Carlin Robinson, the Personal Representative of Mrs. Williams’ estate and Guardian and Next Friend of her children, and Eunice Graves, Mrs. Williams’ mother, filed federal and state claims against Baltimore City Police Department (BCPD) officer Daniel A. Lioi. The Complaint alleged that Lioi was responsible for Mrs. Williams’ death because he enabled Williams to postpone his self-surrender on a misdemeanor arrest warrant, which provided Williams the opportunity to murder his wife.

We previously affirmed, on interlocutory appeal, the district court’s denial of Lioi’s motion to dismiss the claims against him as being barred by qualified immunity. Robinson v. Lioi , 536 F. App'x 340 (4th Cir. 2013). Thereafter, Robinson and Graves (collectively "Robinson") amended their complaint to add another BCPD officer, Major Melvin Russell, as a defendant. Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to both officers, Robinson v. Lioi , No. 1:12-cv-00192-CCB, 2017 WL 2937568 (D. Md. June 30, 2017), concluding that the evidence was not sufficient to allow a verdict in Robinson’s favor and, in the alternative, the officers were entitled to qualified and public official immunity.

Robinson now appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

In reviewing the propriety of granting summary judgment, we consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here, Robinson, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. See Doe v. Rosa , 795 F.3d 429, 436 (4th Cir. 2015).

A.

In the summer of 2008, Williams met Deputy Major Lioi and Major Russell of the BCPD’s Eastern District in the course of Williams’ role as the president of a Baltimore-area community association. The men interacted at a handful of civic events that summer and fall.

The events forming the basis of Robinson’s claims occurred over a nine-day period from Sunday, November 9, 2008, when a misdemeanor arrest warrant was issued for Williams’ arrest, to Monday, November 17, 2008, when Williams fatally stabbed his pregnant wife.

On the evening of Sunday, November 9, Mrs. Williams obtained a temporary protective order against Williams based on an assault that occurred the prior month in which he physically restrained her and cut off some of her hair. Based on the same incident, the Baltimore City Court Commissioner also issued an arrest warrant for Williams charging him with the misdemeanor offenses of second-degree assault and unauthorized removal of property.

Minutes after the warrant issued, a police dispatcher notified BCPD Officer Jose Arroyo that a misdemeanor warrant was ready to be picked up from the Court Commissioner’s office.1 Had Arroyo followed normal procedure, he would have taken the warrant directly to the "hot desk" at Central Records to have it logged into the police computer database. J.A. 575. Instead, Arroyo took the warrant to the BCPD’s Eastern District office. Arroyo indicated that he sometimes bypassed the normal procedure if a supervisor ordered him to do so, but he could not remember whether anyone had issued such an order regarding this warrant. Nor could he provide any explanation for why he deviated from the procedure this time.

After Arroyo arrived at the Eastern District, an unidentified person instructed him to leave the arrest warrant on the desk handling the Sector 1 region. Arroyo could not recall who told him to leave the warrant there, or why, but the address listed on the warrant for Williams was located in Sector 1. Arroyo knew both Lioi and Russell, and when he was specifically asked if Russell or Lioi had instructed him to bring the warrant to the Eastern District, Arroyo testified that he "d[id]n’t recall." J.A. 578. He then clarified that, given the chain of command, he would not have received an order directly from either officer and that he "d[id]n’t know" whether either of them had given such an instruction to someone else. J.A. 579–80.

At some point over the weekend, Williams contacted Russell and was concerned that his wife "got papers on him." J.A. 706. Williams asked Russell if he could find out what happened.2 In his deposition, Russell stated that he first learned of the arrest warrant when he returned to work on Monday or Tuesday (November 10 or 11) and Officer Adrienne Byrd showed it to him.3 Russell had observed Byrd holding the warrant for Williams in her hands, but he testified that he never took physical possession of the warrant at that time or later.

Russell later spoke with Williams, confirming that there was a warrant for his arrest and encouraging him to turn himself in. J.A. 451–54, 707. Russell advised that Williams should not wait to turn himself in because if he were arrested on a Friday and his arraignment were to be delayed, he could be detained over the weekend.

Beginning on Monday, police officers attempted to arrest Williams at his residence, but were unsuccessful. J.A. 112, 451–52, 485, 707–08, 762, 815. Russell said he personally went by Williams’ residence to arrest him "once, maybe twice," but it was dark and no one answered the door. J.A. 451.

On Wednesday (November 12), Williams texted Russell to say that he would like to turn himself in the following Tuesday in order to have time to raise sufficient bond money. Russell called Williams and encouraged him to turn himself in without delay. J.A. 451–52, 482–83. Later that afternoon, Russell informed Lioi—who was the next senior officer in the Eastern District—that Williams would be turning himself in the next evening. Russell asked Lioi to oversee the process because Russell was not scheduled to work Thursday evening.4

On Thursday afternoon (November 13), Williams texted Russell that he was "running behind," but "should be there in 15." J.A. 480. Russell replied, "K." J.A. 480. Both men stated in their depositions that the texts referred to Williams self-surrendering, but Williams did not show up at the station that afternoon.

Instead, at about 9:00 p.m., Williams arrived at the Eastern District to self-surrender. Lioi called Central Records to get the arrest warrant and learned that it had not been logged into their database and they did not have the warrant. Lioi enlisted help in searching for the warrant at the Eastern District and in calling other possible locations, but no one could locate it. For example, Lioi called Russell to see if he could help them locate the warrant, but Russell did not answer his phone, so Lioi left him a voice mail message. And when Lioi called the court commissioner, he was told "that the warrant possibly could be at the North Avenue Courthouse," which he also tried to reach, but it was closed for the night. J.A. 562.

After concluding that they were not going to promptly locate the arrest warrant, Lioi allowed Williams to leave the Eastern District station so long as he agreed to return once they found the warrant. Williams agreed and asked if he could self-surrender after the weekend. He mentioned having several things to do and not wanting to risk being detained if the arraignment was delayed on Friday. It’s not clear from the record what agreement Lioi and Williams reached at that time, but Williams departed the police station.

Shortly thereafter, Russell returned Lioi’s call and recommended that Lioi contact Byrd because he had seen her with the warrant earlier that week and believed she had attempted to arrest Williams. In addition, Russell suggested that Lioi search Byrd’s patrol car for the paperwork.

After Russell’s call, Sergeant Todd Tugya, who was helping Lioi search for the warrant, telephoned Byrd. She "advised that she did, indeed, have possession of the warrant ... and that she had attempted to serve it. However, she advised that she left the warrant in the visor of her patrol car because she intended to continue her attempts to serve it on her next shift." J.A. 112. She told Tugya which patrol car she had used, so that they could search it.5 Just after midnight on Friday (November 14), officers located the warrant over the visor of Byrd’s patrol car.

Later that day, Lioi "confirmed" with Russell that Williams could self-surrender after the weekend. J.A. 277. Russell indicated...

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