Graves v. United States

• Decision Date: 07 July 2022
• Docket Number: 21-1464L
• Parties: MICHAEL GRAVES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

MICHAEL GRAVES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

No. 21-1464L

United States Court of Federal Claims

July 7, 2022

Takings Physical Takings; Land-Use Exaction; Statute of Limitations Motion to Dismiss

A Blair Dunn, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.

Mark Pacella, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

CAROLYN N. LERNER JUDGE

PlaintiffsMichael Graves and Sue Ann Graves allege that the United States took their property interest in a Colorado forest road through a physical taking without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.The Government filed a motion to dismiss, in which it argued that Plaintiffs' Complaint is barred by the six-year statute of limitations for claims brought under the Tucker Act.This Court held oral argument on the Government's Motion on May 19, 2022.For the reasons that follow, the action was brought beyond the statute of limitations, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the Complaint is DISMISSED.

I.Background A. Factual Background^[1]

1.Forest Road 252 1B

Michael Graves and Sue Ann Graves own property (the "Graves Property") in rural Conejos County, Colorado, completely encased within the boundaries of the Rio Grande National Forest.SeeCompl.¶¶ 1, 12-14, ECF No. 1;Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss("Def.'s Mot.")at 1, ECF No. 7.The property has historically been accessed by way of a United States Forest Service ("USFS" or "Forest Service") Forest Road ("FR") and its offshoot-FR 252andFR 252 1B, respectively.Compl.¶ 2;Def.'s Mot.at 1.Both roads sit on federal National Forest land.SeeCompl.¶¶ 2-4;Def.'s Mot.at 1;Def.'sMot. Ex. 3, ECF No. 7-3(Conejos Peak Ranger District map);Def.'sMot. Ex. 4, ECF No. 7-4(National Forest Road designation map).Plaintiffs allege that they own a real property right-of-way easement on the offshoot road, which they refer to as the "Graves private road."SeeCompl.at 1-2, ¶¶ 1, 2, 25.

Under the Mining Act of 1866, which later became section 2477 of the Revised Statutes("R.S. 2477"), private landowners surrounded by public lands could establish a right-of-way interest over access roads to their property.Mining Act of 1866, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253, codified at43 U.S.C. § 932, repealed byFederal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706 (a),90 Stat. 2743, 2793;see generallyPamela Baldwin, Cong. Rsch. Serv., No. 93-74A, Highway Rights of Way: The Controversy Over Claims UnderR.S. 2477(1993).Plaintiffs claim that their physical right-of-way property interest in the FR 252 1B offshoot was established around 1912 under R.S. 2477 from the original grant of the Graves Property.SeeCompl.¶¶ 8, 9(citingR.S. 2477);id. at ¶¶ 2, 22; Pl.'s Resp. and Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss("Pl.'s Resp.")at 5-10, ECF No. 8.They trace the chain of title on the Graves Property to 1912 and allege that FR 252 1B is an offshoot of a road established in 1895 and 1896.SeeCompl.¶¶ 18, 22.

In approximately 1995, ownership of the Graves Property passed to Mr. Graves's mother, Margarite Lindsey.SeeCompl.¶ 17; Compl.Ex. 2, ECF No. 1-2.In 1996, she signed a "private road easement" or "permanent easement" with the USFS that permitted her access to the Graves Property using FR 252 1B.SeeCompl.¶ 17;see alsoCompl.Ex. 2;Def.'sMot. Ex. 1, ECF No. 7-1.This easement grant recognized that the USFS owned the road and gave Ms. Lindsey a "nonexclusive easement for use of a road."Def.'sMot. Ex. 1.Plaintiffs acquired the Graves Property in their names in 1999.SeeCompl.Ex. 2.

2.The Forest Service's Management of Forest Road 252 1B

Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA"), the USFS has authority to manage the "roads, trails [and] highways" over public forest land, which the Forest Service organizes into a system of national forest roads.43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(6);see generally, United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513, 1515-17(10th Cir.1994).For non-public roads, the USFS issues private easements and other special-use permits that dictate private access requirements.See, e.g., Fitzgerald Living Tr. v. United States, 460 F.3d 1259, 1261-62(9th Cir.2006)(describing an example of a plaintiff's permits and easements).

Plaintiffs explain that FR 252 1B was a "pre-forest reservation road" until around 2009, when "the Forest Service declared the road a 'system' road when previously it was not a system road and was never maintained."Compl.¶¶ 18-19.Following the declaration of FR 252 1B as a national forest system road, the USFS installed a sign ("FR 252 1B"), but Plaintiffs allege they were not given notice that the road was "taken" under USFS control.Id.¶ 19.Then, in 2012, the Bureau of Land Management allegedly "surveyed the road to provide the proper legal description for a special use permit."Id.¶ 3.

3.The Forest Service's Alleged Taking

Plaintiffs allege that in 2012, the USFS "pressed Mr. Graves into waiving the permanent renewable easement" previously signed by his mother"for a revocable special use permit."Compl.¶ 17.^[2] The Graveses signed a "Private Road Easement Issued Under the [FLPMA]"(the "2012 FLPMA Easement") that, like the prior agreement, permitted them access to their property using FR 2521B.^[3] Def.'s Mot. Ex. 2, ECF No. 7-2at 1;seeCompl.¶ 17.The FLPMA Easement is "a nonexclusive easement for use of a road" that places multiple restrictions on Plaintiffs' use.Def.'s Mot. Ex. 2at 1.For example, it requires that Plaintiffs pay annual fees and reserves the USFS's right to use the road, extend use of the road to other users, issue rights-of-way to others, and "terminate this easement if [it] assumes jurisdiction and control of the road as a National Forest System Road and issues a replacement easement."Id. at 3-4.The Graveses signed the FLPMA Easement on September 26, 2011, and the USFS approved the easement on January 4, 2012.Id. at 1, 5.It remains in effect today.Compl.¶ 17.

Plaintiffs assert that the 2012 FLPMA Easement did not apply to them or extinguish their rights in the road.OralArg. Tr. at 6:23-8:9, ECF No. 14;seeCompl.¶¶ 19-23; Pl.'s Resp. at 3.They recognize that the Forest Service is permitted under FLPMA to regulate their interest- such as by use of an easement application-but maintain that they had a verbal understanding with the USFS that the 2012 Easement did not require them to forgo their right-of-way under R.S. 2477.SeeOralArg. Tr. at 13:19-23.For example, Plaintiffs' counsel highlights that it is common for the USFS to have other agreements and notes that they did not pay the permit fee for a period of years when they were told it was not required.SeeOralArg. Tr. at 15:15-24.

Then, in 2016, Plaintiffs allege that a USFS official told them that the Forest Service had seized the forest road and stated that "even if [FR 252 1B] was previously a private easement[,] that it was now a forest system road belonging to the federal government."Compl.¶ 19.Plaintiffs"provided a copy of a warranty deed stating FR 252 1B was a private road easement," but were told that "FR 252 1B was not [their] property."Id.¶ 4.

Overall, the Graveses maintain that they hold a private right-of-way interest in FR 252 1B that grants them exclusive use.Seeid.¶¶ 4, 14, 26; Oral.Arg. Tr. at 11:7-10, 14:8-9, 15:6-8.They allege that the USFS, "by denying and refusing to recognize the statutorily vested real property right-of-way easements of Plaintiffs, by extracting special use permits, permit fees, and by declaring that the private property right of way easement was a public easement in 2018[,] took . . . private property away from the Plaintiffs through inverse condemnation."

Compl. at 1.Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that the "Forest Service requirement that Mr. Graves maintain an easement, pay fees, and the requirement of a special use permit, and allowing other landowners to use Mr. Graves [sic] private easement constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment."Id.¶ 23;see alsoCompl.¶¶ 25-26.

B.Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on June 11, 2021, for just compensation for the alleged taking.See Compl.The Government filed a motion to dismiss on October 12, 2021.See Def.'s Mot. Plaintiffs filed a response brief, see Pl.'s Resp., and the Government filed a reply brief, seeDef.'s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss("Def.'s Reply"), ECF No. 9.

II.Legal Standards A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Under the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).Because the Tucker Act only waives sovereign immunity and does not create substantive rights, a plaintiff must identify a separate source of law that can be fairly interpreted as creating a right to money damages.Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172(Fed. Cir.2005);see alsoUnited States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 289-90(2009).

The Tucker Act encompasses the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause which is a money-mandating provision that grants jurisdiction in this Court.SeeWilliams v. United States, 289 U.S 553, 581(1933);Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc v. FAA, 525 F.3d 1299, 1309(Fed. Cir.2008)("[T]he Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a money-mandating source for purposes of Tucker Act jurisdiction.").This Court has exclusive jurisdiction for inverse...