Gravett v. Mugge

• Decision Date: 30 June 1878
• Citation: 89 Ill. 218,1878 WL 10009
• Parties: WILLIAM GRAVETTv.GEORGE MUGGE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

89 Ill. 218

1878 WL 10009 (Ill.)

WILLIAM GRAVETT

v.GEORGE MUGGE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June Term, 1878.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Saline county; the Hon. MONROE C. CRAWFORD, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. CREBS & CONGER, for the appellant.

Mr. ANDREW D. DUFF, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

This action was brought in trespass by George Mugge against William Gravett, for taking and carrying away a lot of lumber which plaintiff claims belonged to him. The lumber taken by defendant was afterwards measured, and it was found there were in all 31,349 feet. A portion of it was good lumber, and was worth $38 per 1000 feet, and the residue was what is called “culls,” and was worth $20 per 1000 feet. The exact number of feet of each kind of lumber is given, so that the precise value of that which was taken is shown to be $1005.71. On this branch of the case there is no conflict in the evidence. At the time the lumber was moved the banks of the river where it had been placed were under water to the depth of four or five feet, in consequence of which quite a quantity of refuse lumber was floated away and lost. Defendant estimates the amount to be 7000 feet, and worth not exceeding $10 per 1000 feet. On the other hand, plaintiff insists the quantity was much greater, and included much good lumber. On the trial, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, finding as his damages the sum of $3000, but plaintiff remitted $1700 of the amount, and thereupon the court overruled the motion entered for a new trial, and rendered judgment on the verdict for $1300, and defendant brings the case to this court on appeal.

The verdict of the jury as to the amount of damages sustained by plaintiff was so grossly wrong, that he remitted more than one-half of it. There has, therefore, been no finding as to the amount of damages, to which any importance can be attached. Our opinion is, the ends of justice will be better subserved by submitting the cause to another jury. This conclusion is the more readily adopted on account of an instruction given by the court, for plaintiff, which would warrant the belief the jury were authorized to give exemplary damages in case they found for plaintiff. The principle expressed in the instruction had no application to the facts of the case, and may have misled the jury into the error of finding so large a verdict--one that it is conceded was not warranted by the evidence. Notwithstanding the remittitur, it can not be known what portion of the judgment is for actual damages and what portion is for exemplary damages, which the jury, under the instruction given, were authorized to award. If any portion of the amount for which the judgment was...