Gravlee v. Williams

• Decision Date: 12 November 1896
• Citation: 20 So. 952,112 Ala. 539
• Parties: GRAVLEE v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

20 So. 952

112 Ala. 539

GRAVLEE v. WILLIAMS.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 12, 1896

Appeal from circuit court, Walker county; James J. Banks, Judge.

Action by Ella L. Graylee against Lee W. Williams. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

This action was brought on June 28, 1894, by the appellant, E. L Gravlee, against the appellee, L. W. Williams, to recover $1,640, as the statutory penalty (Code, § 3296) for the cutting of certain trees and saplings on plaintiff's land. Issue was joined on the plea of the general issue. The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that on the 17th day of January, 1891, W. G. Gravlee entered into a contract with the defendant for the purchase of the lands described in the complaint from defendant for $1,000, the defendant at the time of the said contract being the owner of said lands; that W. G. Gravlee paid cash $250, and gave his notes for the deferred payments, and that defendant and his wife executed and delivered to said W. G. Gravlee their bond for title to said lands, which was introduced in evidence and copied in the record; that no deed was made by defendant to said W. G Gravlee for said lands, though said W. G. Gravlee held said lands under said bond, and said lands were wild woodlands with no improvements thereon whatever, chiefly valuable for the timber trees growing thereon. On the 12th day of January 1893, W. G. Gravlee sold the said lands to plaintiff, and indorsed, transferred, and assigned his said bond for title to plaintiff, as shown per indorsement copied in the transcript; that W. G. Gravlee paid the taxes on said lands while he held the same, and plaintiff has kept the taxes thereon paid regularly since she bought the same as aforesaid; that, when plaintiff bought said lands from W. G. Gravlee, she agreed to pay the notes that he had given to defendant, and defendant was at once informed of this arrangement, and made no objection to it, and that plaintiff paid said notes as they became due, without default; that on or about the first part of the month of February, 1894, defendant cut down and carried away from said lands 136 oak trees, 1 pine tree, and 34 oak and 34 pine saplings, and made cross-ties out of paid trees, and sold the cross-ties. Immediately after said trees were cut, but not before, on plaintiff paying the defendant the balance of the purchase money for said lands,-which, however, was not then due,-defendant and his wife made, executed, and delivered to plaintiff a deed to said lands, dated the 20th day of February, 1894, and duly recorded, which was introduced in evidence and copied into the record. This being all the evidence, the court, at the request of the defendant, gave the following written charge to the jury: "If the jury believe the evidence, they will find for the defendant." To the giving of this charge the plaintiff duly excepted. There were verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals, and assigns as error the giving of the general affirmative charge in favor of the defendant, and the judgment rendered.

Appling & McGuire, for appellant.

Coleman & Bankhead, for appellee.

BRICKELL C.J.

The question the case presents is whether the assignee of a bond of the vendor of lands, covenanting for the making of title to the obligee on the full payment of the purchase money, can maintain an action against the vendor, who enters before the purchase money is fully paid, cutting and removing trees from the lands, to recover the penalties given to the owner of lands by the statute (Code, § 3296). Uniformly, the statute has been regarded as penal, and, of consequence, subject to a strict construction, by which is intended that it is not to be extended beyond the plain meaning of its words. Or, as it was expressed in Iron Co. v. Curry (Ala.) 18 So 554, "No case should be holden to be covered by it which does not fall naturally, and without constraint, within some fair and accepted designation of its words, in the light of its context." Cable Co. v. Le Noir (Ala.) 18 So. 266; Russell v. Irby, 13 Ala. 131. The bond for title was assignable, and if, as seems to have been true, the assignment was absolute, the estate and interest in the lands which were vested in the assignor passed to the assignee. The vendor having notice of the assignment, the assignee succeeded to the place and relation the assignor had occupied, and could pursue all remedies, legal or equitable (and no other), for the enforcement of his rights or interests, which the assignor could have pursued. Brown v. Chambers, 12 Ala. 697; Skinner v. Bedell, 32 Ala. 44; Wat. Spec. Perf. Cont. § 68. The relation of the vendor and the vendee of lands, the vendor covenanting to convey title on the full payment of the purchase money, has been of frequent definition. Until the purchase money is fully paid, the vendee has but an imperfect equity. The vendor has the legal estate, and, in courts of law, is regarded as having the right to and in the lands,-the sole, exclusive right. For the recovery of possession, he may maintain ejectment against the vendee, compelling him to resort to equity for redemption, or rather for specific performance. Bankhead v. Owen, 60 Ala. 457, and authorities cited. As the estate of the vendor, the lands are subject to levy and sale under execution, and the purchaser at the sale may maintain ejectment, and recover possession from the vendee. The equity with which he is invested will not, in a court of law, protect his possession. Nickles v. Haskins, 15 Ala. 619; Trammel v. Simmons, 17 Ala. 411; Sellers v. Hayes, Id. 749; Chapman v. Glassell...