Gravois v. Travelers Indem. Co.

Decision Date08 March 1965
Docket NumberNo. 6247,6247
Citation173 So.2d 550
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
PartiesMrs. Mary Chiasson GRAVOIS et al. v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY et al.

Charles S. Becnel, of Becnel & Kliebert, Vacherie, for appellants.

A. Deutsche O'Neal, of O'Neal & Waitz, Houma, for appellees.

Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER, HERGET, LANDRY and REID, JJ. *

REID, Judge.

This is a suit for tort brought by Mrs. Mary Chiasson Gravois, individually and as the duly qualified administratrix of the succession of her husband, Stephen J. Gravois, and also as the duly qualified tutrix of her two minor children, Kimberly John Gravois and Stephanie Maria Gravois, for the death of her husband Stephen J. Gravois. The suit was brought against the Jeffers Construction Company and the individual partners, namely, J. Earl Boudreaux, Ray Boudreaux and Chase Jeffers, and its insurer Travelers Indemnity Company.

Plaintiff alleged that on February 18, 1960, Stephen J. Gravois was working on a sulphur mine installation owned and operated by Freeport Sulphur Company located approximately seven miles south of Grand Isle and more than a marine league from the shore of the State of Louisiana. There was no dispute as to the fact that the Freeport Sulphur mine was approximately seven miles south of Grand Isle and neither was it disputed that the decedent Stephen J. Gravois was, on February 18, 1960, a regular employee of Freeport Sulphur Company and a member of an installation crew working on the mine complex belonging to Freeport Sulphur Company. The plaintiff was granted an award and was at the time of the trial receiving payments under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act.

Plaintiff had brought an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana as well as in the 17th Judicial District Court of the State of Louisiana. The Federal Court action has been stayed pending the outcome of this suit and counsel for plaintiff states in his brief it will be heard only if the State Court holds that it has no jurisdiction in this case.

The record shows that a labor contract had been entered into between Jeffers Construction Company and Freeport Sulphur Company wherein Jeffers Construction Company agreed to furnish labor, equipment, and supervision as required by Freeport Sulphur Company and that Jeffers Construction Company would be considered as an independent contractor with regard to the work done thereunder.

Plaintiff contends the decedent's death was caused by negligence of employees of Jeffers Construction Company and that under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(a), there is reserved to the third person entitled to compensation a third party remedy in the event that the injured party or his representative determines that some person other than the employer or person or persons in his employ is liable for damages.

On order to bring this action under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act plaintiff's counsel urges in his brief the provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(c) which reads:

'With respect to disability or death of an employee resulting from any injury occurring as a result of operations described in subsection (b) of this section, compensation shall be payable under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. * * *'

He then alleges he wrongful death of plaintiff was directly caused by the negligence of third parties, namely, employees of the Jeffers Construction Company.

Plaintiff's suit then is based upon the provisions of 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 761--767, entitled 'Death on the High Seas Act', which provides that the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the District Courts of the United States. In the alternative plaintiff alleges that in the event the Death on the High Seas Act is not applicable, suit could be brought under the laws of the State of Louisiana under the 'saving to suitors clause' of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1) which provides in cases of admiralty that:

'The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the State, of:

'(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.'

The theory of the plaintiff's case is all important in the issue here presented as the main point is the question of jurisdiction of the State Court.

In summary, the plaintiff's theory of the case is that she assumes that the structure at issue is within the Outer Continental Shelf, and as the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act provides that the exclusive remedy for the employee is the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act which permits either the employee or his representative to bring an action of tort against a third party, she is entitled to bring this action under the 'savings to suitors clause' or, under the 'savings to suitors clause' under the laws of the State of Louisiana and under Article 2315 of the LSA-Civil Code.

Exceptions of no cause of action and of lack of jurisdiction were filed and an answer in the form of a general denial, with a plea of contributory negligence was filed. All of the exceptions were referred to the merits because the Trial Judge wanted to hear the entire case on the facts. At the time of the trial defendants reurged their exceptions but the Trial Judge felt it was unnecessary to go into a long discussion of the exceptions and decided to dispose of the case on the facts 'and not on any delicately posed question of law.'

The Trial Court did pass on the question of jurisdiction and found that the Court did have jurisdiction under the case of Presley v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corporation, La.App., 141 So.2d 411. He then concluded as a matter of fact that the Jeffers Construction Company, its employees and agents were free from any negligence in this case and therefore there could be no judgment against them and he dismissed plaintiff's suit.

It is from that judgment plaintiff has appealed.

In the opinion of this Court, the prime question at issue is the question of jurisdiction. An exception to the jurisdiction ratione materiae was filed by the defendants although no specific grounds were raised for the basis of the exception. On this appeal the question of jurisdiction is treated by both parties in an offhanded manner and it could almost be said defendants have abandoned their argument on the question of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the question of whether or not the Courts of the State of Louisiana would have jurisdiction over the subject matter is one that cannot be avoided, nor, can it be waived or consented to by the parties, even if they so intended. LSA-C.C. Art. 3.

Jurisdiction in this case is determined by the provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331 through § 1343. Section 1331(a) defines the Outer Continental Shelf as follows:

'The term 'outer Continental Shelf' means all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in section 1301 of this title, and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.' 1

Section 1332 reads as follows:

'(a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as provided in this subchapter.

'(b) This subchapter shall be construed in such manner that the character as high seas of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf and the right to navigation and fishing therein shall not be affected.'

Section 1333 reads in pertinent part as follows:

'(a) (1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands and fixed structures which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, and transporting resources therefrom, to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of Exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State: Provided, however, That mineral leases on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued only under the provisions of this subchapter. (Emphasis ours).

'(2) To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State as of August 7, 1953 are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf, and the President shall determine and publish in the Federal Register such projected lines extending seaward and defining each such area. All of such applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United States. State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf. (Emphasis ours).

'(3) The provisions of this section for adoption of State law as the law of the United States shall never be interpreted as a basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any State for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the outer Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources thereof or the revenues therefrom.

'(b) The United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising out of or in connection with any operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the purpose...

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