Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George's County

• Decision Date: 30 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-2312.,01-2312.
• Parties: Marion GRAY-HOPKINS, in her individual capacity, as mother, Personal Representative and next friend of Gary Hopkins, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND; Brian C. Catlett, A Police Officer of Prince George's County, Maryland, Defendants-Appellants, and Prince George's County Police Department; John Doe, A Police Officer of Prince George's County, Maryland and Supervisor of Brian Catlett; Devin C. White, A Police Officer of Prince George's County, Maryland; James Skyrm, A Police Officer of Prince George's County, Maryland and Supervisor, Defendants. John S. Farrell, Movant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 224

309 F.3d 224

Marion GRAY-HOPKINS, in her individual capacity, as mother, Personal Representative and next friend of Gary Hopkins, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND; Brian C. Catlett, A Police Officer of Prince George's County, Maryland, Defendants-Appellants, and Prince George's County Police Department; John Doe, A Police Officer of Prince George's County, Maryland and Supervisor of Brian Catlett; Devin C. White, A Police Officer of Prince George's County, Maryland; James Skyrm, A Police Officer of Prince George's County, Maryland and Supervisor, Defendants John S. Farrell, Movant.

No. 01-2312.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued April 2, 2002.

Decided October 30, 2002.

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ARGUED:

Crystal Renee Mittelstaedt, County Attorney's Office, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellants.

Walter L. Blair, College Park, Maryland; C. William Michaels, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

Sean D. Wallace, County Attorney, John A. Bielec, Deputy County Attorney, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellants. Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr., The Cochran Firm, New York, New York, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, Circuit Judge, STAPLETON, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation, and BROADWATER, United States District Judge for the Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Senior Judge STAPLETON wrote the opinion, in which Judge MOTZ and Judge BROADWATER joined.

OPINION

STAPLETON, Senior Circuit Judge.

This civil rights action arises from an incident in which a Prince George's County police officer killed the son of plaintiff/appellee, Marion Gray-Hopkins. The officer, Brian Catlett, appeals from the District Court's denial of his motion for summary judgment based on a claim of qualified immunity. He and the County also appeal from the District Court's refusal to grant them summary judgment with respect to certain of Gray-Hopkins' state law claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Officer Catlett shot and killed Gary Hopkins, on November 27, 1999, following a dance at the West Lanham Fire Department in Prince George's County, Maryland. The parties hotly dispute the events leading up to this shooting. The District Court reviewed both parties' version of the facts and found sufficient evidence, in the form of witness affidavits and DNA analysis, to support each of those proffered versions.

According to appellants, after the dance a fight broke out in the parking lot. Two off-duty police officers working as private security guards at the dance, Officers Catlett and Marriott, were at the scene. A crowd formed, which they were unable to disperse. Catlett called the dispatcher to send on-duty officers to assist.

The occupants of a cream-colored Cutlass and a black, four-door Cadillac were the primary participants in the fighting. Marriott heard a person in the crowd state that an individual in the Cutlass had a gun. The information regarding the presence of the gun was radioed to the other officers who were on their way to the scene. Officer Devin White was one of these officers who heard this information as he approached the firehouse.

When White arrived at the firehouse, he stopped his marked police vehicle in the front of the driveway. The Cutlass was not moving when White approached it with his gun drawn. He then asked those in the vehicle several times to let him see their hands. The passenger in the front seat got out of the vehicle and disappeared into the crowd. The driver complied with White's request. Gary Hopkins was sitting in the rear of the vehicle. He did not raise his hands, but instead reached out of the car and grabbed at White's gun. Officer White then backed away from the Cutlass with his gun still in his hands. Gary Hopkins then got out of the car.

White continued to back away from the car. He ordered Hopkins, who was then completely out of the car to "Stop. Let me see your hands." Hopkins and White then struggled for control of White's weapon. In the course of this struggle, White repeatedly yelled for Hopkins to "Get off, let go, let me see your hands." While still engaging in a struggle with Hopkins over the control of his weapon, White heard a shot, which apparently forced Hopkins to let go of the weapon. Catlett fired that gunshot, which fatally struck Gary Hopkins.

In support of their version of events, appellants rely upon the deposition testimony of Dr. Fowler and Agent Smrz. According to Dr. Fowler, Hopkins had a laceration on his left index finger that was caused by the sharp edge of the front sight of a Beretta handgun issued by the Prince George's County Police Department. Hopkins' DNA was recovered from White's handgun, according to Agent Smrz's testimony.

The appellees present a strikingly different account of the events leading up to the shooting. Although appellees do not dispute that a "scuffle" ensued after the dance was shut down around 2:30 a.m., they present testimony that Hopkins was a peacemaker. He suggested that everyone should leave the parking lot and go to his mother's house. As the car Hopkins was riding in was attempting to exit the parking lot, White stopped the car. After Hopkins exited the vehicle, he was in a neutral position with his hands raised and at no point threatened White or grabbed his gun. According to a witness, Tyrone Freeman, Hopkins' hands were raised and he was facing White when Catlett fired his gun.

The District Court found material facts to be in dispute, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Gray-Hopkins, held that Catlett was not entitled to summary judgment on his claim for qualified immunity. Specifically, the Court found that there was a genuine dispute as to whether excessive force was used and whether a reasonable officer would have known that his actions were unlawful. The District Court further held that summary judgment was not warranted on certain of Gray-Hopkins' state law claims.

II. THE FEDERAL CLAIM

Gray-Hopkins asserts that Catlett used excessive force against her son in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Catlett insists that he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit on this claim. He is entitled to that immunity unless a reasonable officer in his position would have known that firing his weapon at Gary Hopkins would violate his constitutional right to be free of excessive force. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Catlett asks that we reverse the District Court's determination that he was not so entitled on the current record. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to review the District Court's determination and, if so, the scope of that jurisdiction.

A. Jurisdiction

We have jurisdiction to review final orders of district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Under the collateral order doctrine, an order is final for purposes of § 1291, even if it does not terminate proceedings in the district court, so long as it conclusively determines the disputed question, resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Because qualified immunity is an immunity from having to litigate, as contrasted with an immunity from liability, "it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). As a result, a district court's order denying a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment and, assuming the other two requirements are met, is appealable as a final order under the collateral order doctrine. Id.

Our jurisdiction to review orders denying a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity is limited, however, to the review of legal issues. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995). Accordingly, "we possess jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a decision of a district court rejecting a government official's claim of entitlement to qualified immunity to the extent that the official maintains that the official's conduct did not violate clearly established law." Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 529 (4th Cir.1997). On the other hand, "to the extent that the appealing official seeks to argue the insufficiency of the evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact — for example, that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a conclusion that the official engaged in the particular conduct alleged — we do not possess jurisdiction under § 1291 to consider the claim." Id. at 529-30. In Bass we summarized and restated the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Johnson as follows:

In other words we possess no jurisdiction over a claim that a plaintiff has not presented enough evidence to prove that the plaintiff's version of the events actually occurred, but we have jurisdiction over a claim that there was no violation of clearly established law accepting the facts as the district court viewed them.

Id. at 530.

Where, as here, the District Court articulates the facts as it viewed them in determining that summary judgment was inappropriate, the task of an appellate court is relatively straightforward. It must accept those facts and then determine whether, based on those facts, a reasonable person in the defendant's position could have believed that he or she was acting in conformity with the clearly established law at the time. To the extent the appellant argues that the record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee, is insufficient to support the facts as articulated by the District Court,...