Gray-Ross v. St. Louis Pub. Schs.

Decision Date22 March 2022
Docket NumberED109775
PartiesISABELLA GRAY-ROSS, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Respondents.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis Honorable Christopher E. McGraugh

Before Sherri B. Sullivan, Chief Judge and James M. Dowd, Judge concur.

Philip M. Hess, Judge

Introduction

Isabella Gray-Ross ("Appellant") appeals the judgment of the 22nd Judicial Circuit Court ("trial court") granting the motion to dismiss filed by Lakesha LaPrade ("LaPrade"), Lieutenant Kestner Miller, Lisa Taylor Brown, Sergeant Misty Dobynes, and Tracy Davis ("Supervisory Respondents"), together (Individual Respondents).

Appellant raises four points on appeal. In Point I, Appellant argues the trial court erred in granting LaPrade's motion to dismiss based on official immunity because her motion did not sufficiently raise the affirmative defense of official immunity in that she failed to disprove Appellant's pleading she breached a ministerial duty. In Point II Appellant argues the trial court erred in granting the Supervisory Respondents' motion to dismiss based on official immunity because they failed to sufficiently raise the affirmative defense of official immunity by failing to disprove Appellant's pleading they are public employees who breached ministerial duties. In Point III, Appellant argues the Coverdell Act does not provide an independent basis to affirm the dismissal because the Coverdell Act extends immunity only to efforts to control, discipline, expel, or suspend a student or maintain order or control in the classroom or school. In Point IV Appellant argues the public duty doctrine does not provide an independent basis to affirm the dismissal because Appellant pled she was owed a specific duty by the Individual Respondents because she had a special, direct, and distinctive interest in being protected by them.

We affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

Appellant's petition reveals the following facts. Appellant was a member of the McKinley High School girls' soccer team during the spring 2018 soccer season. On April 30, 2018, McKinley played a match hosted by Northwest Academy of Law. Both schools are part of St. Louis Public Schools ("SLPS"). Appellant claims she was attacked during the match by members of the Northwest team, who punched and kicked her and caused a traumatic brain injury and an orbital blowout fracture.

On November 19, 2020, Appellant filed her first amended petition containing three counts of negligence. In Count I, Appellant alleged SLPS breached its duty to ensure student-athletes are safe from assault and the Northwest soccer field was a dangerous condition of public property due to a lack of security present. In Count II, Appellant alleged LaPrade breached her duties as a security guard because she failed to be at the soccer field at the time of the match. In Count III, Appellant alleged the Supervisory Respondents were negligent for failing to have a plan or policy in place to prevent and manage violence at school sporting events.

SLPS moved to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The Individual Respondents moved to dismiss arguing liability was barred by official immunity, the Coverdell Act, and the public duty doctrine. The trial court granted both motions finding SLPS was entitled to sovereign immunity and the Individual Respondents were entitled to official immunity. Finding official immunity dispositive regarding the Individual Respondents' motions, the trial court did not rule on their Coverdell Act and public duty doctrine arguments.

This appeal follows. Appellant does not raise the issue of the dismissal of SLPS based on sovereign immunity in this appeal. Additional facts and procedural history will be included as needed to address Appellant's claims.

Standard of Review

Our review of a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss is de novo. Lang v. Goldsworthy, 470 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Mo. banc 2015) (citing Lynch v. Lynch, 260 S.W.3d 834, 836 (Mo. banc 2008)). A plaintiff's averments are taken as true, and all reasonable inferences therefrom are liberally construed in the plaintiff's favor. A.F. v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 491 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (citing State ex rel. Henley v. Bickel, 285 S.W.3d 327, 329 (Mo. banc 2009)). We will affirm the dismissal if it is supported on any ground stated in the motion to dismiss, whether or not the trial court relied on that ground. Prop. Exch. & Sales, Inc. v. King, 822 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992) (citing Delmain v. Meramec Valley R-III School Dist., 671 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984)).

Discussion
Point I: Sufficiency of LaPrade's Official Immunity Defense

Appellant argues the trial court erred in granting LaPrade's motion to dismiss based on official immunity because she failed to sufficiently raise the affirmative defense of official immunity. Appellant argues a party attempting to raise official immunity must establish they were performing a discretionary act, but LaPrade failed to plead her challenged action was discretionary. Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418 421 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). Appellant argues LaPrade's motion to dismiss "does not disprove" Appellant's allegation she violated ministerial duties. Appellant argues the motion to dismiss failed to establish "on its face and without exception" official immunity applied. Nguyen v. Grain Valley R-5 Sch. Dist., 353 S.W.3d 725, 729-30 (quoting Cornelius v. CJ Morrill, 302 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009)). Appellant argues she was not required to plead the specific statute, regulation, or policy mandating a ministerial duty because LaPrade failed to properly raise official immunity and overcome Appellant's assertion her duties were ministerial. Nguyen, 353 S.W.3d at 729; Goldsby v. Lombardi, 559 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Mo. banc 2018). Appellant argues a court must not infer any discretion where it is not explicitly and without exception stated in the petition. Nguyen, 353 S.W.3d at 729. Appellant argues we must therefore accept, for the motion to dismiss, the alleged duty to be at the match was ministerial because we read factual assertions broadly and draw all inferences in favor of the pleader. Bachtel v. Miller Cty. Nursing Home Dist., 110 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Mo. banc 2003). Appellant argues the factors in Southers v. City of Farmington favor a finding LaPrade violated a ministerial duty by failing to be at the field during the match. 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. banc 2008), as modified on denial of reh'g (Sept. 30, 2008). Appellant argues whether LaPrade was a public official performing a ministerial duty is a fact-intensive question and the case should be remanded to develop a record.

LaPrade argues Appellant did not plead sufficient facts to state a claim and her petition was properly dismissed due to official immunity, because the breach of a ministerial duty required by law is a very narrow exception to the general applicability of official immunity. State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Mo. banc 2019). LaPrade argues her security duties were discretionary and protected by official immunity, and Appellant pled no facts demonstrating otherwise, and Appellant seeks to shift her pleading burden by claiming LaPrade failed to prove official immunity applies. LaPrade argues Appellant failed to state a claim as a matter of law because Appellant pled mere conclusions unsupported by sufficiently specific factual allegations of the breach of a ministerial duty and omitted an allegation of a specific duty or how it should have been carried out. ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 380 (Mo. banc 1993); Berkowski v. St. Louis County Board of Election Commissioners, 854 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Stephens v. Dunn, 453 S.W.3d 241, 250 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (citing State ex rel. Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Mo. banc 1986)). LaPrade argues providing school security is generally a discretionary function. McCoy v. Martinez, 480 S.W.3d 420, 427 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (citing Jackson v. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979)).

Missouri is a fact-pleading jurisdiction. Gerke v. City of Kansas City, 493 S.W.3d 433, 436 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (citing Gardner v. Bank of Am., N.A., 466 S.W.3d 642, 645 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015)). A petition must contain a short and plain statement of the facts showing the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. A petitioner is not required to plead evidentiary facts but must plead the ultimate facts she will prove to make out her cause of action. Suelthaus & Kaplan, P.C. v. Byron Oil Indus., Inc., 847 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992) (citing Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, 698 S.W.2d 854, 865 (Mo. App. E.D. 1985)). Bare conclusions are insufficient. Id.; See also ITT Com. Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 379. Pleading merely that an employee was performing a ministerial act with "no discretion" is insufficient to state a cognizable claim against a public official. A.F., 491 S.W.3d at 632 (citing Hendricks v. Curators of University of Missouri, 308 S.W.3d 740, 747 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)). The same pleading standard applies to responsive pleadings raising an affirmative defense. Echols v. City of Riverside, 332 S.W.3d 207, 211 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).

In a negligence action, the existence and breach of a legal duty are the petitioner's burden to plead. A.F., 491 S.W.3d at 632 (citing Stephens, 453 S.W.3d at 251). When a petitioner alleges negligence by public employees Missouri courts apply official immunity to shield them from liability if they acted in the course of their official duties in the performance of discretionary acts. Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 611 (citing Davis v. Lambert-St. Louis Int'l Airport, 193 S.W.3d 760, 763...

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