Gray v. Board of Trustees of University of Tennessee, Civ. No. 1567.

Decision Date13 April 1951
Docket NumberCiv. No. 1567.
Citation100 F. Supp. 113
PartiesGRAY et al. v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

Carl A. Cowan, Avon N. Williams, Jr., and Z. Alexander Looby, Nashville, Tenn., Thurgood Marshall, and Robert L. Carter, New York City, for plaintiffs.

John J. Hooker, K. Harlan Dodson, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., for defendants.

Before MILLER, Circuit Judge, and DARR and TAYLOR, District Judges.

MILLER, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiffs by this action seek to enjoin the Board of Trustees of the University of Tennessee, the University of Tennessee, and certain of its officers from denying them admission to the Graduate School and to the College of Law of the University because they are members of the Negro race.

In brief, the complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are citizens of the United States and of the State of Tennessee, are residents of and domiciled in the City of Knoxville, State of Tennessee, and are members of the Negro race; that plaintiffs, Gene Mitchell Gray and Jack Alexander, are fully qualified for admission as graduate students to the Graduate School of the University; that plaintiffs Lincoln Anderson Blakeney and Joseph Hutch Patterson are fully qualified for admission as undergraduate students in law to the College of Law of the University; that the four plaintiffs are ready, willing and able to pay all lawful charges and fees, and to comply with all lawful rules and regulations, requisite to their admission; that the University of Tennessee is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Tennessee, was established and is operated as a State function by the State of Tennessee, with two of its integral parts or departments being the Graduate School and the College of Law; that it operates as an essential part of the public school system of the State of Tennessee, maintained by appropriations from the public funds of said State raised by taxation upon the citizens and taxpayers of the State including the plaintiffs; that there is no other institution maintained or operated by the State at which plaintiffs might obtain the graduate or legal education for which they have applied to the University of Tennessee; that the plaintiffs Gene Mitchell Gray and Jack Alexander applied for admission as graduate students to the Graduate School of the University and that the plaintiffs Lincoln Anderson Blakeney and Joseph Hutch Patterson applied for admission as undergraduate students in law to the College of Law of the University; and that on or about December 4, 1950, the Board of Trustees of the University refused and denied each and all of their applications for admission because of their race or color, relying upon the Constitution and Statutes of the State of Tennessee providing that there shall be segregation in the education of the races in the schools and colleges in the State. Plaintiffs contend that the action of the defendants in denying them admission to the University denies the plaintiffs, and other Negroes similarly situated, because of their race or color, their privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States, their liberty and property without due process of law, and the equal protection of the laws, secured by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and by Section 41, Title 8 United States Code Annotated.

The defendants, by answer, state that they are acting under and pursuant to the Constitution and the Statutes of the State of Tennessee, by which they are enjoined from permitting any white and Negro children to be received as scholars together in the same school; that provision has been made by Tennessee Statutes to provide professional education for colored persons not offered to them in state colleges for Negroes but offered for white students in the University of Tennessee; that the State of Tennessee, under its Constitution and Statutes and under its police power, has adopted reasonable regulations for the operation of its institutions based upon established usages, customs and traditions, and such regulations being reasonable are not subject to challenge by the plaintiffs; and that the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States did not authorize the Federal Government to take away from the State the right to adopt all reasonable laws and regulations for the preservation of the public peace and good order under the inherent police power of the State.

The plaintiffs requested a hearing by a three-judge court under the provisions of Title 28 U.S.Code, § 2281, and moved for judgment on the pleadings in that the pleadings showed that there was no dispute as to any material fact and they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The present three-judge court was designated and in due course the case was argued before it.

We are of the opinion that the case is not one for decision by a three-judge court. Title 28 U.S.Code, § 2281, requires the action of a three-judge court only when an injunction is issued restraining the action of any officer of the State upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute. We are of the opinion that the case presents a question of alleged discrimination on the part of the defendants against the plaintiffs under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, rather than the unconstitutionality of the statutory law of Tennessee requiring segregation in education. As such, it is one for decision by the District Judge instead of by a three-judge court.

The plaintiffs rely chiefly upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208; Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 68 S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed. 247; Sweatt v....

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7 cases
  • BOARD OF SUP'RS, ETC. v. Tureaud
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • October 28, 1953
    ...of any State statute. As said by Circuit Judge Miller speaking for a three-judge district court in Gray v. Board of Trustees of University of Tennessee, D.C., 100 F. Supp. 113, 114, 115: "We are of the opinion that the case is not one for decision by a three-judge court. Title 28 U.S. Code,......
  • Easterly v. Dempster
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee
    • May 5, 1953
    ...institutions on account of their color. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 6 Cir., 202 F.2d 275; Gray v. Board of Trustees of University of Tennessee, D. C., 100 F.Supp. 113; McSwain v. County Board of Education of Anderson County, D. C., 104 F.Supp. No case is stated for an award of......
  • Wilson v. City of Paducah
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
    • September 10, 1951
    ...§ 2281. In my opinion, this contention is unsound. The same question was raised in the case of Gray v. Board of Trustees of the University of Tennessee, D.C.E.D.Tenn., N.D., 100 F.Supp. 113, and there considered and rejected by the writer of this memorandum. The opinion in that case gives t......
  • Battle v. Wichita Falls Junior College Dist.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas
    • November 27, 1951
    ...v. City of Paducah, D.C., 100 F.Supp. 116; City of Paducah v. Shelbourne, 341 U.S. 902, 71 S.Ct. 609, 95 L.Ed. 1341; Gray v. Board of Trustees, D. C., 100 F.Supp. 113; Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. Authorities can be multiplied. The facts show that the privilege of attending the de......
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