Gray v. Comm'r of Corr.

• Decision Date: 18 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 32906.,32906.
• Citation: 138 Conn.App. 171,50 A.3d 406
• Parties: Bennie GRAY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

138 Conn.App. 171

50 A.3d 406

Bennie GRAY

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 32906.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 15, 2012.

Decided Sept. 18, 2012.

Laljeebhai R. Patel, special public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).

Emily Graner Sexton, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael L. Regan, state's attorney, and Marcia Pillsbury, special deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

BEAR, ESPINOSA and WEST, Js.

WEST, J.

The petitioner, Bennie Gray, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly rejected his claim that his appellate counsel in his first habeas action rendered ineffective assistance by not advocating the correct standard for ineffective assistance of trial counsel in guilty plea cases. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the petitioner's appeal. On September 10, 1998, the petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a–55a and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. In the petitioner's first habeas action, he claimed, inter alia, that his trial counsel, attorney Burton Weinstein, rendered ineffective assistance by fraudulently inducing him to enter the nolo contendere plea. On July 23, 2004, the habeas court denied the petition concluding that “[t]he [p]etitioner has persuaded this [c]ourt that [trial counsel] used improper tactics to pressure the [p]etitioner to plead nolo contendere and accept the plea bargain but has not met his burden of proving that [trial counsel's] actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in view of the result as opposed to the potential result.” On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment of the habeas court. Gray v. Commissioner of Correction, 99 Conn.App. 444, 449, 914 A.2d 1046, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 925, 926 A.2d 666 (2007). This court determined that “[t]he habeas court recognized and applied the correct standard for adjudicating the petitioner's habeas claim. It asked whether there was a reasonable probability that if it were not for the ineffectiveness of counsel for the [petitioner], there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different?” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 448, 914 A.2d 1046.

In the present case, the petitioner filed a second habeas petition claiming that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his first habeas appeal, where he was represented by attorney Donald O'Brien. ¹ The petitioner alleged that appellate counsel failed to challenge directly the habeas court's application of the incorrect standard for ineffective assistance of trial counsel in guilty plea cases, which failure caused this court to render an erroneous decision. In this regard, the petitioner alleged that the appropriate standard in his case was set forth in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), and that the standard set forth in Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 234 Conn. 139, 662 A.2d 718 (1995), is inapplicable.² Specifically, the petitioner alleged that, because his case does not involve a failure of trial counsel to discover evidence or defenses, under Hill, the focus is on the plea proceeding and its outcome, and not the outcome of a possible criminal trial.

In its memorandum of decision denying the petitioner's habeas petition, the habeas court found that appellate counsel did raise the Hill standard in his brief and attempted to distinguish Copas. The habeas court further noted that this court already has determined that the appropriate standard involves inquiring whether “there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different?” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gray v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 99 Conn.App. at 448, 914 A.2d 1046. The habeas court stated that even if appellate counsel had developed the argument with more focus and detail, he would not have been successful because, although this court has not always quoted the “different outcome” component of the prejudice test in guilty plea cases, it remains an integral part of Hill and not merely a separate prong added by Copas. Finally, the habeas court rejected the petitioner's argument that the “different outcome” test does not apply because this case does not involve a failure to discover evidence or defenses. The court stated: “Logically it makes no sense to delete the Copas ‘different outcome’ test merely because the petitioner here claimed in his prior habeas petition that his trial attorney improperly persuaded him to plead guilty, as opposed to the reported cases in which a [petitioner] claims that his trial counsel failed to discover evidence or defenses. The precise reason why counsel was ineffective in inducing the petitioner to plead guilty—whether it is bad advice or failure to investigate—is immaterial if the petitioner is actually guilty. In either scenario, the petitioner is not truly prejudiced unless there is a reasonable probability that he would achieve some measure of success at trial.” The habeas court granted the petition for certification to appeal from the judgment. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly denied his claim that his appellate counsel in his first habeas action rendered ineffective assistance. Specifically, the petitioner argues that the Hill standard is the correct standard, which requires proof only that the petitioner would have insisted on going to trial. He further argues that, had his appellate counsel properly briefed and advocated this standard, this court would have reversed the habeas court in the first habeas action and restored the petitioner's constitutional right to a jury trial. We disagree.

We begin by setting forth the standard of review applicable to the petitioner's appeal. “In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erroneous, but our review of whether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the petitioner's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is plenary.... The habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, 119 Conn.App. 530, 535–36, 988 A.2d 881, cert. denied, 296 Conn. 902, 991 A.2d 1103 (2010).

“Our Supreme Court has adopted [the] two part analysis [set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ] in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 131 Conn.App. 805, 808, 29 A.3d 166 (2011). “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.... First, deficient performance may be proved by showing that the counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.... Second, prejudice to the defense requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 119 Conn.App. at 534–35, 988 A.2d 881; see also Strickland v. Washington, supra, at 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.³“Because the petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test to prevail on a habeas corpus petition, this court may dispose of the petitioner's claim if he fails to meet either prong.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 535, 988 A.2d 881.

Under the performance prong, “[a] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.... The right to counsel is not the right to perfect representation.... [Although] an appellate advocate must provide effective assistance, he is not under an obligation to raise every conceivable issue. A brief that raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good arguments ... in a verbal mound made up of strong and weak contentions.... Indeed, [e]xperienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues.... The effect of adding weak arguments will be to dilute the force of the stronger ones.... [I]f the issues not raised by his appellate counsel lack merit, [the petitioner] cannot sustain even the first part of this dual burden since the failure to pursue unmeritorious claims cannot be considered conduct falling below the level of reasonably competent representation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 131 Conn.App. at 808–809, 29 A.3d 166.

The habeas court concluded that “there was no ineffective assistance in, or any prejudice resulting from, any failure of [appellate counsel] to argue at greater length that the Copas ‘different outcome’ test did not apply in this case.” ⁴ Because we agree that the petitioner has failed to show that appellate counsel's performance was deficient based on any failure to brief properly and to advocate the appropriate standard for ineffective assistance of trial counsel in guilty plea cases, we agree with the judgment of the habeas court.

At the outset, the petitioner failed to offer any expert testimony that appellate counsel rendered deficient performance. Instead, the petitioner offered his own testimony...