Gray v. Creamer

• Decision Date: 28 May 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 71-445.
• Citation: 376 F. Supp. 675
• Parties: Norman C. GRAY, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. J. Shane CREAMER, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

376 F. Supp. 675

Norman C. GRAY, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. J. Shane CREAMER, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 71-445.

United States District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.

May 28, 1974.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ronald A. Berlin, Michael L. Rosenfield, Harry F. Swanger, Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Stephen M. Sokel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pittsburgh, Pa., for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

OPINION

GOURLEY, Senior District Judge:

This is a Civil Rights proceeding filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 by plaintiffs who assert that various actions by defendants constitute violations of their constitutional rights. When this suit was instituted, all plaintiffs were inmates of the penal system of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and were incarcerated at various times at the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh. Defendants at the time this suit was filed were all employees of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and all acted in some capacity in connection with the said penal institution. The Court has afforded the parties a full and complete trial and has considered the briefs and argument of counsel relative to plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees.

The plaintiffs contend that their constitutional rights have been infringed as a result of mail censorship, censorship of various publications, cruel and unusual punishment, denial of procedural due process, and being transferred as punishment for participation on the newspaper VIBRATIONS. Each of these contentions will be individually considered. However, the Court wishes to make clear that in determining whether there has been any violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights it is guided by an overriding principle that:

"To determine, with precision, those rights which follow an inmate into prison involves a process of weighing and balancing conflicting interests. The desire that there be a maximum opportunity for the exercise of rights and privileges may often collide with the practical necessities of managing and administering a complicated penal community. The task of striking the proper balance between these conflicting interests is generally within the competence of the prison authorities. Thus, the federal courts have been understandably reluctant to intervene in "matters of state prison administration, recognizing that a wide latitude for judgment and discretion must be extended to prison officials." Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1970)

The censorship of incoming and outgoing prisoner mail is an area which touches on the rights of both the prisoner and the sender or recipient of the mail. Procunier v. Martinez, 42 U.S. Law Week 4606, ___ U.S. ___, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974).

The Supreme Court in this decision upholds censorship of prisoner mail provided two criteria are satisfied: (1) the regulation in question must further an important or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression, and (2) the limitations of First Amendment freedoms are no greater than necessary to protect the particular governmental interest involved.

The situation which prevails at the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh depends upon the category of mail involved. Incoming and outgoing privileged mail, i. e., mail from lawyers, judges and state and federal officials is not censored in any way. Such mail sent to prisoners is opened by the inmate-addressee in the presence of an employee of the Institution and simply checked for any contraband. Privileged mail sent by a prisoner is never opened or spot-checked. All non-privileged incoming mail is opened and inspected for contraband before the inmate receives it, but it is not read, censored or reproduced. Non-privileged outgoing mail is spot-checked for security reasons to insure that mail privileges are not being abused, as for example to prevent attempts to devise escape plans. Otherwise, outgoing mail is not censored, read, or reproduced. On this basis it must be concluded that there is no constitutional violation of plaintiffs' rights to receive or send mail, and that the criteria of Procunier, supra, are met.

Closely related to the question of general mail censorship is the issue of the extent to which censorship of publications should be permitted. It is the Court's belief that the standard announced in Procunier, supra, is also applicable to the receipt of various periodicals, books and magazines. A censorship committee has now been established to implement an administrative directive which sets guidelines for the censoring of various publications. This directive is included in Part A of an Appendix to this Opinion and is consistent with standards set forth in Procunier. The Court is satisfied that the screening process as employed with respect to various publications at the Pittsburgh Correctional Institution does not seek to unnecessarily hamper freedom of expression and that a substantial governmental interest is served in maintaining prison security and discipline in implementing the directive. While there may have been a delay in establishing the censorship committee in accordance with the administrative directive, this resulted not from any effort to violate plaintiffs' rights, but from insufficient personnel at the prison.

Although in certain instances some books were returned to the publisher without being given to the inmate, these were occasions in which the prisoner had not complied with ordering procedures whereby a request is first submitted to the Institution and then forwarded to the publisher. Otherwise, the Court finds that there has been no censorship violative of plaintiffs' rights.

Plaintiffs contend that punishment in the form of transfer or segregation from the general population of the prison was meted out to them because of their participation on the newspaper VIBRATIONS. Transfer to another prison has been held not to be a violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights. Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1972). Moreover, the Court finds that no inmate was transferred to another institution or segregated from the general population solely as a result of activities on VIBRATIONS. Such segregation of prisoners as took place at the time VIBRATIONS was shut down was a result of information received by Defendant Walters on Sunday, April 18, 1971, that the tag shop at the Institution was to be the scene of a serious inmate disturbance on Monday, April 19, 1971. The Court is satisfied that no action in the form of transfer or segregation from the general population was taken by defendants in order to punish any plaintiff for his participation on VIBRATIONS. This conclusion is founded on the fact than many inmates segregated from the general population on or near April 19, 1971, had absolutely no connection with VIBRATIONS, while several on the staff of that newspaper were neither segregated nor transferred in April, 1971. Accordingly, no basis exists to conclude that plaintiffs were punished for an expression of their views on VIBRATIONS.

Plaintiffs contend that they were subjected to physical and verbal harassment and that conditions and treatment received by them and other prisoners in areas of administrative and punitive segregation constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, Plaintiff Harris asserts that he was subjected to administrative segregation on "A" Range pending an investigation, although he had violated no institutional rules or regulations.

Any statement made here would be less than candid if it did not give recognition to the often deplorable conditions which prevail at the Pittsburgh Correctional Institution. But the Court is not prepared to determine that these conditions amount to cruel and unusual punishment; although deplorable, the conditions do not strike the conscience of the Court as being intolerable. Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965). Furthermore, there has been no demonstration of barbarous conduct which is revolting in the extreme. Ford v. Board of Managers of New Jersey State Prison, 407 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1969).

The Court recognizes that the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment is founded on the basic goal of preserving "the dignity of man." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 100, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958). Continuing, the Court in Trop indicated that the Amendment takes its meaning from "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Two additional tests have been set forth in Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.Supp. 674 (N.D.Cal.1966): (1) is the punishment greatly disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed; (2) does the punishment go beyond what is necessary to achieve a legitimate penal goal. See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910).

A review of the conditions as they exist at the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh convinces the Court that under none of the above tests have any plaintiffs been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, nor has there been any physical and verbal harassment.

Areas of segregation within the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh consist of "A" Range, "J" Range, and the Behavior Adjustment Unit. Inmates are housed in "A" Range for protective and punitive administrative segregation and are reviewed weekly by the Program Review Committee. Inmates are housed temporarily in the front half of "J" Range upon their initial arrival at the Institution. The back half of "J" Range is used as transitional housing for inmates who have been in administrative segregation prior to their return to the general population.

The Behavior Adjustment Unit is reserved for inmates who display or have exhibited a pattern of abnormal and dangerous behavior within the Institution.

The Behavior Adjustment Unit is divided into four Ranges: "U", "V", "W" and "X" with the latter being reserved for...