Gray v. Defa

• Decision Date: 31 March 1943
• Docket Number: 6561
• Citation: 135 P.2d 251,103 Utah 339
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: GRAY v. DEFA et al

135 P.2d 251

103 Utah 339

GRAY v. DEFA et al

No. 6561

Supreme Court of Utah

March 31, 1943

Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; George A. Faust and J. Allan Crockett, Judges.

Action by Norma Gray against Marion Defa, also known as Marion Defabrizio, and others to quiet title to realty, wherein three of the defendants filed counterclaim. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendants appeal.

Reversed.

C. E Norton, of Salt Lake City, for appellants.

W. D Beatie, of Salt Lake City, for respondent.

WOLFE Chief Justice. McDONOUGH and WADE, JJ., LARSON, Justice MOFFAT, Justice, concurring.

OPINION

WOLFE, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff seeks to obtain a decree quieting title to certain lands. The complaint alleged that plaintiff was the owner in fee of the property therein described; that the defendants claimed certain rights in and to the lands through some claim of interest in a contract of sale and certain leasehold agreements, the exact nature of which were unknown to the plaintiff, but were adverse to her title. The prayer, based on the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, Chap. 64, Title 104, U. C. A., 1943, asked only for a declaration that plaintiff owned the land free from all adverse claims of these defendants.

The defendants filed a demurrer to this complaint which demurrer was duly overruled. Whereupon three defendants, Jaynes, Defa, and Buck, each filed a separate answer and counterclaim by which each claimed an interest in the land. Jaynes alleged that he had a contract to purchase the land from plaintiff and her predecessors in interest. Defa and Buck each claimed a leasehold interest by virtue of separate lease agreements also with plaintiff and her predecessors in interest. In addition, each counterclaim set up a claim for damages alleged to have arisen out of these previous transactions, and each contained a prayer for general relief and for damages. Jaynes also asked for a decree of specific performance of the contract of sale. The other three defendants, Graff, Wright and Norton, filed answers setting up interests under various assignments of the contract of sale and the leasehold agreements.

The court, holding that this was exclusively an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, found that the counterclaims of the defendants "were not considered as a proper part of this cause of action and that no evidence with reference to certain counterclaims was allowed." It also held that the defendants, by their failure to make payments pursuant to the terms of the contract and lease agreements, had forfeited all rights thereunder. It entered a declaratory judgment which quieted title in the plaintiff and defendants appealed.

The appeal is taken on the judgment roll. Our only concern will therefore be whether the pleadings, findings of fact and conclusions of law support the judgment. Byron v. Utah Copper Co., 53 Utah 151, 178 P. 53.

The appellants make seven assignments of error. The primary proposition thereby urged is that the court erred in refusing to consider the various issues raised by the counterclaims.

Although the plaintiff sought relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the action in effect is an action to quiet title, which latter action is in the nature of a declaratory proceeding. Bancroft, Code Practice and Remedies, § 127, p. 177. Considered as a regular quiet title action all matters raised by the counterclaims were properly pleadable. When so considered the court would have been required to adjudicate all rights of the parties in the various agreements, thus settling the entire controversy. See Hanes v. Coffee, 212 Cal. 777, 300 P. 963; California Trust Co. v. Cohn, 214 Cal. 619, 622, 7 P.2d 297, 299; Nevada Land & Invest. Corp. v. Sistrunk, 220 Cal. 174, 30 P.2d 389.

The complaint in the instant case was aimed or directed at all rights which the defendants claimed in the land by virtue of these various agreements and the contract of sale. The adjudication of all issues raised by the counterclaims was necessary to a complete settlement of the rights of the parties arising out of said contractual relationships. The judgment entered did not take into account part of the issues raised by way of counterclaim and therefore did not completely settle the controversy. As already stated, the usual action to quiet title would have done so. Both parties apparently take the position that the court had no authority to grant declaratory relief and coercive relief in the same proceeding. The respondent contends that since the counterclaims asked for regular legal and for equitable coercive relief, the court properly refused to consider them. Appellants assert that since the court could not enter a regular legal or an equitable coercive relief in combination with declaratory relief, it abused its discretion in entering any decree but should have required plaintiff to bring another form of action.

The respondent relies on § 104-64-6, U. C. A. 1943, which apparently gives the court wide discretion in determining when it may enter a declaratory decree. That section provides:

"The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."

In discussing this provision, Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 2d Ed., p. 293, states:

"This rule merely embodies the established Anglo-American practice in all jurisdictions and indicates both the practical and remedial scope and limitations of the relief. Yet the discretion granted, however wide and unlimited in appearance, is a judicial discretion, hardened by experience into a rule, and its exercise is subject to appellate review."

He concludes that when the declaratory judgment will not serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue or will not terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceedings, the court should decline to render the same. See, also, Angell v. Schram, 6 Cir., 109 F.2d 380; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hobeika, D. C., 23 F.Supp. 1; Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, Wyo., 296 P. 206; Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 49 Wyo. 22, 52 P.2d 404; James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N.Y. 298, 176 N.E. 401; 16 Am. Jr. § 14, p. 287, 68 A. L. R. 116; 87 A. L. R. 1212.

Other jurisdictions, which have Declaratory Judgment Acts similar to the Utah Act, hold that where there is another established remedy available by which the controversy could be settled, this fact may be taken into consideration in determining whether or not the court abused its discretion in entering a declaratory judgment. The rule is stated by the Kansas Supreme Court in Witschner v. City of Atchison, 154 Kan. 212, 117 P.2d 570, as follows:

"The fact that a question may readily be presented in an actual trial, though not a sufficient ground in every situation on which to deny the use of the Declaratory Judgment Law, constitutes one of the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether courts should maintain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Law."

See, also, Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, D. C., 10 F.Supp. 779; Schriber Sheet Metal & Roofers v. Shook, 64 Ohio App. 276, 28 N.E.2d 699; Berman v. Wreck-A-Pair Bldg. Co., 234 Ala. 293, 175 So. 269; Day v. Ostergard, 146 Pa.Super. 27, 21 A.2d 586; Woollard v. Schaffer Stores Co., 272 N.Y. 304, 5 N.E.2d 829, 109 A. L. R. 1262.

Other cases have gone further and held that statutes similar to the Utah Act were intended to furnish a new remedy where none existed before and that declaratory relief cannot be given where another established remedy exists. See Miller v. Siden, 259 Mich. 19, 242 N.W. 823; Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N.W. 552; Reynolds v. Chase, 87 N.H. 227, 177 A. 291; James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N.Y. 298, 176 N.E. 401; Leafgreen v. La Bar, 293 Pa. 263, 142 A. 224; In re Cryan's Estate, 301 Pa. 386, 152 A. 675, 71 A. L. R. 1417; Brindley v. Meara, 209 Ind. 144, 198 N.E. 301, 101 A. L. R. 682; Morgan v. Dietrich, 179 Md. 199, 16 A.2d 916; Williams v. Tawes, 179 Md. 224, 17 A.2d 137, 132 A. L. R. 1105; 16 Am. Jur. p. 287, § 13. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, pp. 307-309, 327-337, criticizes cases so holding and explains the basis therefor. He concludes, as we shall subsequently see in more detail, the the declaratory judgment is an alternative remedy to be granted whenever it will serve a useful purpose in settling the uncertainty and insecurity giving rise to the proceeding.

At first blush it appears that the entry of the declaratory decree in the instant case did serve a useful purpose in that it determined that defendants had forfeited all interest in the land by their failure to make payments pursuant to the terms of the contract of sale and the various lease agreements. However, it is difficult to see how such a determination could have been made without hearing the issues raised by the counterclaims. If the plaintiff had, as the defendants contend, fraudulently sold the water rights which were appurtenant to the land so as to cause $ 50,000 damage to Jaynes, he would be justified in refusing to make further payments at least until a settlement of this matter was attained. Also if plaintiff did not allow defendants Defa and Buck to have the quiet possession of the land pursuant to their respective lease agreements but on the contrary allowed the land to be sold for taxes to the damage of said defendants, said defendants also would be justified in refusing to make further payments on the lease agreements. See Pembrook v. Houston, 41 Cal.App. 54 181 P. 828; Palladine v. Imperial Valley, etc., Ass'n, 65 Cal.App. 727, 225 P....