Gray v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co.

Decision Date18 May 1907
Docket Number1,339.
Citation156 F. 736
PartiesGRAY v. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RY. CO.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Rehearing Denied Oct. 22, 1907.

This writ of error is from a final judgment against the plaintiff in error, as plaintiff below, upon demurrer sustained to the declaration, as finally amended, and election to stand by such declaration.

The transcript of record shows that the plaintiff in error filed suit in trespass on the case, December 7, 1900, in the superior court of Cook county, against F. C. Austin Manufacturing Company, and E. W. Meddaugh and Henry B. Joy as receivers of Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Company; and that in 1903 the Grand Trunk Western Railway Company was impleaded as a defendant therein. Subsequently, after issues joined and trial in that court upon which verdict was set aside, the proceedings resulted in submission to a dismissal as to the defendants Austin Manufacturing Company and the receivers (upon suggestion of the death of one receiver and discharge of the other, and delivery of all the railroad property to the defendant Grand Trunk Western Railway Company), and continuance of the cause with a new trial granted as against the Grand Trunk Western Railway Company. Thereupon, on application of such remaining defendant, the cause was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States on June 19, 1905. Other proceedings in the Superior Court which are referred to in the transcript, are not material upon this writ of error. Several amended declarations were filed, resulting in the final amended declaration, upon which this judgment of dismissal rests under demurrer.

This declaration avers that the plaintiff in error was injured on March 5, 1900, in operations of the railroad under receivers named, through negligence in such operation, while he was 'in the exercise of due care and caution about his own safety,' and that the receivers were appointed and acting under orders of the United States Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, in foreclosure proceedings against the railroad company then owning the road. For recovery thereupon against the defendant in error, subsequent proceedings in that court under a foreclosure decree are averred in the filing of a petition by the defendant in error, as purchaser under the decree, and an order of the court granting the prayer of the petition; each entitled in that cause and reading as follows: First. 'This petition of the Grand Trunk Western Railway Company respectfully shows:

'(1) That it is a corporation existing under and by virtue of the laws of the states of Michigan and Indiana, created as hereinafter stated; that it is now the owner of the entire railroad and property formerly owned by the Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Company-- one of the defendants in the above-entitled cause-- which were embraced in and sold under and pursuant to the decree in said cause; and that it derived its said title through the following deeds of conveyance: (a) By separate deeds for each of the states of Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois, of the portion of said railroad and property lying and being in each of said states, by Walter S. Harsha, special master commissioner, to Charles M. Hays and Elijah W. Meddaugh, the purchasers at the sale, made pursuant to said decree, in which deeds said complainant, the Mercantile Trust Company (of New York), trustee, and said defendants, the Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Company, the Union Trust Company (of Detroit), trustee, and Hugh Paton, trustee, joined. (b) By separate deeds of conveyance, for each of said states, by said Hays and Meddaugh, of that portion of said railroad and property lying and being in the state of Michigan to the Port Huron & Indiana Railway Company; of that portion thereof lying and being in the state of Indiana, to the Indiana & Illinois Railway Company; and of that portion thereof lying and being in the state of Illinois, to the Chicago Lake County Railway Company-- each of said railway companies having been organized by said Hays and Meddaugh, pursuant to statutory provisions, for the express purpose of accepting such conveyances.
'(2) That subsequently said Port Huron & Indiana Railway Company and said Indiana & Illinois Railway Company were consolidated, and thereby your petitioner was duly created, pursuant to the statutes of the states of Michigan and Indiana. Afterward your petitioner, having become the owner of the entire capital stock of said Chicago Lake County Railway Company, purchased that part of said railroad and property lying and being in the state of Illinois, and received a deed thereof from said Chicago Lake County Railway Company.
'(3) That by the laws of the states of Michigan and Indiana, under and pursuant to which it was created as aforesaid, your petitioner is expressly made liable for all the debts and obligations of its constituent members, to wit: Said Port Huron & Indiana Railway Company and said Indiana & Illinois Railway Company; and by the laws of the state of Illinois, under and pursuant to which it acquired that part of said railroad and property lying in said state of Illinois as aforesaid, your petitioner is expressly made liable for all the debts and obligations of said Chicago Lake County Railway Company.
'(4) That in each of the several deeds through which your petitioner derived its title to said railroad and property as aforesaid, it is provided, in substance, that the conveyance is expressly made subject to the obligations by said decree imposed upon the purchasers of said railroad and property at said sale thereof by said special master commissioner, and upon their successors and assigns.
'Copies of each of said several deeds of conveyance which constitute petitioner's chain of title to said railroad and property are hereto attached.
'(5) It is provided in said decree, under and by virtue of which said railroad and property were sold to said Hays and Meddaugh as aforesaid, as follows, viz.: 'It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the purchaser or purchasers of said railroad franchises and other property at such sale shall, as part of the consideration and in addition to the price bid, pay and discharge any and all receivers' indebtedness and liabilities that shall not have been paid by the receivers, and any and all claims heretofore filed in this cause, or that may be hereafter filed within four calendar months from the date of entering this decree, but only when and as the court shall allow such claims and adjudge the same to be a lien prior to the mortgage foreclosed in this suit; and shall pay all costs of court, fees of clerks and masters, and any sums awarded by the court to the parties to this suit, and their counsel, or to the receivers in this cause; and, furthermore, shall pay all costs and expenses involved in and incident to the suits instituted in said Circuit Courts of the United States for the District of Indiana and for the Northern District of Illinois in foreclosure of said mortgage of April 10, 1880, and shall abide by and comply with and perform all other orders and decrees that may be made by this court or by said Circuit Courts of the United States for the District of Indiana and for the Northern District of Illinois, or either of them, in the said cases therein pending. Any such purchaser or purchasers, and his or their successors and assigns, shall have the right to enter his or their appearance in this court, or any other court, and he or they, or any of the parties to this suit, shall have the right to contest any claim, demand, and allowance existing at the time of the sale and then undetermined, and any claim or demand which may arise or be presented thereafter, which would be payable by such purchaser or purchasers, his or their successors or assigns, or which would be chargeable against the property purchased, in addition to the amount bid by such purchaser or purchasers at the sale, and may appeal from any decision relating to any such claim, demand or allowance.'
'(6) Your petitioner hereby admits itself to be the successor and assigns of said Hays and Meddaugh, within the intent and meaning of said decree, and that it is legally liable for all the obligations imposed by said decree upon the purchasers of said railroad and property at the sale thereunder as aforesaid, and is amenable to all orders and decrees of this court, of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana, or the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, that may be made in respect thereof; and it hereby submits itself to the jurisdiction of this court and of said courts in respect of any such orders or decrees.
'(7) That your petitioner is desirous of securing immediate possession of said railroad and property, and, to that end, prays an order of the court directing the receivers to at once turn over and deliver the same to your petitioner, together with any money balances, credits, etc., growing out of or connected with the operation of said railroad and property by said receivers, that may be in their possession and control; your petitioner hereby signifying its willingness to accept and assume all outstanding obligations and liabilities of said receivers, and hereby undertaking to fully satisfy and discharge the same as they shall from time to time, within the terms of said decree in that behalf, be allowed and ordered paid by this court, by the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana, or by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. And your petitioner is willing and hereby agrees to accept the full and final accounting of said receivers, as such accounts shall be rendered by them to petitioner,
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