Gray v. GULF, MOBILE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY

• Decision Date: 13 July 1970
• Docket Number: No. 28202.,28202.
• Parties: Richard L. GRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GULF, MOBILE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

429 F.2d 1064 (1970)

Richard L. GRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GULF, MOBILE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 28202.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 13, 1970.

Boardman Noland, Takoma Park, Md., Willis C. Darby, Jr., Mobile, Ala., Whiteford S. Blakeney, Charlotte, N.C., for plaintiff-appellant, Blakeney, Alexander & Machen, Charlotte, N.C., of counsel.

Allan R. Cameron, Sullivan & Cameron, W. A. Kimbrough, Jr., Mobile, Ala., Edward J. Hickey, Jr., James L. Highsaw, Jr., Mulholland, Hickey & Lyman, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee; Plato E. Papps, Gen. Counsel, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

Before TUTTLE, WISDOM and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:

We are called upon to resolve a clash between enforced union adherence and an individual conscience which forswears union allegiance. Plaintiff Richard L. Gray, whose religious convictions compel him to reject all forms of union affiliation, seeks to invoke the First Amendment as a protective shield against compulsory unionism sanctioned by the Railway Labor Act. The constitutional issue is sensitive and perhaps far-reaching, but our resolution of the issue is guided by previous Supreme Court teachings. Because we conclude that the court below was correct in its application of these teachings, we uphold the court's denial of relief.

The relevant facts are not disputed.¹ In February, 1967, plaintiff Gray began working as a machinist with the defendant railroad.² Previously the defendant railroad and the defendant union had entered into a union shop agreement pursuant to the provisions of § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act.³ Section 2, Eleventh permits union shop agreements provided there is no discrimination against any employee with regard to membership requirements, and provided further that membership is not denied or terminated for any reason other than failure "to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership." Under the terms of the agreement here involved Gray was required to become a member of the union within the first sixty days of his employment. Gray refused to do so on the ground that his religious convictions forbade his joining or supporting a labor union.⁴ In lieu of union

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membership the union offered Gray an arrangement whereby he could pay the required dues and fees without actually becoming a member of the union, but Gray found even this proposed arrangement unacceptable.⁵ In his own words, "I had become of the genuine and sincere conviction that to pay dues and fees to the union would violate my religious faith."⁶ Because of Gray's unwavering refusal to comply with the terms of the union shop agreement, dismissal proceedings were instituted against him,⁷ and at the conclusion of the proceedings the railroad had no alternative but to terminate his employment.

Having lost his job because of his religious convictions, Gray brought suit against the railroad and the union in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. In his complaint he contended that the termination of his employment was in violation of the First, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.⁸ In his prayer for relief he sought (1) an order granting him reinstatement to his former position, (2) an injunction forbidding his discharge in the future for failure to pay union dues and fees so long as his refusal to do so was based on his religious convictions, and (3) an award of damages growing out of his loss of employment. The district court denied relief, and plaintiff has appealed. Finding ourselves in agreement with the opinion written by Judge Thomas in the court below, we affirm.

On appeal Gray hurls a two-fold argument at the statute. He contends initially that § 2, Eleventh should not be interpreted to require a railroad employee to pay union dues and fees pursuant to a union shop agreement if the employee objects to such payments on religious grounds. Alternatively, if the statute is so interpreted, he contends that it is unconstitutional.

We find the first branch of Gray's argument — the statutory construction contention — totally devoid of merit. Nothing in the statute exhibits a congressional intent that any employee in a union shop situation is to be totally exonerated from the requirement of paying union dues and fees. On the contrary, § 2, Eleventh specifically permits agreements requiring "all employees" to become members of the union representing their craft or class. Thus we conclude that plaintiff's only possible salvation is to be found in his constitutional argument.

In deciding the constitutional issue we are not required to navigate in uncharted waters. Instead, we are guided firmly to our destination by two Supreme Court decisions, Railway Employees' Department, AFL v. Hanson, 1956, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L. Ed. 1112, and International Association of Machinists v. Street, 1961, 367 U.S. 740, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141. These decisions were relied upon by Judge Thomas in the court below; they have been invoked by the parties on this appeal; and we agree that they are dispositive of the issue now before us.

The decisions in Hanson and Street can best be understood in light of the legislative history of § 2, Eleventh. That legislative history was discussed at great length in the Street opinion. As the Court there noted, "the question of union security in the rail industry was first given detailed consideration by Congress in 1934."⁹ At that time, for a variety of reasons,¹⁰ Congress chose to adopt § 2, Fifth of the Railway Labor Act, specifically forbidding union shop agreements.¹¹

"The question of union security was reopened in 1950. Congress then evaluated the proposal for authorizing the union shop primarily in terms of its relationship to the financing of the unions\' participation in the machinery created by the Railway Labor Act to achieve its goals. The framework for fostering voluntary adjustments between the carriers and their employees in the interest of the efficient discharge by the carriers of their important functions with minimum disruption from labor strife has no statutory parallel in our industry. That machinery, the product of a long legislative evolution, is more complex than that of any other industry.¹²

* * * * * *

"In prescribing collective bargaining as the method of settling railway disputes, in conferring upon the unions the status of exclusive representatives in the negotiation and administration of collective agreements, and in giving them representation on the statutory board to adjudicate grievances, Congress had given the unions a clearly defined and delineated role to play in effectuating the basic congressional policy of stabilizing labor relations in the industry. * * *

"Performance of these functions entails the expenditure of considerable funds. Moreover, this Court has held that under the statutory scheme, a union\'s status as exclusive bargaining representative carries with it the duty fairly and equitably to represent all employees of the craft or class, union and nonunion. Citing cases. The principal argument made by the unions in 1950 was based on their role in this regulatory framework. They maintained that because of the expense of performing their duties in the congressional scheme, fairness justified the spreading of the costs to all employees who benefited. They thus advanced as their purpose the elimination of the `free riders\' — those employees who obtained the benefits of the unions\' participation in the machinery of the Act without financially supporting the unions.¹³

* * * * * *

"This argument was decisive with Congress. The House Committee Report traced the history of previous legislation in the industry and pointed out the duty of the union acting as exclusive bargaining representative to represent equally all members of the class. `Under the act, the collective-bargaining representative is required to represent the entire membership of the craft or class, including nonunion members, fairly, equitably, and in good faith. Benefits resulting from collective bargaining may not be withheld from employees because they are not members of the union.\' HR Rep No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4. Observing that about 75% or 80% of all railroad employees were believed to belong to a union, the report continued: `Nonunion members, nevertheless, share in the benefits derived from collective agreements negotiated by the railway labor unions but bear no share of the cost of obtaining such benefits.\' Ibid. These considerations overbore the arguments in favor of the earlier policy of complete individual freedom of choice."¹⁴

Consequently, in 1951 Congress sanctioned union shop agreements in the rail industry by adopting § 2, Eleventh. In doing so Congress "contemplated compulsory unionism to force employees to share the costs of negotiating and administering collective agreements, and the costs of the adjustment and settlement of disputes."¹⁵

The constitutionality of § 2, Eleventh was soon under attack in the courts. In Hanson a group of railroad employees who sought to avoid union membership argued that their First and Fifth Amendment rights were invaded by the compulsions of a union shop agreement sanctioned by § 2, Eleventh. The Supreme Court disagreed. Finding the statutory sanction of union shop agreements a reasonable exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause,¹⁶ the Court explained its rejection of the constitutional objections and delineated the scope of its holding in these words:

"Wide-ranged problems are tendered under the First Amendment. It is argued that the union shop agreement forces men into

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