Gray v. Jenkins

• Court: Kansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SCHROEDER
• Citation: Gray v. Jenkins, 183 Kan. 251, 326 P.2d 319 (Kan. 1958)
• Decision Date: 07 June 1958
• Docket Number: No. 41014,41014
• Parties: Malcolm M. GRAY, Appellee, v. Jack B. JENKINS, Appellant.

Page 319

326 P.2d 319

183 Kan. 251

Malcolm M. GRAY, Appellee, v. Jack B. JENKINS, Appellant.

No. 41014.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

June 7, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The functions of the Kansas Civil Service Board are administrative and not judicial in character.

2. G.S.1949, 75-2949, provides a statutory remedy for an aggrieved classified employee on permanent status under the state civil service law where he has been dismissed for cause.

3. No statutory provision for appeal to the courts is made from an order of the State Civil Service Board, either under the civil service statutes or under the code of civil procedure.

4. It is the public policy of this state, established by the legislature, that any controversy with a classified employee under state civil service which falls within the scope of the jurisdiction of the State Civil Service Board, shall be adjusted there, irrespective of the fact that there is conferred no statutory right of appeal to the courts; and the section of the civil code providing that the writ of mandamus may not be issued in any case where there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, must be interpreted accordingly.

5. The jurisdiction of a special tribunal established by statute to pass on matters expressly committed to it is exclusive and its determination is final, and courts will not review its conclusions nor inquire into the method by which they were reached, where the action of such tribunal in making final disposition of a case is characterized by good faith, and is free from fraud, corruption, and oppression.

6. Where a civil service employee on permanent status was dismissed for cause and sought by writ of mandamus to compel the appointing authority to more specifically state in writing the reasons for his dismissal, it is held: The judgment of the district court granting a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the appointing authority to specifically state the reasons for the employee's dismissal was error, and the action should have been dismissed when the case was submitted on the pleadings.

Henry L. Daniels, Topeka, argued the cause, and was on the briefs for appellant.

Eugene W. Hiatt, Topeka, argued the cause, and was on the briefs for appellee.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

This is an appeal by the Superintendent of the Motor Vehicle Department from an order of the lower court which sustained a motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted a peremptory writ of mandamus upon the application of a civil service employee of the State of Kansas requiring the Superintendent to more specifically state the reasons for the employee's dismissal.

The principal question presented is whether the extraordinary remedy of mandamus may be sought to compel the Superintendent, upon the facts and circumstances herein presented, to specifically state the reasons for the discharge of a permanently classified employee, while a statutory appeal of the employee is pending before the Kansas Civil Service Board.

The facts material to the disposition of this appeal are as follows: On the 28th day of August, 1957, Malcolm M. Gray, a civil service employee, appellee herein, was dismissed for cause. Pursuant to G.S.1949, 75-2949, the Superintendent of the Motor Vehicle Department, appellant herein, prepared a letter setting forth the reasons for Gray's dismissal and within time mailed the original to Walter F. Kuiken, Director of Civil Service, Kansas Department of Administration, and a copy to Gray. The body of the letter reads:

'Please be advised that on August 28, 1957 Mr. Malcolm M. Gray, Executive I, a permanent classified employee assigned as Supervisor of the Dealers' Division of the Motor Vehicle Department was dismissed for cause.

'Pursuant to Civil Service Rule No. 19-10-5, please be advised that the reasons for Mr. Gray's dismissal were:

'(1) General incompetence--inability to direct the activities of his section.

'(2) Issuance of contradictory directives to several dealers subject to regulation by his section.

'(3) Causing confusion in his section by the issuance of contradictory instructions.

'(4) Failure to require dealers' reports as provided by G.S.1949, Section 8-137.

'(5) Unsatisfactory liaison with Titles and Registrations Division and others.

'(6) Incompetent office management.

'(7) Sleeping on duty.'

Within the statutory time Gray filed his appeal from the dismissal with the Kansas Civil Service Board. The date for hearing Gray's appeal was set for September 27, 1957, by the Board and all parties were notified of such setting. On the 9th day of September, 1957, Gray filed a motion before the Board entitled 'Motion to Make More Definite and Certain and to Strike'. After due notice and hearing this motion was overruled by the Board on the 12th day of September, 1957.

Thereafter on the 19th day of September, 1957, while this appeal was pending before the Board for hearing, Gray filed an application for a writ of mandamus in the district court of Shawnee County, Kansas. An alternative writ of mandamus issued directing the Superintendent, appellant herein, to appear and show cause on the 27th day of September, 1957, why a peremptory writ of mandamus should not issue. This was the same day set for the hearing of Gray's appeal from his dismissal on its merits before the Board. At Gray's instance the hearing before the Board was continued and still remains pending.

At the hearing in the district court on the application for the writ of mandamus Gray filed, and there was argued, his motion for judgment on the pleadings and for the issuance of a peremptory writ directing the Superintendent to furnish the Personnel Director of the Department of Administration a letter setting out specifically the reasons for his dismissal. This motion was sustained and a peremptory writ of mandamus issued on the 6th day of November, 1957. The Superintendent duly appeals to this court.

The pertinent statutory sections are G.S.1955 Supp. 75-2929, and G.S.1949, 75-2949. The Board is empowered to hear appeals in 75-2929, supra, in the following language:

'The state civil service board shall hear appeals taken to it pursuant to sections 75-2940 and 75-2949 of the General Statutes of 1949 or any amendments thereto, and shall conduct hearings and pass upon complaints by or against any officer or employee in the classified service for the purpose of demotion, suspension, removal, or dismissal of such officer or employee, in accordance with the provisions of this act and acts amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto, and shall establish such rules and regulations as may be necessary to give effect thereto. * * *' (Emphasis added.)

The provisions relative to dismissal of civil service employees are set forth in 75-2949, supra, in the following language:

'(1) An appointing authority may dismiss any permanent classified employee when he considers that the good of the service will be served thereby, and for disciplinary purposes may suspend without pay a permanent classified employee for a period not to exceed thirty days but no permanent employee in the classified service shall be dismissed for political, religious or racial reasons. In case of a dismissal or suspension, the director shall be furnished with a statement in writing specifically setting forth the reasons for such dismissal or suspension. Upon request, a copy of such statement shall be furnished to such employee.

'(2) Any employee so dismissed or suspended may request in writing within thirty days after receipt of such notification a hearing before the board to determine the reasonableness of such action and the board shall grant the employee a hearing within forty-five days after receipt of such request.

'(3) After the hearing and consideration of the evidence for and against a suspension the board shall approve or disapprove such action and in the event of a disapproval the board shall order the reinstatement of the employee and the payment to the employee of such salary as has been lost by reason of such suspension.

'(4) After the hearing and consideration of the evidence for and against a dismissal the board shall approve or disapprove such action and may make any one of the following appropriate orders. (A) Order the reinstatement of the employee and the payment to the employee of such salary as has been lost by reason of such dismissal. (B) Sustain the dismissal of such employee, unless the board finds that the dismissal was based upon political, racial or religious reason, in which case, it shall order the reinstatement of the employee and the payment to the employee of such salary as has been lost by reason of such dismissal. (C) Except as provided above the board may sustain the dismissal, but may order the name of the dismissed employee returned to the appropriate registers, or may take steps to effect the transfer of such employee to a comparable position in another department.

'(5) The board shall establish such rules as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the above section.' (Emphasis added.)

The general and well established rule is that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, discretionary in character, and may ordinarily be brought only on relation of the proper public official, but private citizens may maintain it where they have a special and peculiar interest in the matter not common to the public generally and a clear legal right to compel performance of a specific act by the officer sought to be coerced. Bradley v. Cleaver, 150 Kan. 699, 95 P.2d 295. The only purpose of a writ of mandamus is to require a person to whom it is issued to perform some act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. State ex rel. Fatzer v. Shanahan, 173 Kan. 403, 246 P.2d 305; G.S.1949, 60-1701, and cases cited thereunder. The statutory law of this state provides that a writ of mandamus may not issue in any case where there is a plain and adequate...