Gray v. Madigan

• Decision Date: 18 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 3:91-0986.,3:91-0986.
• Citation: 796 F. Supp. 1093
• Parties: Billy GRAY v. Edward MADIGAN, Secretary of Agriculture, United States Department of Agriculture.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

796 F. Supp. 1093

Billy GRAY v. Edward MADIGAN, Secretary of Agriculture, United States Department of Agriculture.

No. 3:91-0986.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

June 18, 1992.

Ben A. Burns, James Alfred DeLanis, Baker, Worthington, Crossley, Stansberry & Woolf, Nashville, Tenn., G. Thomas Blankenship, J. Lee Robbins, Blankenship & Robbins, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff.

Michael L. Roden, Office of U.S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., Thomas Millet, Jennifer E. Kaplan, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

JOHN T. NIXON, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Billy Gray, a professional trainer of Tennessee Walking Horses, brings this action under 15 U.S.C. § 1825(d)(6), 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, seeking a declaration from this Court that the procedures used in administrative hearings conducted pursuant to the Horse Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1831, are constitutionally deficient. Defendant has moved to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming (1) that Congress vested exclusive jurisdiction over such matters with the courts of appeals, 15 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2), and (2) that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In the alternative, defendant seeks dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

BACKGROUND

On March 5, 1990, plaintiff Billy Gray was served with an administrative complaint alleging that he violated the Horse Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1831 ("the Act"). The complaint sought the imposition of a $2000 civil penalty and an order disqualifying him from showing, exhibiting, or entering any horse or otherwise participating in such activity for a period of five years. On June 25, 1991, a hearing on the merits of the complaint was held before an Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ"). After hearing the Department of Agriculture's ("the Department") proof, Gray moved to dismiss the complaint on constitutional grounds and for the failure of the Department to make out a prima facie case. The ALJ denied the motion and Gray asked for a recess in order to seek redress in federal district court. Although the ALJ denied this motion, a recess was granted and no further action has been taken in the case.

On December 3, 1991, Gray filed this petition for declaratory relief seeking a number of declarations from the Court. Specifically, Gray seeks the following relief:

1. A declaration that the United States Constitution, and certain Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Procedure shall apply and be enforced in all administrative proceedings filed under the Act in order to preserve due process.

2. A declaration that the Constitution, certain Federal Rules of Evidence and Procedure, and the decisions of courts interpreting them, shall govern all such administrative matters under the Act, including without limitation, the use of prior judgments, decrees or consent rulings against the accused, and the admission of expert testimony and other evidence.

3. A declaration of the standard of proof applicable to hearings under the Act.

4. A declaration, as a matter of law, that the failure of an accused to testify at a hearing should not be considered by the Administrative Judge or the Judicial Officer in determining whether the accused has violated the Act, this being essential to preserve due process.

5. Defining, as a matter of law, the terms "entering" and "entry" as found in the Act and applied by the Department.

6. A declaration, as a matter of law, that there shall be no unwritten and unpublished rules, regulations, procedures, and/or policies used by the Department, its Secretary, Judicial Officer, or the Administrative Judge in administering and enforcing the Act.

7. A declaration that Administrative Judges sitting on Department cases under the Act shall be entitled and required to exercise independent judgment, and be entitled to the same freedom from political influence as any other federal judicial officer and, specifically, that no one may influence that judgment ex parte in any pending case by threatening their job, their compensation, their advancement, or otherwise.

8. A declaration that in order to meet its burden of proof of a violation of the Act, the Department, at the least, must make out a prima facie case of all the elements of the alleged defense. To meet the burden and convict an individual of "soring," for instance, the Department must prove "entry," "soring" as defined by the Act, and that the accused or someone at his direction caused the "soring"; and not rely solely on the presumption created in 15 U.S.C. § 1825(d)(5).

9. A declaration that the Department failed to make out a prima facie case against Mr. Gray and any other relief to which Mr. Gray may be entitled.

10. Access to discovery to the extent necessary to prove his right to relief, especially to determine the unwritten rules, policies and procedures governing his case.

The Department has responded with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is asserted that the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction for appeals from agency determinations and that Gray's failure to exhaust adequate administrative remedies divests this Court of federal question jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

Under the Act, "the United States district courts ... are vested with jurisdiction specifically to enforce, and to prevent and restrain violations of the Act, and shall have jurisdiction in all other kinds of cases arising under the Act, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section." 15 U.S.C. § 1825(d)(6) (emphasis added). The express exception to district court jurisdiction is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2). This section provides that "any person against whom a violation is found and a civil penalty assessed ... may obtain review in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which such person resides or has his place of business or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit."

The clear language of the statute places jurisdiction with the courts of appeals to review agency decisions. When Congress expresses such an intent, courts have held that jurisdiction is exclusive. "It is a well settled principle that where Congress establishes a special statutory review procedure for administrative action, that procedure is generally the exclusive means of review for those actions." Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 916 F.2d 317, 321 (6th Cir.1990). Accord Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans and Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 420, 85 S.Ct. 551, 557, 13 L.Ed.2d 386 (1965); Compensation Department of District Five, United Mine Workers of America v. Marshall, 667 F.2d 336, 340 (3d Cir. 1981); City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C.Cir.1979).

Section 1825(d)(6) expressly precludes district courts from reviewing final agency determinations. Although the statute does not state that the court of appeals jurisdiction is exclusive over final agency determinations, courts have routinely read such Congressional intent into similar statutes.¹ Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon v. Bonneville Power Administration, 767 F.2d 622, 627 (9th Cir.1985); Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 77 (D.C.Cir.1984) (hereinafter "TRAC"). It appears, therefore, that Congress intended the courts of appeals to pass on the merits of an individual's claims and the validity of the individual's penalty under the Act, and that this means of review is exclusive.

When Congress has so vested the courts of appeals with exclusive jurisdiction, parties may not circumvent this means of exclusive judicial review. Where review of agency action is committed to the court of appeals, "any suit seeking relief that might affect the Circuit Court's future jurisdiction is subject to the exclusive review of the Court of Appeals." TRAC, 750 F.2d at 75 (emphasis in original). Accord Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon, 767 F.2d at 626 ("where a statute commits review of final agency action to the court of appeals, any suit seeking relief that might affect the court's future jurisdiction is subject to its exclusive review"). See also Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 246, 73 S.Ct. 236, 241, 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952) ("the declaratory judgment procedure ... may not be used as a substitute for statutory methods of review"); Cost Control Marketing and Management v. Pierce, 848 F.2d 47, 48 (3d Cir.1988); Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, 773 F.2d 1356, 1360-61 (D.C.Cir.1985); Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v. Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1985); First Commodity Corp. v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 644 F.Supp. 597, 599 (D.Mass.1986); Readers Digest Association v. United States Postal Service, 501 F.Supp. 126, 128-29 (D.D.C.1980), cited approvingly in The Enterprise, Inc. v. Bolger, 774 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir.1985).

These cases stand for the proposition that this Court does not have jurisdiction over actions which would preempt the court of appeals' jurisdiction. In other words, if the issues raised by the plaintiff are inextricably interwoven with the issues statutorily commended to review by the court of appeals, this Court is without jurisdiction even though no final agency action has been taken. An exception to this rule exists where the plaintiff establishes that the statutorily prescribed method of review is inadequate and therefore that the failure of the district court to hear the matter would result in irreparable harm. Nader v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 261, 266 (D.C.Cir.1972) ("when Congress has specified a procedure for judicial review of administrative action, courts will not make nonstatutory remedies available without a showing of patent violation of agency authority or manifest infringement of substantial rights...