Gray v. Metts

Decision Date20 May 2002
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. DKC 2001-2653.,Civ.A. DKC 2001-2653.
Citation203 F.Supp.2d 426
PartiesNash GRAY, Jr., et al. v. Iris T. METTS, Ed.D., et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Brian Keith Gruber, Chevy Chase, MD, for plaintiff.

Andrew W. Nussbaum, Knight Manzi Nussbaum and LaPlaca, PA, Upper Marlboro, MD, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHASANOW, District Judge.

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this action for attorneys' fees and costs arising from an Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") administrative due process hearing are 1) the motion of Defendants to dismiss Plaintiffs' claim pursuant to FedR.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) as barred by the statute of limitations and 2) the motion of Plaintiffs for summary judgment. The issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For reasons that follow, both motions will be denied.

I. Background

The relevant facts as set forth in the Complaint are not in dispute. Plaintiffs Nash Gray, Sr. and Takita Irving-Gray bring this action in their own right and on behalf of their son, Nash Gray Jr., who is a child with disabilities, eligible for special education as required by the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. and qualified as a handicapped individual under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. After an administrative due process hearing, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Ann C. Kehinde issued a written decision on February 6, 2001, finding in favor of Plaintiffs that Defendants, the Board of Education of Prince George's County and Iris Metts, Ed. D., in her official capacity as Superintendent of Prince George's County Public Schools, denied Nash Gray Jr. a free appropriate public education under the IDEA.

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs' counsel contacted Defendants' counsel to discuss Defendants' implementation of the ALJ's decision. In that discussion, Defendants' counsel asked Plaintiffs to submit to him a statement of the requested attorneys' fees and costs arising from the due process hearing. Counsel for Defendants asserted that his clients would consider the request for fees during the time period in which they would also consider whether to appeal the ALJ's decision.

On or about February 23, 2001, counsel for Plaintiffs mailed a written request for attorneys' fees and costs, along with a detailed statement of the work performed and the costs generated, to counsel for Defendants. In previous matters between counsel for Defendants and counsel for Plaintiffs, Defendants have paid attorneys' fees and costs to counsel for Plaintiffs pursuant to IDEA actions.

Defendants did not appeal the ALJ's decision within the 180 day period in which they had to do so and never contacted Plaintiffs within that time period to deny the request for attorneys' fees and costs. On August 6, 2001, Plaintiffs' counsel wrote to Defendants' counsel to advise him that the time period in which Defendants could appeal had expired and requested that Defendants notify him of a decision regarding the request for fees and costs no later than August 27, 2001. On August 27, Defendants informed Plaintiffs that they would not voluntarily pay attorneys' fees and costs in this case.

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking attorneys' fees and costs on September 5, 2001. Courts may award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party in a due process hearing under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); see also Combs v. School Board of Rockingham County, 15 F.3d 357, 360 (4th Cir.1994). Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that the claim is time-barred by a 180 day statute of limitations which, they contend, is applicable to claims for fees under the IDEA and began to run from the date of the ALJ's decision. In response, Plaintiffs contend that 1) the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the school system had exhausted its opportunity to appeal, 2) the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled even if it did begin to run at the ALJ decision, and 3) they had insufficient notice of the applicable limitations period. In addition, Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on the ground that Defendants, in moving to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint as time-barred, do not dispute any facts as to Plaintiffs' eligibility for fees or as to the reasonableness of the fees requested.

II. Motion to Dismiss
A. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) ought not be granted unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Such a motion ought not be granted unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). A Rule 12(b)(6) challenge requires a court to accept all well-pled allegations of the complaint as true and to construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir.1997). The court, however, need not accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir.1989), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events. United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979). Nevertheless, neither vagueness nor lack of detail is a sufficient ground on which to grant a motion to dismiss. Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 78 F.Supp.2d 764, 775 (N.D.Ill.1999) (quoting Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir.1985)).

B. Statute of limitations as ground for dismissal

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that typically must be raised in a pleading under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c) and is not usually an appropriate ground for dismissal. However:

Although a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) invites an inquiry into the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not an analysis of potential defenses to the claims set forth therein, dismissal nevertheless is appropriate when the face of the complaint clearly reveals the existence of a meritorious affirmative defense.

Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir.1996), citing Richmond F. & P. R.R. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir.1993); see also 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1357, at 352 (1990). In this case, the facts necessary to determine whether the statute of limitations had run are apparent on the face of the complaint and are undisputed. Therefore, it is appropriate to make a determination here as to whether the claim is time-barred.

C. Analysis

Both parties agree that the court in Mayo v. Booker, 56 F.Supp.2d 597 (D.Md. 1999), adopted a 180-day limitations period for bringing a claim in Maryland for attorneys' fees in IDEA cases. Paper no. 3, at 1; Paper no. 4, at 3. However, the parties dispute when the time period begins to run. Defendants argue that, according to Mayo, this period began to run when Plaintiffs became the prevailing party in the February 6, 2001, ALJ decision. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that Mayo did not address what triggers the running of the statute of limitations. Instead, Plaintiffs contend that the court should adopt the approach from McCartney v. Herrin Community Unit School Dist., 21 F.3d 173 (7th Cir.1994), in which the court held that a decision in the plaintiffs' favor did not become final until the defendant school district exhausted all judicial remedies. Accordingly, Plaintiffs contend that the ALJ's decision was not final until Defendants' period for noting an appeal had expired and so the limitations period did not begin to run until August 6, 2001.

Neither the Supreme Court nor the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has directly addressed this question. McCartney is the only case in which a federal circuit court of appeals dealt explicitly with the question of when the limitations period begins to run in actions for attorneys' fees under the IDEA: "Until the [administrative] decision in the parent's favor becomes final upon exhaustion of all judicial remedies by the school district, the parent does not know whether she has any claim to attorney's fees. So the filing of a lawsuit to obtain those fees would be premature until then." McCartney, 21 F.3d at 175. Defendants cite Mayo and a Sixth Circuit case, King v. Floyd County Board of Education, 228 F.3d 622 (6th Cir.2000), both of which adopted state statutes of limitations pertaining to appeals from administrative orders for use in IDEA attorneys' fee cases. Neither court addressed the issue of what triggers the running of the limitations period. While Defendants do argue that Mayo (explicitly and implicitly) and King (implicitly) point to the issuance of an administrative decision as the beginning of the limitations period, the question of when the period began was never asked in those cases and the precise date was not important because the dates of the adopted limitations periods had long since passed by the time attorneys' fees were sought.

In lieu of precedent on this point, Defendants also attack the logic underlying McCartney, arguing that it was wrongly decided. Defendants attempt to draw a parallel between the question presented today and post-trial motions for attorneys fees and argue that McCartney is decided illogically because it would result in the invalidation of Local Rule 109. Local Rule 109, Defendants contend, presents an analogous situation to that sought to be avoided by the court in McCartney because it requires that a motion for attorneys' fees must be filed within 14 days of judgment where an appeal may be noted within a longer period of time. Therefore, a prevailing party may be forced by Rule 109 to file a motion for attorneys'...

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