Gray v. Nash Finch Co., C86-0010

• Decision Date: 17 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. C86-0010,C86-0016.,C86-0010
• Parties: Bobbi GRAY, Plaintiff, v. NASH FINCH COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

701 F. Supp. 704

Bobbi GRAY, Plaintiff, v. NASH FINCH COMPANY, Defendant.

Nos. C86-0010, C86-0016.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division.

November 17, 1988.

J. Richard Johnson, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for plaintiff.

Mark M. Schorr, Lincoln, Neb., Carolyn M. Hinz, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for defendant.

HANSEN, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendant's unresisted motion to strike jury demand, filed August 12, 1988. The procedural history of this case is as follows:

On January 22, 1986, plaintiff filed her complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. At the same time, plaintiff filed a petition in the Iowa District Court for Linn County. In her complaint as amended and her petition plaintiff alleged that, due to her age and sex, defendant committed unfair and/or discriminatory employee practices as defined in Iowa Code Chapter 601A. Plaintiff further alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Plaintiff attached to her complaint and petition an administrative release and/or right-to-sue letter issued by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission pursuant to Iowa Code § 601A.16 and 240 Iowa Admin.Code § 1.5(4) (currently contained in 161 Iowa Admin.Code § 3.9) dated October 28, 1985. Also accompanying plaintiff's complaint and plaintiff's petition was an administrative release/right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dated November 26, 1985.

On February 14, 1986, defendant filed a petition for removal seeking removal of plaintiff's state law action to this court. The petition was unresisted and the removed action was assigned case file number C86-0016. On March 20, 1986, the magistrate¹ filed an order consolidating cases numbered C86-0010 and C86-0016.

In this consolidated case, plaintiff alleges that she is a 25-year-old female who was first hired by defendant in May, 1981. In August, 1982, plaintiff alleges that she was promoted to a grocery buyer-merchandiser. Following this promotion, plaintiff alleges disparate treatment as compared to her male counterparts due to her age and sex. In December, 1984, plaintiff was terminated. Plaintiff claims that defendant improperly discriminated against her because of her sex and age. Plaintiff seeks a letter of apology, a clean personnel record, a cease and desist order preventing defendant from committing discriminatory practices, reinstatement, back pay, seniority rights, and fringe benefits from the date of defendant's alleged unfair and/or discriminatory employment practices. Furthermore, plaintiff seeks damages for mental and emotional distress and attorney's fees. Plaintiff seeks a jury trial, and defendant filed a motion to strike jury demand on August 12, 1988. Plaintiff has not resisted this motion and the time to resist has expired. See Local Rule 14(f). Thus, the court may grant defendant's motion. See id. However, due to the nature of the issue, the court considers defendant's arguments on the merits. Accordingly, defendant's unresisted motion to strike jury demand is properly before the court.

Discussion

Federal Claims

Plaintiff alleges discrimination on the basis of her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The Eighth Circuit has held that there is no statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial in a Title VII action. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1209 n. 3 (8th Cir.1985) (citing Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410, 410 (8th Cir.1978)), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058, 106 S.Ct. 1285, 89 L.Ed.2d 592 (1986). In so deciding, the Eighth Circuit joined the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits in holding that "an award of back pay under Title VII for discriminatory employment practices is an integral part of the equitable remedy of reinstatement and is not comparable to damages in a common-law action for breach of employment contract." Harmon, 583 F.2d at 411. Accordingly, in light of the Eighth Circuit's construction of Title VII, plaintiff has no right to a jury trial on her federal claims.

State Claims

Because this court sits in diversity in hearing plaintiff's state claims, the issue of whether plaintiff has a right to a jury trial must be determined under Iowa law. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Although the issue has been judicially discussed, no court has determined whether there is a right to a jury trial in a Chapter 601A claim. See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (8th Cir.1988) (issue not preserved for appeal); Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local Union No. 238 v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 394 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 1986) (same). Accordingly, the court "must judicially `estimate' what the Iowa Supreme Court would do if confronted with the same issue." Heeney v. Miner, 421 F.2d 434, 439 (8th Cir.1970) (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 209, 76 S.Ct. 273, 279, 100 L.Ed. 199 (1956) (concurring opinion)). Furthermore, because the defendant's arguments involve issues of statutory construction as well as constitutional interpretation, if the statute is "fairly subject to different constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and another unconstitutional or of doubtful constitutionality, the construction by which it will be upheld will be followed and adopted." State v. Rasmussen, 213 N.W.2d 661, 666 (Iowa 1973) (citing State v. McGuire, 200 N.W.2d 832, 833 (Iowa 1972)). Thus, the court addresses the statutory construction issue first.

Statutory Construction

There are two related, but distinct, ways that a plaintiff can make a claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code Chapter 601A. Under Iowa Code § 601A.15, a party claiming to be agrieved may file a written complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and the commission will make an administrative investigation and hold a hearing. Such decisions by the commission are reviewed "in accordance with the terms of the Iowa administrative procedures Act Iowa Code Chapter 17A." Iowa Code § 601A.17(1). However, a complainant may also request an administrative release/right-to-sue letter from the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. Iowa Code § 601A.16(2). This gives the complainant a right to commence an action in district court. Id. In this case, plaintiff chose the latter route and received an administrative release/right-to-sue letter from the Iowa Civil Rights Commission on October 28, 1985.

One commentator has stated that "a significant benefit of the right-to-sue option may be the prospect of a district court trial by jury." See Nichols, Iowa's Law Prohibiting Disability Discrimination in Employment: An Overview, 32 Drake L.Rev. 273, 327 (1982-83). However, this commentator relied on Ia.R.Civ.P. 177 and 178 to support this statement. See Nichols, Iowa's Law, 32 Drake L.Rev. at 319 nn. 382, 383. Defendant concedes that plaintiff demands a jury trial. Accordingly, Ia. R.Civ.P. 177 has been complied with. Ia.R. Civ.P. 178, in relevant part, states that "issues for which a jury is demanded shall be tried to a jury unless the Court finds that there is no right thereto...." Ia.R.Civ.P. 178 (emphasis added). Accordingly, any reliance on the Rules of Civil Procedure for a right to a jury trial is misplaced. The key question here is whether there is a statutory right to a jury trial.

Iowa courts have looked to the interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., to interpret the Iowa Civil Rights Act. "Iowa Code Chapter 601A is patterned after the federal act.... Interpretations of the federal act are instructive." Annear v. State, 419 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Iowa 1988) (citing Hubbard v. State, 163 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Iowa 1969)). As stated previously, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "there is no right to a jury trial in a Title VII suit." Craft, 766 F.2d at 1209 n. 3 (citing Harmon, 583 F.2d at 410). Iowa case law is consistent with this result. See, e.g., Halsey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 410 N.W.2d 250, 252 (Iowa 1987) (following receipt of right-to-sue letter, plaintiff's disability discrimination action was "filed, docketed, and tried in equity in the district court."); Frank v. American Freight Sys., Inc. 398 N.W.2d 797, 799 (Iowa 1987) (following issuance of right-to-sue letter, plaintiff pursued disability discrimination action in equity and it was tried as an equitable action). But cf. Ayala v. Center Line, Inc., 415 N.W.2d 603, 604-06 (Iowa 1987) (following issuance of right-to-sue letter, parties not contending that jury trial was error; court holding that assessment of attorney's fees under Iowa Code § 601A.15(8)(a)(8) is equitable issue for the court). Furthermore, interpretation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., is inapposite. Statutorily, the ADEA clearly provides for a jury trial in age discrimination complaints. See 29 U.S. C. § 626(c)(2). Neither party has cited, nor has the court found, a clear statutory right to a jury trial in Iowa Code Chapter 601A. Thus, because of this basic statutory difference, the ADEA is not instructive in determining whether Iowa Code Chapter 601A contains a jury trial provision.

If a plaintiff alleges discrimination, and if that plaintiff elects to proceed according to the administrative release/right-to-sue letter route, the district court sits as the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. See Iowa Code § 601A.16. "The district court may grant any relief in an action brought pursuant to an administrative release/right-to-sue letter which is authorized by § 601A.15, subsection 8 to be issued by the commission." Iowa Code § 601A.16(5). The general provisions of Iowa Code § 601A.15 do not require a jury. Furthermore, the stated legislative purpose in adding the option of obtaining an administrative...