Gray v. Pierce County Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 31 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. 30552-6-II.,30552-6-II.
• Citation: 97 P.3d 26,123 Wash. App. 744
• Parties: Shurna GRAY, and her children, Erica Gray, Samtuala Gray, and James Gray, through their guardian ad litem, Shurna Gray; Steve and Gaylene Kenward; Antoinette Dawson, and Tyree and Hattie Cook, and other persons similarly situated, Appellants/Cross-Respondents, v. PIERCE COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

97 P.3d 26

123 Wash. App. 744

Shurna GRAY, and her children, Erica Gray, Samtuala Gray, and James Gray, through their guardian ad litem, Shurna Gray; Steve and Gaylene Kenward; Antoinette Dawson, and Tyree and Hattie Cook, and other persons similarly situated, Appellants/Cross-Respondents, v.PIERCE COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

No. 30552-6-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

August 31, 2004.

David Lieberworth, Ronald Joseph Knox, Garvey, Schubert & Barer, Seattle, for Respondent.

Gregory D. Provenzano, Columbia Legal Services, Olympia, for Appellant.

BRIDGEWATER, J.

The Pierce County Housing Authority(PCHA) and tenants participating in PCHA's Housing Opportunities and Personal Education Program (HOPE) both appeal a summary judgment order.Additionally, PCHA appeals an order of final judgment awarding the tenants attorney fees.We hold that the tenants have failed to demonstrate a property interest, either by writing or mutual understanding, in the rental units such that PCHA could not terminate a tenancy except for cause.We also hold that PCHA's HOPE program was not exempt from the Residential Landlord Tenant Act as an "institution," and thus, PCHA was not permitted to use non-judicial, self-help methods to evict HOPE tenants.We reverse the trial court's attorney fee award to Columbia Legal Services because the majority of the fees were for a preliminary injunction and for tenants who were not removed from their tenancy but remand for a determination of the portion of attorney fees related to a tenant who was removed from her tenancy.Accordingly, we affirm the rulings on summary judgment but reverse, and we remand the attorney fee award.

PCHA is a municipal corporation created by Pierce County pursuant to chapter 35.82 RCW.PCHA was created to provide safe and affordable housing for low-income Pierce County residents, and it currently owns and operates apartment complexes located throughout Pierce County.Under RCW 35.82.080, PCHA must keep rents "at the lowest possible rates," and it receives state assistance in the form of federal government subsidies and reduced rents in order to do so.

In 1995 and 1996, PCHA became concerned that increasing numbers of low-income applicants for housing were rejected during the screening process based upon their income and credit, rental, and criminal histories.PCHA developed an advisory council and sought input from community agencies in order to deal with this issue.PCHA determined that many of these applicants lacked various life skills that caused them to fail as tenants.In 1997, PCHA created the HOPE program.Under this program, PCHA offered housing to individuals and families who, because of low income, bad credit, past evictions, or criminal history, could not obtain rental housing in the private or public sectors.PCHA did not receive any federal or state funds for the program, and, unlike PCHA's regular tenants, HOPE participants did not receive federal or state subsidies for their housing.

The "H.O.P.E. PROGRAM POLICY" states that the program's purpose was to "develop and administer an education and/or re-education program that would enable certain individuals that cannot obtain housing due to their inability to pass industry-wide standard criteria set forth in a tenant screening with an opportunity to secure affordable housing."Clerk's Papers(CP)at 780.In her declaration, deputy executive director for PCHA, Starla Warren, stated that prospective HOPE candidates were screened and interviewed for the program.Those accepted were "instructed that the emphasis of the program is on education and life style change."CPat 731.

HOPE participants did not sign a standard PCHA month-to-month lease agreement; rather, they signed a one-year "STUDENT/OWNER" contract.CPat 323.Participants were permitted, but not required, to live in PCHA housing during the program.Under the contract, participants living in PCHA housing were required to pay a "[l]odging fee," and all participants were required to attend a weekly class for four months and comply with PCHA rules and regulations.CPat 323.The classes were taught by PCHA staff, and were intended to educate HOPE participants in the "fundamentals of becoming an ideal tenant."CPat 753.In addition, the contract contained a seven-day lockout clause.Under that clause, participants who breached the contract or violated PCHA rules and regulations would receive a seven-day notice to vacate and then PCHA would change their unit locks.Students who successfully completed the one-year program received a certificate of completion and were invited to enter into a standard PCHA landlord/tenant rental agreement.

On February 2, 2001, a HOPE program family that had been locked out and other HOPE program families filed a complaint against PCHA.The plaintiffs sought certification as a class on behalf of all HOPE participants subject to the seven-day lockout clause and a permanent injunction enjoining PCHA from using non-judicial lockouts.The plaintiffs alleged two actual lockouts, one involving Shurna Gray and her family and another involving Sandra Gibson.Additionally, the complaint sought damages for the Gray family and attorney fees under chapter 59.18 RCW.

On February 6, the trial court entered an agreed temporary restraining order enjoining all non-judicial lockouts and conditionally certifying the plaintiff class.As required by the order, PCHA returned Gibson her key.On April 6, the court entered a preliminary injunction continuing the interim ban on non-judicial lockouts in connection with the HOPE program.

On April 10, PCHA terminated the HOPE program and permitted HOPE participants currently residing in PCHA housing to apply for standard month-to-month rental agreements.The face of PCHA's standard month-to-month rental/lease agreements contains the following language: "Either party may terminate this agreement with TWENTY (20) DAYS WRITTEN NOTICE PRIOR TO THE LAST DAY OF A MONTHLY TERM (end of a month), in accordance with Washington State Law(RCW 59.18)."CPat 396.In addition, the agreements contain a standard integration clause, which states, "This writing embodies the entire Agreement between the parties ... Tenant agrees that any purported oral terms additional or contrary to this writing are not binding on either party."CPat 397.

On May 25, PCHA filed a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's lockout-related claims for injunctive and declaratory relief because the termination of the HOPE program had rendered them moot.On June 11, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the legality of PCHA's lockout policy.On July 13, the court granted PCHA's motion for summary judgment, dismissing all of the plaintiff's non-judicial lockout claims because those claims were now moot.But the court ruled that its order did not affect the Grays' claims for damages.

On September 6, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that HOPE participants' tenancies were governed by the Washington Residential Landlord Tenant Act (RLTA), chapter 59.18 RCW, and that PCHA's policy of locking out tenants without court process violated the RLTA.Because the court had previously dismissed the plaintiffs' lockout claims as moot, the court's ruling affected only the Grays' claims.

On June 20, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, alleging that the terms of PCHA's standard month-to-month lease agreements providing for termination by either party upon 20-days' notice without cause violate article 1, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.On September 28, PCHA brought a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' due process claims related to its standard month-to-month rental agreements.In November, the trial court granted PCHA's motion, ruling that the plaintiffs did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in their ongoing month-to-month tenancies.

In April 2002, PCHA and the Grays entered into a settlement agreement.In the agreement, the Grays released PCHA from all causes of action or suits relating to the plaintiffs' second amended complaint, including claims for expenses or attorney fees.On December 5, 2002, the court entered an order awarding the plaintiffs $38,340 in attorney fees, finding them to be the prevailing party on the lockout issue.

The plaintiffs appeal the court's determination that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether PCHA's lease agreements violate the due process clause.In turn, PCHA cross-appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the legality of its lockout policy and its award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs.

I.Summary Judgment Motions

Both parties contend that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment against them.When reviewing an order of summary judgment, we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court.M.W. v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.,149 Wash.2d 589, 595, 70 P.3d 954(2003).Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.CR56(c).We consider all facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist.,107 Wash.App. 550, 557, 27 P.3d 1208(2001).The nonmoving party may not rely on speculation or argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain.Retired Pub. Employees Council of Wash. v. Charles,148 Wash.2d 602, 612, 62 P.3d 470(2003).Summary judgment is not proper if reasonable minds could draw different conclusions from undisputed facts or if all of the facts necessary to determine the issues are not present.Ward v. Coldwell...