Gray v. Poole

• Decision Date: 08 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-7052,01-7052
• Citation: Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
• Parties: (D.C. Cir. 2002) William T. Gray, III, Appellant, v. Theisha Poole, Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 1113

275 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

William T. Gray, III, Appellant, v.Theisha Poole, Appellee

No. 01-7052

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 7, 2001

Decided January 8, 2002

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia(No. 99cv02233)

Brian A. Hill, appointed by the court, argued the cause as amicus curiae on the side of appellant.With him on the briefs were Alan I. Horowitz and John D. Bates.

William T. Gray, III, appearing pro se, was on the briefs for appellant.

Mary L. Wilson, Assistant CorporationCounsel, argued the cause for appellee.With her on the brief were Robert R. Rigsby, CorporationCounsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy CorporationCounsel.

Before: Edwards, Henderson, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Edwards.

Harry T. Edwards, Circuit Judge:

AppellantWilliam T. Gray, III, appeals the District Court's dismissal of his pro se lawsuit against Theisha Poole, a District of Columbia social worker.Poole investigated and helped initiate a child neglect action filed in the District of Columbia Superior Court("Superior Court"), which ultimately resulted in the termination of Gray's custody of his younger brother.Gray filed a complaint in District Court, claiming that Poole and the two attorneys responsible for the child neglect action had violated 42 U.S.C. 1983 in investigating, initiating, and prosecuting the matter.The District Court dismissed Gray's action, holding that all three defendants were protected by absolute immunity.This court summarily affirmed the dismissal as to the two attorneys.SeeGray v. Poole, 243 F.3d 572(D.C. Cir.2001)("Gray I").The only remaining issue before this court is whether Poole is protected by absolute or qualified immunity.

Poole engaged in two distinct types of activities in connection with the child neglect matter.She first investigated the case and recommended that a neglect action be brought.Those activities were similar to actions taken by police officers prior to the commencement of a criminal prosecution and, consequently, should be assessed in the same way.Accordingly, Poole is entitled to only qualified, not absolute, immunity for those functions.She also submitted a statement to the court in connection with the neglect action.That activity was "intimately associated" with the judicial process and, therefore, Poole is entitled to absolute immunity from suit for what she said in the statement.SeeImbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409(1976).

We hereby affirm in part and reverse in part the District Court's dismissal of Gray's claims and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.Background

The underlying facts in this case are fully recounted in Gray I.Therefore, we will only briefly summarize the events relevant to Poole's appeal.

Appellant Gray lost custody of his minor brother and guardianship of his brother's estate in a series of actions, culminating in a neglect action brought by the District of Columbia in 1999.The petition initiating the neglect action was signed by the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia and Poole, and the matter was heard in Superior Court.Subsequent to the initiation of the neglect action, Gray filed a pro se law suit against the attorney prosecuting the neglect action, Corporation Counsel, and Poole, the social worker assigned to the neglect case.In the original complaint, Gray claimed, inter alia, that Poole violated 42 U.S.C. 1983 in negligently investigating the neglect case and then filing an unfounded petition in support of the neglect case.In a response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, Gray also alleged that Poole made an ill-founded recommendation to Corporation Counsel to bring the neglect action and authorized or participated in an illegal entry of Gray's home.

The District Court dismissed Gray's law suit after finding that, on the facts alleged, all three defendants were protected by absolute immunity.SeeGray v. Poole, Civ. Act.No. 99-2233, slip op. at 3, 5(D.D.C.Apr. 27, 2000).In Gray I, this court granted the motions for summary affirmance filed by the two attorneys who brought and supervised the neglect action, and "directed full briefing and argument for Gray's appeal of Poole's dismissal."243 F.3d at 575 n.3.The court then appointed amicus curiae to present argument in support of Gray.

II.Discussion

In reviewing the District Court's dismissal of Gray's law suit, we must accept all of appellant's allegations as "entirely true."Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 261(1993).And, because Gray is proceeding pro se, our review of his pleadings is subject to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520(1972).We must also examine other pleadings to understand the nature and basis of Gray's pro se claims.SeeRichardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548(D.C. Cir.1999)(holding that District Court abused its discretion when "failing to consider [pro se plaintiff's] complaint in light of his reply to the motion to dismiss").

In reviewing Gray's claims, we must first consider whether Poole is entitled to absolute immunity, as the District Court held, or only qualified immunity, as Gray contends.The Supreme Court has instructed the lower federal courts to adhere to a "functional approach" in determining the applicability of absolute versus qualified immunity:

[W]e have recognized two kinds of immunities under 1983.Most public officials are entitled only to qualified immunity.Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807(1982);Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508(1978).Under this form of immunity, government officials are not subject to damages liability for the performance of their discretionary functions when "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 818.In most cases, qualified immunity is sufficient to "protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority."Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S., at 506.

We have recognized, however, that some officials perform "special functions" which, because of their similarity to functions that would have been immune when Congress enacted 1983, deserve absolute protection from damages liability.Id., at 508."[T]he official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question."Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. [478,] 486[(1991)];Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432, and n.4(1993).Even when we can identify a common-law tradition of absolute immunity for a given function, we have considered "whether 1983's history or purposes nonetheless counsel against recognizing the same immunity in 1983 actions."Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. [914,] 920[(1984)].Not surprisingly, we have been "quite sparing" in recognizing absolute immunity for state actors in this context.Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224(1988).

In determining whether particular actions of government officials fit within a common-law tradition of absolute immunity, or only the more general standard of qualified immunity, we have applied a "functional approach,"see, e.g., Burns, 500 U.S., at 486, which looks to "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it,"Forrester v. White, 484 U.S., at 229.

Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268-69.

In Gray I, we examined the Supreme Court's application of this functional approach in two cases Imbler and Butz and held that "government attorneys who prosecute child neglect actions perform 'functions analogous to those of a prosecutor[and] should be able to claim absolute immunity with respect to such acts.' "243 F.3d at 577(quotingButz, 438 U.S. at 515).Here, Poole urges us to extend this analogy so that she is afforded absolute immunity for all of her actions.Amicus for Gray, on the other hand, asserts that, because the statutory responsibility for initiating the neglect action did not lie with Poole, any analogy to prosecutorial immunity is spurious.Amicus suggests, instead, that we should adopt a rule that provides absolute immunity only for in-court oral testimony, which, in this case, would afford Poole only qualified immunity.In our view, neither Poole nor Gray has enunciated the correct standard for the determination of the appropriate level of official immunity to which Poole is entitled.

We begin our analysis by identifying the relevant functions carried out by Poole that form the basis of Gray's complaint.The actions at issue include two distinct and separate types of activities.Some of Gray's charges involve Poole's functions as an investigator and adviser to the Corporation Counsel, while the remaining claims focus on the statement Poole signed in the neglect action.These two groups of functions fall neatly into two clear-cut categories, which we discuss in turn.

Poole's actions as an investigator and adviser to the Corporation Counsel i.e., relating to whether Corporation Counsel should bring the neglect action are analogous to actions taken by police officers prior to the giving of testimony in a criminal prosecution.Like a police officer, Poole tracked down information, made professional judgments, and passed on her findings to attorneys in the office of the Corporation Counsel.These functions are subject to qualified, not absolute, immunity.

In Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45(1986), the Supreme Court made it clear that, in assessing the appropriate level of official immunity, the function of a police officer applying for a warrant is not equivalent to the function of a prosecutor seeking an indictment:

We intend no disrespect to the officer applying for a...