Gray v. Royal

• Decision Date: 31 March 2016
• Docket Number: CV 515-10
• Citation: 181 F.Supp.3d 1238
• Parties: Daniel L. Gray, III; and Anna R. Payne, Plaintiffs, v. Randy F. Royal, in his individual and official capacity as Sheriff, Office of the Sheriff for Ware County, Georgia; Rebecca Williams in her individual and official capacity as Deputy Sheriff, Office of the Sheriff for Ware County, Georgia; and Ware County, Georgia, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

181 F.Supp.3d 1238

Daniel L. Gray, III; and Anna R. Payne, Plaintiffs,

v.Randy F. Royal, in his individual and official capacity as Sheriff, Office of the Sheriff for Ware County, Georgia; Rebecca Williams in her individual and official capacity as Deputy Sheriff, Office of the Sheriff for Ware County, Georgia; and Ware County, Georgia, Defendants.

CV 515-10

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Waycross Division.

Signed March 31, 2016

ORDER

LISA GODBEY WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

Plaintiffs Daniel Gray, III ("Gray") and Anna R. Payne ("Payne")¹ bring suit against Defendants for recording Plaintiffs in their work area without their express consent. Gray and Payne allege that Defendants violated their right to privacy under the United States Constitution, specifically the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl."). Additionally, Plaintiffs claim violations of Paragraphs I, II, and V of the Georgia Constitution. Id. They also assert state law claims for negligent retention, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

There are two pending motions presently before the Court. First, Defendants Randy F. Royal ("Royal"), Rebecca Williams ("Williams"), and Ware County, Georgia ("Ware County") (collectively, "Defendants") filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss, primarily arguing that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See generally Dkt. No. 6. Specifically, Ware County asserts that it is precluded from being held liable pursuant to Georgia law. Id. at pp. 8, 10-11. For their part, Royal and Williams assert that they are shielded from liability in their official capacities under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at pp. 4-7, 11-15, 19. Royal and Williams further aver that they are protected from suit in their individual capacities by virtue of qualified immunity and official immunity for claims asserted against them in their individual capacity. Id. at pp. 17-20.

Second, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 26), reiterating the same arguments contained in their Motion to Dismiss, but also advancing additional theories in support of their contention that: (1) the Motion to Dismiss should be granted; and (2) the remaining claims against Williams in her individual capacity should be dismissed. See generally Dkt. No. 26–1. In response, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition rebutting Defendants' arguments as to Royal and Williams but conceding that all claims against Ware County fail as a matter of law. See generally Dkt. No. 32–1.²

Both of Defendants' Motions are now ripe for review. Given that the parties conducted discovery, the Court will address these claims pursuant to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. As to Plaintiffs' federal claims, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 26) is GRANTED.³ The remaining state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent retention and supervision are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.

Factual Background

In 2009, Royal began his term as Sheriff of Ware County. Dkt. No. 26–5, 5:25; Dkt. No. 26–7, 6:3–5. Royal upheld policies instituted by his predecessor, Sheriff McQuaig ("McQuaig"). Dkt. No. 26–4 ¶ 10. One policy, which was instituted in 2002, mandated that all incoming and outgoing telephone calls in the Office of the Sheriff would be recorded. Id.¶¶ 5-6. McQuaig issued an order and posted copies of this new policy in several conspicuous locations throughout the office. Id.¶¶ 7-8. It was common knowledge among the Office of the Sheriff of Ware County employees that all incoming and outgoing telephone calls were recorded. Id.¶ 12.

Gray first started working for the Office of the Sheriff as a Detention Officer in November 2001, during McQuaig's tenure as Sheriff and before he instituted the recording policy. Dkt. No. 26–5, 5:18–6:4. In 2007, Payne began working at the Ware County Sheriff's Office as an Administrative Clerk, while McQuaig was still the Sheriff. Dkt. No. 26–7, 5:9–18. At the time, Payne was assigned to work the Criminal Investigation Division ("CID"). Id. at 5:14-15. Gray and Williams were promoted to detective positions in the CID shortly after Royal began serving as Sheriff of Ware County. Dkt. No. 26–5, 6:18.

A portion of the office space of the Ware County Sheriff's Department is dedicated to the CID. Id. at 22:18-23; Dkt. No. 26–2, p. 2. The CID space occupies a square-shaped space. Id. The CID is comprised of several offices, in addition to two interview rooms, that are arrayed around the square. Id. Interviews and interrogations occur in the rooms surrounding the CID, which are equipped with recording devices. Dkt. No. 26–5, 36:7–25, 39:7–12. The recording devices used to record interviews and interrogations were capable of recording "background noise" in the central CID area. Id. at 39:11-12; Dkt. No. 26–7, 18:11–25. If the door to the interview room was left open, the recording device would also record conversations occurring in the central area of the CID. Dkt. No. 26–5, 38:20–39:5.

Ware Sheriff employees could access the CID through a restricted access corridor or through the use of a special key card. ID. at 91:13-21, 92:4-14; Dkt. No. 26–2, p. 2. The CID also contained a desk that was available for use by anyone in the CID, id. at 26:6-12, in addition to several chairs that were used by CID detectives or non-employees waiting to be interviewed. Id. at 31:1-8. Inmates also frequented the CID as they were responsible for maintaining the premises. Id. at 90:24-91:12. Gray and Williams worked in offices immediately adjacent to the CID, id. at 23:21-24:12, while Payne worked at a partly-enclosed desk in the center of the CID. Id. at 24:19-22, 29:11-19; Dkt. No. 26–7, 8:20–9:2. In the central area of the CID, there was a photocopier, typewriter and telephone, all of which were available for general use. Id. at 26:2-27:20. One of the two open sides of Payne's desk area faced Gray and Williams' offices. Dkt. No. 26–7, 15:1–10. Gray, and most of the other detectives in the CID, typically worked with their office doors open. Dkt. No. 26–5, 39:13–40:1.

On May 10, 2013, Williams hid an audio recording device in the CID. Id. at 22:3-17; Dkt. No. 26–7, 9:7. According to Gray, the recording device was "located directly outside of [his] office ... on top of a wall-mounted cabinet." Id. at 22:15-17. Williams managed to record everything occurring around the recording device for approximately one hour before it was discovered by Deputy Newman. Id. at 43:2-7, 48:21-49:1, 90:7-10. Deputy Newman did not work in the CID, but, while walking in the CID, he found the active recording device. Id. at 83:3-6, 89:24-95:5. Gray then placed the recording device in a sealed bag before giving it to Royal. Id. at 94:9-13. Royal later determined that the recording device belonged to Williams. Id. at 93:1-19.

The recording device recorded Gray and Payne speaking on their office telephones. Id. at 52:20-53:6, 54:25-55:5; Dkt. No. 26–7, 19:8–23. During the recording, Williams is heard talking on the telephone, and talking to both Gray and Payne, in addition to speaking to another female. Dkt. No. 26–5, 50:12–18, 54:7–12, 58:8–10, 68:1–16, 71:1–72:11, 76:10–17, 78:24–79:2, 80:19–22, 87:4–11. Additionally, at least three individuals who worked in other areas of the Sheriff's Office can be heard entering the CID and speaking during the recording. Id. at 78:6-16, 83:15-21, 86:5-15. Payne confirmed that all of her conversations on the recording, including her telephone conversations, were work-related conversations and none of her conversations included topics of a personal nature. Dkt. No. 26–7, 19:8–23.

Royal punished Williams by giving her a ten-day suspension without pay and transferring her from the CID to the Magistrate Court. Dkt. No. 26–6, 100:1–101:9. Plaintiffs admit that as far as they know, only Gray and a Lieutenant listened to Williams' recording prior to it being played during the depositions in this case. Id. at 103:1-18. When asked whether Royal knew that Williams was going to record co-workers, Gray admitted that he does not "know if [Royal] knew in advance or not. [Gray had] no way of knowing that." Dkt. No. 26–5, 97:25–98:1. Payne admitted that "as far as she knows," Williams acted totally alone in recording them. Dkt. No. 26–7, 26:25–27:2. Payne resigned in December of 2013, id. at 6:6-7, while Gray resigned in June of 2013. Dkt. No. 26–5, 6:4. Plaintiffs filed suit on January 20, 2015. Dkt. No. 1.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is required where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir.2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). A dispute over such a fact is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. In making this determination, the court is to view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir.2000).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To satisfy this burden, the movant must show the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden shifts to...