Gray v. School District, 16882.

Decision Date05 May 1930
Docket NumberNo. 16882.,16882.
Citation28 S.W.2d 683
PartiesMRS. FRED J. GRAY, APPELLANT, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 73, CLAY COUNTY, MISSOURI ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Clay County. Hon. Ralph Hughes, Judge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED (with directions).

Wm. Bush and James S. Summers for appellant.

Lawson & Hale for respondents.

BLAND, J.

This is an action by plaintiff for compensation due her for services as a high school teacher, employed as such by Consolidated School District No. 1 of Clay county. The petition contains two counts, the first one being a contract entered into between plaintiff and the consolidated district covering the school term of 1923-24, and the second count being on a contract covering the school term commencing in September, 1924. The first count of the petition prays for the sum of $1018.85 and interest and the second for $145.41 plus interest. The answers of the defendants consist of general denials. The cause was submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts. No finding of facts or declaration of law was requested or given. The trial resulted in a general finding for the defendants. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court upon the theory that a constitutional question was involved, but that court found to the contrary and transferred the cause here.

The facts show that plaintiff taught school in the consolidated district for the nine months school year 1923-24, and for the month of September, 1924, pending litigation involving the dissolution of said school district. The district was organized in 1913 and it appears that from and after its organization the taxpayers thereof have been involved in unfortunate controversies among themselves. Shortly after its formation the prosecuting attorney of Clay county instigated a proceeding attacking the validity of its organization. [See State ex inf. v. Clardy, 267 Mo. 371.]

On May 3, 1923, an election was held to determine whether the district should be dissolved. Following such election the persons in charge of it announced that two-thirds of the taxpayers and qualified voters of the district had voted thereat for dissolution, but the result of said election was openly contested by some of the taxpayers and residents of the district opposed to such dissolution. Thereafter, on September 10, 1923, the Attorney-General instituted in the Supreme Court a proceeding in quo warranto for the purpose of securing a judicial determination of whether the Consolidated School District had in fact been dissolved. [State ex inf. Barrett v. Clements, 305 Mo. 297.] The decision of that court, rendered on September 18, 1924, was that the district had been dissolved at the election held on May 3, 1923. During the interim, that is, from May 3, 1923, to September 18, 1924, the consolidated district continued to function. It continued after September 10, 1923, with the aid of a restraining order from the Supreme Court issued at the commencement of the quo warranto proceeding last mentioned. This injunctive process was very general in its terms and evidently was for the purpose of maintaining the status quo as of the date of, or anterior to, the election of May 3, 1923, until the determination of the litigation.

The board of directors, and a number of taxpayers, in good faith believed that the requisite two-thirds majority of the qualified voters had not voted at the election held on May 3, 1923, to dissolve the district so the directors, believing that the district had not been dissolved continued after the election to conduct the affairs of the consolidated district, including the schools therein. They employed teachers and made other suitable provisions for schools.

The common school districts included in the consolidated district prior to May 3, 1923, were Faubian, Big Shoal, Englewood, Linden and Fairview. After May 3, 1923, there opposed to the consolidated district organized common school districts in the Faubian, Big Shoal and Englewood districts but none was organized in the Linden and Fairview districts. The consolidated district without opposition opened and conducted common schools in these two districts and, without opposition, a high school in the building located in the Linden district. The common school districts so organized took possession of the school buildings in their districts and undertook to open common schools therein and certified the tax levies voted by them. Thereupon the directors of the consolidated district took action resulting in the institution of the quo warranto proceedings in the Supreme Court last above referred to, seeking to oust the common school districts from interfering with the functioning of the Consolidated School District.

On April 15, 1923, prior to voting on the dissolution of the Consolidated School District, the voters, by a majority vote, provided for a tax levy of 65 cents on the one hundred dollars valuation for school purposes. However, the result of this vote and the rate of taxation voted was not certified by the clerk of the school board to the County Superintendent or to the clerk of the county court until May 11, 1923, and the county clerk refused to assess and carry out the amount so returned on the tax books. Upon the organization of the three common school districts in question one of them voted to levy 40 cents and the other two in excess of 40 cents. On the certification of these rates to the county clerk he proceeded to assess and carry out the amount so returned on the tax books against the property in the respective school districts. Treating the territory within the Linden and Fairview districts as unorganized territory, the county clerk assessed on the tax books a levy for school purposes of 40 cents on the one hundred dollars valuation on property in this territory.

Again in the spring of 1924, the Consolidated School District provided for a rate of taxation which was certified to the County Superintendent of Schools and to the county clerk, but the latter refused to make any assessment on the tax books. Consequently, the consolidated district has had no funds with which to pay teachers or other expenses incident to the operation of the schools in the consolidated district.

The restraining order issued by the Supreme Court in the fall of 1923, was not obeyed by the directors of the three common school districts above mentioned and after the service of the order upon them they refused to abandon the school houses in their districts and to cease having school taught therein. However, the Supreme Court cited them for contempt and in September, 1923, they abandoned the school property which was then taken over by the directors of the consolidated districts. Thereafter school was taught by the consolidated district in those buildings until September 18, 1924, when the Supreme Court declared the consolidated district to have been disorganized on May 3, 1923. From the time of this decision of the Supreme Court the directors of the consolidated district have ceased to attempt to perform any functions of the school district. After the decision of the Supreme Court the territory in the Linden and Fairview districts was organized into common school districts.

After the school buildings in the Faubian, Englewood and Big Shoal districts were surrendered to the directors of the consolidated district two of said common school districts conducted schools elsewhere in their districts. The board of directors of the Consolidated School District continued in good faith to function as such. They conducted the affairs of the Consolidated School District, held annual meetings, voted taxes, employed teachers, conducted schools, etc. as though it were in fact a de jure school district, until the decision of the Supreme Court made on September 18, 1924, aforesaid.

Of course, the Consolidated School District had no money to pay school teachers and to meet other expenses but the plaintiff remained at her post teaching school in the high school located in the Linden district. The agreed statement of facts recites that no child within the Faubian or Big Shoal district attended the high school, located in the Linden school district, taught by plaintiff, the inference being that the children from the other territory within the Consolidated School District did attend high school therein. It is admitted that if plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action at all that she is entitled to recover what she sues for.

It is the contention of plaintiff that during the period transpiring between May 3, 1923 (the date of the dissolution of the consolidated district) and the decision of the Supreme Court, handed down on September 18, 1924, the consolidated district was a de facto municipal corporation and that, consequently, the contracts entered into by it during that time were valid and binding; that the defendants, school districts, having taken over the property, franchises and functions of the consolidated district are, by operation of law, bound by all its obligations, including the one sued upon. It is insisted by the defendants that the Consolidated School District having been dissolved on May 3, 1923, there could not have been a de facto corporation in existence after that time.

Section 11242, Revised Statutes 1919, provides for the disorganization of certain school districts, including consolidated districts. Said section provides that after the vote of dissolution the district "shall be dissolved and the same territory included in...

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