Gray v. Security Storage & Van Co.

• Decision Date: 10 June 1946
• Docket Number: 18432.
• Citation: 26 So.2d 399
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
• Parties: GRAY v. SECURITY STORAGE & VAN CO., Inc.

26 So.2d 399

GRAY v. SECURITY STORAGE & VAN CO., Inc.

No. 18432.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Orleans.

June 10, 1946

Norman R. Tilden, of New Orleans, for plaintiff and appellee.

Weiss & Weiss, of New Orleans, for defendant and appellant.

JANVIER Judge.

Richard A Gray was the owner of certain household goods, furniture and effects which were destroyed by fire in November 1943, when the warehouse of Security Storage & Van Company on the corner of Conti and Chartres Streets in New Orleans in which warehouse the said effects were stored, was itself practically demolished by fire. The said Gray brought this suit against the said Security Storage & Van Company seeking to collect the alleged value of the said articles which he fixed at $1265.90, and he made the following allegations: That on December 10, 1942 he entered into a written contract with the said company under which, for a storage rate of $6.50 per month, the said company agreed that it would store the said goods in its warehouse at No. 230-240 Decatur Street, in New Orleans; that in violation of the terms of the said contract and without the knowledge of plaintiff, the said company stored his goods in another warehouse owned by it located on the corner of Conti and Chartres Streets instead of in the warehouse on Decatur Street designated in the contract; that the warehouse in which the said goods were stored was 'not a safe building within which to store goods, was not fireproof and was, in fact, in a dilapidated condition * * *' that the act of the said company in storing the articles in the said warehouse 'constituted an act of gross negligence and a breach of its contract with petitioner * * *.'

To this petition, defendant filed a special plea of estoppel in which it made the following allegations of fact:

'That, at the time of the arrangement made between petitioner herein and defendant herein, for the storage of petitioner's household effects, said petitioner, in recognition and acknowledgement of his obligation so to do, under the law and the decisions of Louisiana, ordered and procured the issuance of a fire insurance policy by the General Insurance Company of America, in the sum of $500.00, which policy was issued to and received by said petitioner; that said petitioner paid the premium on said policy, calculated and based upon the said coverage of $500.00; that in the instructions for and application for said fire insurance, said petitioner expressly valued the said stored furniture and household effects at $500.00, and for that reason policy was issued and premium paid for coverage in that amount;

'That said insurance company has paid unto said petitioner, and said petitioner has received and retained, the sum of $500.00, the valuation placed by said petitioner upon said stored furniture and effects.'

Defendant followed these allegations with the following allegation of law: 'That, accordingly, said petitioner is estopped to assert a higher valuation for said furniture and stored effects than the valuation placed by him thereupon as aforesaid, and for which full payment has been made; and petitioner is especially estopped to claim herein or elsewhere the valuation of $1265.90 for said household furniture and effects.'

This plea of estoppel was referred to the merits by the District Judge and defendant filed answer in which it admitted the contract of storage and that the goods had been destroyed by fire in its warehouse, and in which it alleged that plaintiff had applied for and received insurance on the said goods in the sum of $500, and in applying for the said insurance had valued the said goods at $500 and had been paid that amount by the insurer.

Defendant also denied the allegations as to the value of the goods and denied that it was in any way or to any extent liable to plaintiff.

After a trial below there was judgment in favor of plaintiff for $1,265.90 subject to a credit of $500, representing the amount paid by the insurer to the plaintiff. Defendant has appealed.

Plaintiff has not answered the appeal nor appealed independently from that part of the judgment which reduces the amount of the award to the extent of the $500 insurance money received by the plaintiff from his insurer.

The facts except as to the value of the goods and as to the dilapidated condition of the warehouse in which the fire occurred, are not in dispute.

It clearly appears that the contract provided for the storage of the goods in the warehouse on Decatur Street and not in the warehouse on Chartres Street. And it also appears that plaintiff had no knowledge of the fact that his goods had not been stored in the warehouse designated in the contract and therefore cannot be said to have acquiesced in defendant's substitution of the other warehouse for the one designated.

It follows from this that regardless of the cause of the fire and irrespective of whether the goods were as safe in the one warehouse as they would have been in the other, defendant, in putting the goods in a place other than that designated in the contract did so entirely at its own risk and, unless it is saved by its plea of estoppel, made itself liable for such loss as resulted to plaintiff from the destruction of his goods. In Williams v. Gallagher Transfer & Storage Co Ltd., 170 La. 461, 128 So. 277, 278, the Supreme Court considered the legal effect of such an act by a warehouseman and said: '* * * The law in such cases is that 'the warehouseman must comply with the contract of storage. If he has contracted to store goods in a specified warehouse, or in a particular place, and stores them in a different place, it is at his own risk, and he is liable for any injury...