Gray v. State
| Decision Date | 08 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1812-2019 |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
| Parties | KEON GRAY v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 118250007
Graeff, Beachley, Eyler, James R. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
On July 5, 2018, appellant Keon Gray fired a gun into a vehicle occupied by Darnell Holmes, her boyfriend Malik Edison, her daughter D.R.[1], and her goddaughter, seven-year-old Taylor Hayes. Tragically, one of the bullets fatally wounded Taylor. Consequently, the State charged appellant with numerous crimes including: first and second-degree murder of Taylor Hayes, and attempted first and second-degree murder and first and second-degree assault of Darnell Holmes, Malik Edison, and D.R. The State also charged appellant with use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence and unlawful possession of a firearm.
Following a trial that spanned over two weeks, a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted appellant of the second-degree murder of Taylor Hayes, but acquitted him of the attempted murders of Darnell Holmes, Malik Edison, and D.R. The jury did, however, convict appellant of the first-degree assault of Darnell Holmes and Malik Edison. Following an unsuccessful motion for a new trial, the court sentenced appellant to an executed sentence of 75 years.[2] Appellant timely appealed and presents the following five issues for our review:
As we shall explain, we answer all of these questions in the negative, and affirm.[3] Finally, we shall grant the State's request for a limited remand to allow the court to correct an illegal sentence.
On July 5, 2018, Darnell Holmes was driving her Honda Accord on Edmondson Avenue in Baltimore City, Maryland. Also in the vehicle were her boyfriend, Malik Edison, her daughter, D.R and her goddaughter Taylor Hayes. Mr. Edison sat in the front passenger seat, with D.R. directly behind him, and Taylor in the rear-middle seat. As Ms. Holmes neared the Edmondson Village Shopping Center, she noticed a white Mercedes and a black BMW recklessly weaving through traffic. At the intersection of Edmondson and Athol Avenues, the Mercedes maneuvered around Ms. Holmes's Honda, and in doing so, nearly caused a collision. Because of this near-collision, Ms. Holmes beeped her horn at the Mercedes.
Due to traffic congestion stemming from an accident ahead, Ms. Holmes eventually caught up with the Mercedes. As the Mercedes pulled up to the left of Ms. Holmes's Honda, the driver lowered his window, and Ms. Holmes immediately recognized the driver as appellant. Ms. Holmes responded by lowering her window and telling appellant that he had nearly struck her vehicle, and that there were children in her car. When appellant asked Ms. Holmes what she meant by her statement, Ms. Holmes expressed confusion, but told appellant that he was "about to cause a whole accident."
Appellant then pulled the Mercedes in front of Ms. Holmes's vehicle and exited, and the driver of the black BMW did the same. Ms. Holmes followed suit by exiting her vehicle, and went to speak with appellant and his friend. The three then exchanged words, but in Ms. Holmes's view, the discussion did not rise to the level of an argument or major disagreement. Other witnesses on the scene, however, perceived the interaction to be a "heated exchange." Ultimately, the encounter ended with appellant's friend telling him that the situation "wasn't that serious." The three participants then returned to their respective vehicles.
Upon entering their vehicles, appellant and his friend proceeded to turn onto Lyndhurst Street, but stopped and pulled over. Ms. Holmes, who happened to be going in that direction, then pulled onto Lyndhurst Street and as she did so, she noticed that appellant was "bent over in the backseat." As Ms. Holmes drove past appellant, she heard what sounded like a gunshot. Looking into her car's side mirror camera, Ms. Holmes saw appellant standing in the middle of the street shooting at her car. Ms. Holmes then realized that her daughter was screaming Taylor's name because Taylor had been shot.[4] Taylor suffered a single gunshot wound to her back which struck her spinal column, aorta, esophagus, diaphragm, and liver. Sadly, Taylor eventually passed away due to complications arising from this injury. We shall provide additional facts as necessary to resolve the issues on appeal.
Appellant first argues that the circuit court erred by allowing a "surrogate" DNA expert to testify at his trial in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. In order to fully understand appellant's argument, additional background information is necessary.
Shortly after the shooting, a white Mercedes later determined to be owned by a woman named Daneka McDonald was involved in an accident a few miles away.
Ultimately, police connected appellant to Ms. McDonald's vehicle based on cellular records, and from DNA analysis of a swab taken from one of the airbags that had deployed as a result of the accident. In doing so, police found that a match between appellant and the "inferred genotype" of that sample was "158 million times more probable than a coincidental match to an unrelated individual in the African-American population[.]"[5]
At appellant's trial, the State intended to call as a witness the analyst who authored the report matching appellant's inferred genotype to the samples from the white Mercedes, but that analyst purportedly went into labor a month early, and gave birth on the third day of trial. Although the State apparently made some efforts to bring the analyst to court to testify, the analyst's supervisor "adamantly said that's not a possibility." The State then sought to introduce the testimony of the analyst's technical reviewer, Virginia Sladko.
Appellant challenged the admissibility of Ms. Sladko's testimony by arguing that it would violate his rights pursuant to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Appellant argued that, because Ms. Sladko did not perform any independent DNA analysis, allowing her to testify would violate his right to confront the actual author of the report. Although the State conceded that the report itself was not admissible, the court ultimately permitted Ms. Sladko to testify as to the contents of the report based on her "independent review of the raw data."
On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing Ms. Sladko to testify. He first argues that the State failed to make a good-faith effort to summon the actual analyst who authored the report. Next, appellant argues that under State v. Norton, 443 Md. 517 (2015), Ms. Sladko should not have been permitted to testify. Finally, appellant claims that State v. Miller, 475 Md. 263 (2021)[6] is distinguishable from the instant case.
As we shall explain, this case is on all fours with Miller, and pursuant to Miller, whether the State failed to make a good-faith effort to bring in the original analyst is of no consequence where the testifying witness is a technical reviewer who, after substantial contributions to the production of the report, conveys her own independent opinions at trial. This is so because Miller stands for the proposition that in such circumstances, the technical reviewer becomes the functional equivalent of a second author of the report.
In Miller, an unidentified assailant sexually assaulted a victim in 2008. Id. at 265. Although forensic scientists generated a DNA profile for the assailant, the case eventually went cold. Id. Nine years later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS") produced a match for the assailant-Miller. Id. At Miller's trial for the 2008 sexual assault, the State produced several witnesses involved with the forensic evidence, but did not call Thomas Hebert, the former analyst for the Baltimore Police Department who analyzed the DNA evidence and was the primary author of two reports. Id. at 266. The first report was a 2008 report indicating that the DNA of "unknown male #1" was identified from various pieces of evidence collected pursuant to the investigation of the 2008 sexual assault. Id. The second report was a 2017 report naming Miller as the source of that DNA. Id.
By the time of Miller's trial, Mr. Hebert had relocated to Georgia. Id. The State therefore sought to introduce the testimony of Kimberly Morrow, the technical reviewer of the 2017 report.[7] Id. Miller challenged the admissibility of Ms. Morrow's testimony by arguing that it would constitute hearsay and violate his constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. The trial court disagreed and allowed Ms. Morrow to testify. Id.
On appeal, the Court...
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