Gray v. State

• Decision Date: 05 May 1969
• Docket Number: No. 190,190
• Citation: 253 A.2d 395,6 Md.App. 677
• Parties: Thomas Edward GRAY v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 677

6 Md.App. 677

253 A.2d 395

Thomas Edward GRAY v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 190.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

May 5, 1969.

Edward P. Camus, Riverdale, with whom was on brief: Regis A. Johnston, Riverdale, for appellant.

John J. Garrity, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, with whom were on brief: Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., State's Atty. for Prince George's County, and James E. Kenkel, Deputy State's Atty. for Prince George's County, Upper Marlboro, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH, and THOMPSON, JJ.

MORTON, Judge.

The appellant was separately indicted for the murder of his father, Thomas Isiah Gray, and his aunt, Marie Johnson.The cases were consolidated for trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County; the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter in each case; and five year concurrent sentences were imposed.

The appellant was sixteen years old at the time the fatal shootings occurred as an aftermath of a fight involving the appellant's mother and father as well as the mother's sister who was allegedly having an extra-marital affair with the father.The evidence indicates that the father, who worked at night, returned home on Saturday morning, November 4, 1967, at approximately 9:30 a. m. Following their customary practice on Saturdays, the father, mother, fourteen-year-old daughter, their son the appellant, and a young nephew drove to Upper Marlboro to obtain groceries.En route they picked up Marie Johnson at her home, stopped to purchase alcoholic beverages, and proceeded to the grocery store.In the course of the journey the women drank rum and coca-cola while the father sipped from a half pint of scotch whiskey.

As they were returning home, an argument ensued over certain love letters from Marie Johnson to the appellant's father which his mother had discovered a week before.During that week, the mother had almost daily upbraided the father about his affair with Marie Johnson and on each occasion he responded by beating her up.Most of these altercations were witnessed by the appellant.The argument in the car on Saturday morning ended several miles from their home when the mother'accidentally' burned the father with a cigarette, whereupon he ordered her out of the car to walk home.Marie Johnson also alighted and began walking with the mother while the father and the children proceeded in the automobile.The two women were given a lift home by the father's sister who chanced by in her car.On the way, more drinks were consumed by the mother and Marie Johnson.

As they drove into the yard the father told the fourteen-year-old daughter, in the presence of the appellant, to tell the mother'not to come into the house or else he was going to kill her.'The mother disregarded the admonition and came into the home, whereupon the father seized a large wrench, hit his wife on the side of the head and kicked her in the stomach.She was fighting him back with a smaller wrench.At this point the father's sister seized him, and the appellant seized his mother, forcibly separating them.The mother then went outside and proceeded to attack Marie Johnson who was still sitting in the car, whereupon Mrs. Johnson got out of the car, seized a piece of two inch by four inch lumber and started flailing the mother.In the meantime, the father had proceeded to get his shotgun and shells, announced he was going to kill the mother but was forcibly disarmed by his sister who wrestled the gun from him.The father then went outside and when he saw the mother and Marie Johnson fighting on the ground with the mother on top, he pulled her off and placed Marie Johnson on top and then went over and stood beside his sister.

At this point, according to the fourteen-year-old daughter, she saw her brother go into his room and return with a shotgun.'I asked him what he was going to do.'He just said he is tired.But he said more than that.He said he was tired of this-he said he was tired of this mf-I am using initials-mf-s-h-i-t.'The appellant then proceeded to shoot the father in the head from a distance of approximately twenty feet, resulting in his immediate death.According to the testimony of the father's sister, just prior to being shot, the father was doing 'nothing but standing up * * * beside of me * * *.'The appellant then proceeded to reload the single shotgun and shoot Marie Johnson who died some hours later.The father's sister also testified with regard to Mrs. Johnson, who had been fighting with the appellant's mother just previously, that 'when she went for to get up off, raise up off the ground, I saw the defendant when he shot her.'Immediately thereafter, according to the witness, the appellant said: "I'm tired of it.I'm going to break it up, break up this fighting.I'm tired of it.I'm sick of it.'And he whirled the gun around at us who were standing in the yard * * * pointed the gun at us * * * (and)he said, 'Any of you all want it?"After ordering the sister's fifteen-year-old son out of her car at gunpoint, the appellant entered her car and drove away from the premises.The appellant was apprehended an hour and a half later about two miles from his home, apparently en route back to the house.

The appellant's mother testified that her husband had been drinking about a pint of whiskey per day the week preceding his death; that he and the appellant had a very close relationship; that her son was in the tenth grade of public school; and was a 'good boy' who had never been in trouble before.She testified that at the time of the shooting, she had held up her hand to her son and said: 'No.'

The appellant testified that he was lying on his bed when he'heard my mother hollering so I rushed outside, and there was mom and my father was beating her.* * * After I saw this, I figured after what he said when he first came in, I thought he was trying to carry it out, so I just ran in and got my gun and came out and just shot to stop them from killing my mother or doing any harm to her.'He remembered shooting his father bur asserted that he'blanked out' and remembers nothing until he was apprehended.He testified that he was aware that his father had earlier in his life killed two men on separate occasions and had rammed another man with an automobile although he was not convicted of any charges in connection with these occurrences.He stated that he was devoted to his father and that 'instead of being father and son we were like two twin brothers.'

I

The appellant first contends that because of his age, the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to try him on manslaughter charges, since there was no waiver by the juvenile court and, therefore, the verdicts of manslaughter were a nullity.He points out that the juvenile court is given original, exclusive jurisdiction concerning a delinquent child by Md. Code, Art. 26, § 53, and that a 'delinquent child' is defined in § 52 as a person under the age of eighteen years, 'who violates any law or ordinance, or who commits any act which, it committed by an adult, would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment * * *.'While the appellant concedes that the Circuit Court has exclusive jurisdiction when a delinquent child is indicted for first degree murder, since the crime is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he argues that such court has no jurisdiction over a juvenile delinquent charged with second degree murder or manslaughter, absent a waiver, as here, since such crimes are not punishable by death or life imprisonment.

On the surface the appellant's argument appears logical, persuasive, and it would appear to be supported by cases in Louisiana and New York cited in his brief.SeeState v. Bedford, 193 La. 104, 190 So. 347;State v. West, 173 La. 974, 139 So. 304;People v. Murch, 263 N.Y. 285, 189 N.E. 220.See also, Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 156 N.E.2d 649.We are of the opinion, however, that the proposition advanced by the appellant(and the rationale of the decisions he relies upon) overlooks the fundamental principle of law that once a court lawfully acquires jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the litigation, subsequent events will not ordinarily deprive the court of its jurisdiction, although had they existed at the time, they may have initially precluded the court's jurisdiction.The rule was well articulated in Collins v. Robbins, 147 Me. 163, 84 A.2d 536, at p. 538, where it was stated:

'It has long been accepted as a well known principle of law that 'the jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of affairs existing at the time it is invoked and if the jurisdiction once attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, though they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not operate to oust the jurisdiction already attached.* * * 12 Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice, page 171.'

In that case a child under the age of seventeen years was indicted for murder and permitted to plead guilty to the lesser included offense of manslaughter.The question presented was whether the lower court had jurisdiction to impose sentence on a guilty plea of manslaughter in view of a statute which conferred upon juvenile courts'exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses, except for a crime the punishment for which may be imprisonment for life * * * committed by children under the age of seventeen years * * *.'It was held that since the lower court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the child by virtue of the charge of murder it did not lose jurisdiction by accepting a plea to manslaughter even though initially it would not have had jurisdiction over the lesser offense of manslaughter.

In Howland v. State, 151 Tenn. 47, 268 S.W. 115, it was held that notwithstanding a statute conferring jurisdiction up...