Gray v. State
Decision Date | 13 September 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 1945,1945 |
Parties | Julian GRAY v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Flynn M. Owens (Jack B. Rubin, on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellant.
Mary Ann Ince (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.
Panel: KENNEY, CHARLES E. MOYLAN, Jr. (Ret'd, specially assigned), ANDREW L. SONNER,1 (Ret'd, specially assigned), JJ.
Julian Gray appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, denying a petition to reopen a previously concluded postconviction proceeding because reopening the proceeding was "not in the interests of justice." In this appeal, appellant asks the following question:
Was denial of the petition to reopen [the] postconviction proceeding, unadorned by any supporting statement or memorandum as to the issues upon which the petition was based, erroneous, in that it served to render meaningful appellate review impossible?
Answering "no," we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
On April 17, 1991, a jury convicted appellant of the second degree murder of Randy Hudson. He was sentenced to thirty years for the murder conviction plus five years consecutive for the felonious use of a handgun. On direct appeal, he challenged the convictions on two grounds. First, he argued that the trial court violated his right to confrontation and cross-examination by erroneously allowing hearsay evidence. Second, he contended that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to argue about the lack of fingerprint evidence with respect to the spent handgun cartridges. We affirmed appellant's convictions in an unreported per curiam opinion, Gray v. State of Maryland, No. 1006, September Term, 1991, 91 Md.App. 841 (filed April 20, 1992).
In 1999, appellant collaterally attacked his convictions under the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act ("UPPA"), as codified at the time at Maryland Code , Art. 27, §§ 645A-J.2 In his postconviction petition, appellant argued that he was entitled to a new trial because of the ineffective assistance of counsel. He contended that trial counsel had failed to (1) investigate affirmative defenses; (2) effectively cross-examine Erika McCray, a witness for the prosecution; (3) object to inadmissible evidence; and (4) present mitigating evidence at sentencing.
At the postconviction hearing, appellant abandoned all but the first allegation, which concerned the trial testimony of McCray, who had implicated appellant in the murder. McCray testified that she and three friends had been at Peggy Riddick's house on the day that Hudson was shot. As they prepared to leave Riddick's house in the early evening, McCray said she was standing "right at the doorway" and saw "a bunch of guys running through the alley." Because she "thought they were stickup boys," McCray and her friends went back inside Riddick's house. After one or two minutes, they emerged again and McCray observed both appellant and the victim standing on a nearby ramp leading to a laundry room in an adjacent building, "having words." She heard five or more gunshots, observed "the [victim] falling down" and appellant "going [in] another direction." At that time, McCray said she was standing "on the porch at [Riddick's] house."
Appellant contended that trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate whether McCray could have observed the murder from her location on Riddick's front porch. Appellant explained that a wall of an adjacent building obstructed the view of the laundry room ramp from Riddick's front porch. He argued that McCray could have observed the murder only if she was standing on the steps leading down from the porch and not from the "doorway" of the house.
Four witnesses, including appellant, testified at the postconviction hearing. Appellant and Jackie Gray, appellant's sister, testified that they had informed trial counsel that McCray could not have observed the murder from the front porch. Riddick, who had not testified at the trial, stated that she had been prepared to testify that McCray could not have observed the murder from the doorway of the house. John Denholm, appellant's trial counsel, testified that he had not been informed of additional witnesses and could not recall whether he had visited the crime scene.
The circuit court denied appellant's request for postconviction relief in a "Statement of Reasons and Order of Court," which provided the following relevant information:
Appellant filed an application for leave to appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, which we denied in an unreported per curiam opinion, Gray v. State of Maryland, No. 365, September Term, 2000 (filed April 2, 2001). On August 21, 2003, appellant filed a petition to reopen the postconviction proceeding pursuant to Md.Code (2001), § 7-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP"), asserting his innocence and arguing that his postconviction counsel had rendered ineffective assistance.3 In support, appellant relied upon affidavits that an investigator had procured from McCray and Riddick on May 9, 2003.
In her affidavit, McCray recanted her trial testimony, averring that she had lied about witnessing the murder. She stated that her testimony was based upon information that she had learned from Shauna Hantz, one of the friends who was present with McCray on the evening of the murder, and who is now deceased. Riddick averred:
I lived at 1823 Ruxton Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland at the time of this incident. Erika McCray, Shauna Hantz, and Tina were inside my house at the time when we heard gunshots going off outside. There is no way that Erika McCray could have seen who did the shooting as she was inside my house at the time.
With respect to the first allegation, appellant argued that reopening was necessary to remedy the violation of his due process rights that resulted "in the injustice of the conviction of an innocent person." He contended that "no reasonable juror, knowing that McCray perjured herself, would have voted to convict" him. Moreover, appellant could not have raised the issue of "McCray's epiphany" at the prior postconviction hearing because McCray had not "repudiated her trial testimony."
Regarding the second allegation, appellant argued that his postconviction counsel's questioning of Riddick was inadequate because he did not ask Riddick where McCray was standing when the murder occurred. According to appellant, if the correct questions had been asked, the information that Riddick provided in her affidavit, i.e., that McCray was not outside when the murder occurred, would have been elicited during the postconviction hearing.
The State responded that the petition to reopen should be denied for two reasons. First, relying on Diggs v. Warden, 221 Md. 624, 157 A.2d 453 (1960), and Gordon v. Superintendent, Maryland Correctional Institution, 2 Md.App. 355, 234 A.2d 486 (1967), the State argued that newly discovered evidence, i.e., McCray's recanted testimony, was not a basis upon which to grant postconviction relief. Second, it asserted that the performance of appellant's postconviction counsel was not deficient and did not prejudice appellant.
The circuit court denied the petition in an order reading:
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