Gray v. University of Tennessee

• Decision Date: 20 April 1951
• Docket Number: No. 1567.,1567.
• Citation: 97 F. Supp. 463
• Parties: GRAY et al. v. UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

97 F. Supp. 463

GRAY et al. v. UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE et al.

No. 1567.

United States District Court, E. D. Tennessee, N. D.

April 20, 1951.

Carl A. Cowan, Avon N. Williams, Jr., Knoxville, Tenn., Z. Alexander Looby, Nashville, Tenn., Thurgood Marshall, New York City, for plaintiffs.

John J. Hooker, K. Harlan Dodson, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., for defendants.

ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge.

This case was heard by a three-judge court on the record, briefs and argument of counsel for the respective parties on plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in their favor under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.

In an opinion by Circuit Judge Miller, in which Chief District Judge Darr and District Judge Taylor of the Eastern District of Tennessee, concurred, the Court held that the issue involved is alleged unjust discrimination against the plaintiffs under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and not the constitutionality of the Tennessee statutes and constitutional provisions referred to in the complaint. Following this opinion and the order entered pursuant thereto, Judge Miller and Judge Darr withdrew from the case, which is now before this Court for decision on the motion.

Plaintiffs Gray and Alexander have applied for admission to the Graduate School and plaintiffs Blakeney and Patterson have applied for admission to the College of Law, of the University of Tennessee. All admittedly are qualified for admission, except for the fact that they are Negroes.

The matter of their applications was referred by University authorities to the Board of Trustees, who disposed of the matter by the following resolution:

"Whereas, the Constitution and the statutes of the State of Tennessee expressly provide that there shall be segregation in the education of the races in schools and colleges in the State and that a violation of the laws of the State in this regard subjects the violator to prosecution, conviction, and punishment as therein provided; and,

"Whereas, this Board is bound by the Constitutional provision and acts referred to;

"Be it therefore resolved, that the applications by members of the Negro race for admission as students into The University of Tennessee be and the same are hereby denied."

Following the indicated action by the Board of Trustees, plaintiffs filed their joint complaint for themselves and on behalf of all Negro citizens similarly situated, praying for a temporary and, after hearing, a permanent order restraining the defendants from executing the exclusion order of the Board of Trustees against the plaintiffs, or other Negroes similarly situated, and from all action pursuant to the constitution and statutes of the State of Tennessee, and the custom or usage of the defendants, respecting the requirement of segregation of whites and Negroes in state-supported educational institutions and exclusion of Negroes from the University of Tennessee, their references being to Article 11, sec. 12, of the state constitution, to sections 2403.1, 2403.3, 11395, 11396, and 11397 of the Tennessee Code, and the custom and usage of defendants of excluding Negroes from all colleges, schools, departments, and divisions of the University of Tennessee, including the Graduate School and the College of Law.

Defenses interposed are nine in number, but in substance they are these: That defendants, in rejecting the applications of the plaintiffs, were and are obeying the mandates of the segregation provisions of the constitution and laws of the State of Tennessee; that those provisions are in exercise of the police powers reserved to the states and are valid, the Fourteenth Amendment and laws enacted thereunder to the contrary notwithstanding, and that these plaintiffs have no standing to bring this action for the reason that they have not exhausted their administrative remedies under the equivalent facilities act of 1941, Code section 2403.3. The plaintiffs, after alleging in their complaint that the University of Tennessee maintains a Graduate School and a College of Law which offer to white students the courses sought by plaintiffs, make the following specific allegation, which defendants, for failure to deny, admit: "There is no other institution maintained or operated by the State of Tennessee at which plaintiffs might obtain the graduate and/or legal education for which they respectively have applied to The University of Tennessee."

It is, of course, recognized that the Constitution of the United States is one of enumerated and delegated powers. To remove original doubt as to the character of federal powers, the states adopted the Tenth Amendment, which provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The Constitution contains no specific delegation of police powers, and those powers are accordingly reserved. But a glance discloses that, in relation to the Tenth Amendment, the Constitution contains two groups of powers, namely, the previously-delegated powers and the subsequently-delegated powers. By adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, following adoption of the Tenth Amendment, the states consented to limitations upon their reserved powers, particularly in the following respects: "* * * No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. * * *"

It is recognized that "The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83, 69 S.Ct. 448, 451, 93 L.Ed. 513. (Italics supplied). States "have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law." Whitaker v. State of North Carolina, 335 U.S. 525, 536, 69 S.Ct. 251, 257, 93 L.Ed. 212. (Italics supplied). In the foregoing quotations, the italicized portions point up the limitation upon the exercise of a state's police powers.

Segregation by law may, in a given situation, be a valid exercise of the state's police powers. It has been so recognized with respect to schools. Gong Lum et al. v. Rice et al., 275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91, 72 L.Ed. 172. Also, as to segregation on intrastate trains. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256. But where enforcement by the state of a law ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying members of a particular race or nationality equal rights as to property or the equal protection of the laws, the state action has been condemned. This was the result where state law discriminated against aliens as to the privilege of employment. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131. The same result was reached as to enforcement of restrictive covenants in deeds, Shelley et ux. v. Kraemer et ux., 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161; in the housing segregation cases, City of Richmond v. Deans, 4 Cir., 37 F.2d 712, affirmed 281 U.S. 704, 50 S.Ct. 407, 74 L.Ed. 1128; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149: and in the cases where segregation has resulted in inequality of educational opportunities for Negroes, Sweatt v. Painter et al., 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848, 94 L.Ed. 1114; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851, 94 L.Ed. 1149. From these cases it appears to be well settled that exercise of the state's police powers ceases to be valid when it violates the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defense on this ground, therefore, fails.

The second question is whether the plaintiffs have present standing to bring this action. To understand the defense interposed here, it is desirable to look at the historical background of the act of 1941, of which the Court takes judicial notice.

On October 18, 1939, six Negroes applied for admission to the University of Tennessee, four to the Graduate Department and two to the College of Law. Being denied admission, they filed their separate petitions for mandamus in the Chancery Court of Knox County, Tennessee, to require their admission. Following denial of the petitions in a consolidated proceeding, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, where the action of the Chancellor was affirmed by opinion filed ...