Gray v. Wood. Gray
| Decision Date | 25 February 1949 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 8963-8965.,s. 8963-8965. |
| Citation | 64 A.2d 191 |
| Parties | GRAY v. WOOD. GRAY v. HANLEY et al. GRAY v. HANLEY. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Charles A. Walsh, Judge.
Separate actions of trespass on the case for negligence by Pauline M. Gray against Howard D. Wood, against James L. Hanley and another, and against James L. Hanley, for personal injuries. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer, plaintiff brings exceptions.
Exceptions overruled and case remanded for further proceeding.
Charles H. Eden, of Providence, for plaintiff.
William E. McCabe, City Sol., and James J. Corrigan, Asst. City Sol., both of Providence, for defendants.
These actions of trespass on the case for negligence against the principal of the Hope High School and the superintendent of public schools of the city of Providence, individually, and also against them jointly, are here on plaintiff's exception in each case to the ruling of the superior court sustaining a demurrer to the declaration.
We shall hereinafter discuss the question of law posed by the demurrer as though only plaintiff's action against Wood, the principal of the high school, was here but our conclusions will apply equally to the case against the superintendent of schools and also to the case against both of them jointly. The allegations of duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant and the breach thereof are substantially the same in each declaration and are set forth in four counts. There is a slight variation in the averment of negligence in each count but those variances are of no consequence in considering the objections raised by the demurrer. For our purpose, therefore, in determining the issue presented by plaintiff's exception in each case the four counts will be deemed substantially the same and so will each declaration.
The superior court sustained the demurrer on the grounds that the counts in the declaration are too vague, indefinite and uncertain to constitute a cause of action; that they do not set forth any legal duty owed by defendant to the plaintiff, or the violation of any legal duty by the defendant; and that they set forth no neglect or wrong done by defendant. The gist of the declaration is that plaintiff, a teacher in the Hope High School, received an injury by reason of falling on the hard, smooth surface of a floor in the corridor of the school which had been washed and left wet and slippery and in a dangerous condition to walk upon; and that not knowing such condition and not being warned thereof by defendant, his servants or agents, plaintiff walked from a classroom into the corridor and, through no fault of her own, slipped and fell upon the wet floor. The declaration alleges that it was the defendant's duty as principal in immediate charge of said school and in authority over the janitors thereof to see that such floor was not left in a wet and dangerous condition, and that he, his servants and agents, knew or, in the exercise of due care, ought to have known of such dangerous condition and to have warned persons lawfully walking in the corridor, or otherwise should have protected them from being thereby injured.
There is no averment in the declaration that the defendant personally caused the alleged dangerous condition of the floor or that he was present and commanded or participated with some other person under his charge and supervision in washing the floor negligently and thereafter leaving it in such a condition that it was rendered dangerous to walk upon. The most that may reasonably be inferred from the allegations in any of the four counts, consistently with the rules of pleading requiring clearness and certainty, is that a subordinate employee of the school department negligently washed the floor and left it in a dangerous condition and that such employee was subject to the control and authority of the defendant. It cannot be inferred from any of the allegations that defendant was charged with an act of personal misfeasance or that he commanded to be done or ratified an act of misfeasance of a subordinate. The farthest we may go in interpreting the declaration in the plaintiff's favor is that defendant is therein charged by inference with an act of non-feasance in not seeing to it that the floor of the corridor was left in a safe condition to walk upon after it had been washed.
Even when thus viewed most favorably to the plaintiff the declaration, in our opinion, fails to aver a legal duty owing by the defendant to the plaintiff and to set out a legal cause of action against the defendant. It is apparent from the declaration that there is no relation here of master and servant or of principal and agent between defendant and the person who allegedly washed the floor and negligently rendered it unsafe and dangerous. Such a relation being absent the plaintiff may not rely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior and claim that the act of the servant is the act of the master.
The authority of the defendant, as principal of the school, over the persons employed therein did not cause the relation of master and servant to arise between them and the defendant. The relation of master and servant does not exist between public officers and their subordinates, and hence it is uniformly held ‘that public officers are not liable for the negligence of their subordinates unless they cooperate in the act complained of, or direct or encourage it. * * *’ Dowler v. Johnson, 225 N.Y. 39, 121 N.E. 487, 3 A.L.R. 146. In New York in an earlier case than the one cited certain school trustees were exonerated from liability for the negligence of workmen whom they had hired to make repairs in a school yard. Donovan v. McAlpin, 85 N.Y. 185, 39 Am.Rep. 649.
There can be no question that those charged with the supervision, direction and control of public education in Rhode Island are public officers or officials exercising a governmental function. Wixon v. City of Newport, 13 R.I. 454, 43 Am.Rep. 35. In the case at bar plaintiff charges defendant with negligence in the manner in which he has discharged the governmental function entrusted to him of managing and controlling the school and its employees. But, as was said in Dowler v. Johnson, supra, he can be so charged and held liable therefor only if he actively participated in the alleged act of negligence or approved it, and such act resulted in an injury to the plaintiff specially and...
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